This page has two main parts, plus "more" and an appendix:
• Do scientists create reality? —
We'll begin by quickly looking at the silly ideas that are proposed
by some scholars, and
are criticized by other
scholars. This
will set a mood
for THE MAIN PART OF THE PAGE and its Essential Concepts:
• Reality 101 — Essential
Concepts
plus more about Reality 101 — Personal
Comments
Appendix: The Limits of Logic,
and Radical Relativism
Do scientists create reality?
Do scientists study nature, or create nature? Somewhat amazingly,
- Woolgar (1989) argues that scientists construct objects
through their representations of them. Objects, according to Woolgar,
whether they are countries or electrons, are socially constructed entities,
and do not exist aside from this social construction. Science is
therefore not the process of finding things that already exist, but the
process of creating things that were not there to begin with. (Finkel,
1993, p. 32)
This bizarre idea survived for at least 10 years in the mind of Woolgar,
because Latour & Woolgar
(1979, p. 64) claim that
"The
bioassay is not merely a means of obtaining some independently given entity;
the bioassay constitutes the construction of the substance." This
radical constructivism — which
is also illustrated when Wheatley (1991, p. 10) declares that
"objects
do not lie around ready made in the world but are mental constructs" — is
criticized by Matthews (1994, p. 152) who explains a crucial distinction:
"Where
he [Wheatley] goes wrong is in failing to distinguish the theoretical objects
of science, which do not lie around, from the real objects of science, which
do lie around and fall on people's heads."
A description of the way scientists typically think about the observation
of real objects (no, it is not necessary to "create the reality" of
the objects) is provided by a real scientist, a cell biologist:
- First, I assume that cells are real objects. Second,
I assume that other people can see and think about things the way that
I do. ... Others' basic experience of reality is similar to mine. If
they were standing where I am standing, they would see something very similar
to what I see. ... Scientists act as if...the observations made by
one scientist could have been made by anyone and everyone. (Grinnell,
1992, p. 20; emphasis in original)
A prominent philosopher gives another excellent description of
truth and
its relationship with
reality:
- Whether a statement is true is an entirely different
question from whether you or anybody believes it. ... There can be
truths that no one believes. Symmetrically, there can be beliefs
that are not true. ... The expression "It's true for me" can
be dangerously misleading. Sometimes saying this... means that you
believe it. If that's what you want to say, just use the word "belief" and
leave truth out of it. However, there is a more radical idea that
might be involved here. Someone might use the expression "true
for me" to express the idea that each of us makes our own reality
and that our beliefs constitute that reality. I will assume that
this is a mistake. My concept of truth assumes a fundamental division
between the way things really are and the way they seem to be to this or
that individual mind. (Sober, 1991, pp. 15-16)
Next, Sober illustrates what he considers to be a valid meaning for "thoughts
becoming reality" by describing how a person's thoughts
(if he thinks that he won't hit a baseball) can affect his actions (he swings
too high), thus causing a result (he doesn't hit the baseball). By contrast,
- What I do deny is that the mere act of thinking,
unconnected with action or some other causal pathway, can make statements
true. I'm rejecting the idea that the world is arranged so that it
spontaneously conforms to the ideas we may happen to entertain. (Sober,
1991, p. 16)
These quotations, from a scientist and a philosopher, summarize the most important
concepts of Reality 101 — in the distinction between humanly-constructed realities (our beliefs, scientific theories, baseball actions, plus cultures & values,...) and human-independent realities (electrons, bioassays, objects, or planets,...) so I'll just close this section with an
example from science: Anyone who really thinks
that "beliefs create
reality" should be eager to explain how the real motions of all planets
in the solar system changed from earth-centered orbits in 1500 (when this was
believed by almost everyone) to sun-centered orbits in 1700 (when this was
believed by almost all scientists). Did the change in beliefs (from
theories of 1500 to theories of 1700) cause a change in reality (with
planets beginning to orbit the sun at some time - but exactly when did this occur - between 1500 and 1700) ?
This section — Do scientists create reality? — is adapted from Section 4C of a page asking "Should
scientific method be eks-rated?"
REFERENCES
Reality 101 — Essential Concepts
Introduction
Reality 101 is an appropriate
title because:
First,
I'll examine
only the basic concepts of reality, focusing
on ideas that are simple and logical, and should not be controversial.
Second,
I'll look at
only the easy questions, those
that can be logically understood using the "minds" part of our "hearts
and minds." The
difficult questions — which mainly involve our hearts (and values) — are
delayed until later, in a brief introduction to
Reality
909.
Reality — Truth
and Truth-Claims
What is truth? With a
correspondence
definition of truth, the
truth is
what actually
is happening in reality,
or what actually
did happen in reality.
A humanly constructed
theory claims
to describe and/or explain reality. When we make claims based on a theory
(by assuming the theory is true, and using "if... then..." logic by
thinking "if this theory is true, then ___") we are making
truth-claims about
the reality of what is happening now, or did happen in the past. Our truth-claims
are
true if if they are
correct, if
they correspond to the truth of what actually is happening (or did happen) in
reality; and our truth-claims are
false if
they are
wrong, if they do not match the truth defined
by reality.
other terms: The meaning
of what I'm calling a "theory" and theory-based "truth claim" is
wide enough to include what is sometimes called a belief, or belief system,
worldview, paradigm, principle, conviction, hypothesis, conjecture, speculation,
opinion, fact, certainty, conclusion, assumption, premise, idea, concept,...
The Solar System Question
To
illustrate important ideas about truth and
truth-claims,
let's
begin with a famous example: Between
1500 (when almost everyone believed that the sun and planets revolved
around the earth) and 1700 (when almost every educated person believed
that the earth and planets revolved around the sun), what changed and
what did not change?
Did the reality change? Did
the motions of planets change from earth-centered (in 1500) to sun-centered
(in 1700)? No.
Did the truth change? No. Because
truth is determined by reality, what was true in 1500 (the earth and
planets really moved around the sun) was also true in 1700.
Did our truth-claims change? Yes. Our
humanly constructed beliefs about the motions were different in 1500 and
1700. Thus, there were changes in the realities of humanly-constructed
science, philosophy, religion, and culture, as explained below.
Two
Types of Reality
During
the 200 years between 1500 and 1700, some aspects of reality did change. For
example, in 1500 scientists said "of course" when a scholar stated that
everything revolves around the earth, but in 1700 they laughed at a scholar
making the same
statement. This
change in response, from acceptance to ridicule, was due to a real change
in a humanly constructed theory, which produced a real change in a humanly
constructed social context. By contrast, another aspect of reality
(involving the motions of earth, sun, and planets) was not humanly constructed. This "solar
system reality" was independent of humans, and it did not change
when we changed. There is an important difference between humanly-constructed reality and human-independent reality.
A modern example of humanly constructed
reality is the societal agreement, adopted by consensus and institutionalized
in traffic laws, that we will stop at a red light, and that in America (and
in continental Europe but not Britain or Japan) we will drive on the right
side of the road.
But if there is a collision, due to
someone running a red light or driving on the wrong side or making some other
mistake, humans do not construct the laws of physics that determine what
happens during the collision. Yes, we can minimize the harmful results
of a collision by constructing cars with air bags, collapsible bumpers, and
other safety features. But we achieve this humanly-constructed reality (in which we have safer cars) by acknowledging and understanding a human-independent
reality (involving the physics of collisions). We can build safer cars
by cooperating with reality, by designing cars within the context of the
physics that really exists. But we cannot build safer cars by denying
this reality, by trying to overcome it through faith in a kinder-and-gentler
physics we have constructed; during a collison we would prefer this
physics, but we cannot produce it.
If we recognize the existence
of two types of reality — independent and constructed — our worldview
is less simple than if we ignore this distinction and lump everything together
into one category. But a view that "splits" instead of "lumping" will
see things in a way that is more accurate, and will avoid the confusions that
occur when we try to think about both types of reality in the same way.
Our thinking and communicating
should be different for the two types of reality. Some ideas about "beliefs
creating reality" are rational for humanly constructed realities (for
example, deciding whether to praise or ridicule a scholar, or deciding whether
to drive through an intersection or stop) but these ideas are ludicrous for independent
realities (such
as the motions in our solar system) in which reality is not affected by belief
or social agreement.
This distinction will also
help us understand the correct causal relationships. Yes, our thoughts
and actions do cause consequences when "what we think and do" is converted
into constructed reality. But for independent reality, our
believing that something is true does not cause it to be true. { We
can believe that an independent reality is true because it is true (if
the consequences of its existence-and-operation produce evidence that persuades
us of its existence-and-operation) but the correct sequence of causation
is "reality
--> evidence --> belief", not "belief --> reality". }
note: Some highly speculative
interpretations of quantum mechanics claim that human observation (or human
consciousness) can directly affect reality. But in a page about quantum
physics and reality I
use principles of quantum physics to explain why these "mystical
physics" claims are not supported by science and why, at the quantum level
and everyday level, human actions can affect some aspects of reality but
not other aspects.
This distinction is also helpful
when we ask, "Are scientific theories constructed or discovered?" Contemporary
scholars claim that scientific theories
are humanly constructed,
and this is true, but only in some ways. Yes, between 1500 and 1700
our
theories
about the solar system were constructed and they did change. But
our theories
improved
because
we discovered more
about an independent
reality that was not constructed by us. In order to construct accurate
theories about a human-independent reality (like the solar system)
our
theory
construction
must
be constrained and guided by what we discover about this reality. By contrast,
if sociologists are
constructing
theories
about a society that is a humanly-constructed reality,
there
will
be
interactions between theories they are constructing and the reality they
are describing-and-explaining,
which (if the sociologists and their theories are influential in society) will
let
them
help "construct
the
reality" of the society. But
they can do this only because society is a humanly-constructed
reality, not a human-independent reality
Does it matter? Yes, the
distinction between independent reality and constructed
reality is extremely important. A failure to make this distinction,
or a stubborn refusal to make it, will cause confusion. Therefore, if
we want our thinking to be more precise and less confused, we will always ask "Which
type of reality is it?"
non-correspondence definitions
of TRUTH
In the traditional
correspondence definition
of truth, truth is determined by reality, and a truth-claim
is true
if it corresponds to the actual state of reality, either now
or (for a statement about history) in the past, if it matches the way the
world is or was.
But in the new non-correspondence "relativist" definitions,
truth is
determined by human decisions based on human criteria, not by reality:
In a
consensus definition
of truth, a truth-claim is considered to be true within a community
if it is accepted by most people in this community. In a
coherence definition
of truth, the truth of a truth-claim depends on its relationships with
other statements, on how coherently it fits into a system of statements that
are considered true (by some definition); in
scientific
method a theory is considered "probably true" when it is supported
by evidence and logic, in a process of logical evaluation that includes coherence
plus other criteria. With a
pragmatic definition
of truth, a statement is true if it produces satisfactory results when
it is used as a basis for decisions and actions.
To avoid confusion, I think
the
word "truth" should be reserved for a correspondence definition; we
should not use the word "truth" in any other way, and when other people do
use "truth" in another way, we should challenge them, gently and
logically. The non-correspondence definitions of truth — by consensus
(truth is a majority opinion), coherence (truth is a logically justifiable
belief), pragmatism (truth is a useful principle), or in other ways — are
humanly constructed claims about what is true, so they should be called
truth-claims (or
theories, beliefs, principles,...) but not
truth.
multiple
definitions of ABSOLUTE TRUTH
When a non-relativist makes claims
about
absolute truth, this can be confusing
because there are many possible meanings:
• If you intend
the most common meaning —
a principle that is always true, in
all cultures and situations, in the past, present and future — you
can just call this a universally true principle or
universal
principle.
• If you are making a truth-claim
and are using a correspondence definition of truth, adding "absolute" isn't
necessary or helpful. Just call it a
truth-claim and
explain that when you say "truth" you mean
correspondence-based
truth which is
reality-determined truth. { If
you want "absolute" to mean the opposite of "relative" your meaning will
be clarified if you explain that
relative truth is
a humanly constructed truth-claim (based on criteria of consensus, coherence,
pragmatism,...) and this may lead to productive thinking about the biasing
influence (which can be small or large) of the human context in which construction
of the truth-claim is occurring.
• If you're emphasizing
that a truth-claim is about an
independent reality, not
a
humanly constructed reality, explain the difference
between these two types of reality, and clarify your intended meaning.
• If you have an extremely
high level of confidence in a truth-claim, say "I'm absolutely certain
this is true" and explain why you are so confident. We should distinguish
between
absolute truth (which certainly does
exist if we use a correspondence definition of truth) and
absolute
knowledge (which seems impossible for humans to attain).
Because "absolute truth" is overpopulated
with potential meanings, which can lead to confusion and misuderstanding, we
should avoid this term (by replacing it with terms whose meaning is
more precise) or clearly explain the intended meaning.
Sometimes absolute
truth and relative truth are replaced
by Truth (with a capital T) and truth (with
a small t) but this isn't useful because many meanings are possible, so we
don't know the intended meanings of Truth and truth. And this pair
of terms has an extra disadvantage, because "truth" is used in
a way that, in my opinion, it should never be used.
Similarly, the meaning of
a Biblical truth is not clear. It
would be more accurate to say that you think the Bible makes this truth-claim
about reality (about some aspect of the spiritual realm, or human history,
or a Bible-based principle for living,...) because this will clarify
the intended meaning.
Confidence
and Truth
In science — as
in most other areas of life (*) — proof is
impossible, but scientists can develop a rationally
justified confidence in
the truth or falsity of a theory. Why is proof impossible, and how
can scientists develop confidence? This is discussed in The
Limits of Logic, which explains why modern
science has given up the quest for certainty, and has decided to aim for
a high degree
of plausibility, for a rational way to determine "what is a good way
to bet." {* In
some areas, proof is possible. For example, in mathematics we can prove
that "2 + 3 = 5" if we define each of the five concepts ( 2 , +
, 3 , = , 5 ) as in our usual system of math. But in science,
and for the important questions in life, proof is
impossible. }
In most situations the perspective
of most scientists is a critical realism
that combines realist goals (wanting
to find the truth) with critical evaluation (willing
to be skeptical about the truth-claims associated with a particular theory).
Our degree
of confidence in a theory can be summarized in its theory
status, which is an estimate of a theory's plausibility. * This
concept is useful because it allows flexibility in our thinking. If
status is extremely high or low, we can choose to accept or reject a
theory. But we have options because, in addition to this binary yes-or-no
choice, we can also think in terms of a status (a degree
of confidence)
that can vary along a continuum ranging from high to low, from yes to no,
with varying degrees of confidence between these extremes. An important
part of a truth-claim is the confidence assigned
to it by the claimer; there is a difference between claiming "maybe
this is true" and "I'm certain this is true." {* Our
estimates
of a
theory's utility can supplement
our estimates of its plausibility when
we are evaluating theory status. }
Thinking about theory status,
with degrees of confidence, makes it easier to view theories with a logically
appropriate humility because we can avoid the extremes of a
silly radical
relativism (which insists that if we cannot claim certainty, we can
claim nothing) and the over-reaction that produces arrogantly overconfident
claims (in thinking that if we want to avoid the extreme of not claiming any
confidence, we must claim the total confidence of certainty). An appropriate
humility recognizes that, based on evidence and logic, in some situations only
a low level of confidence is justifiable, while in other situations a high
degree of
confidence
(which
is almost a certainty) is justified.
Is relativism illogical and
self-refuting? Some
of its critics make this claim, but I disagree. To
see why, let's
look at two assertions that could be made
by a
relativist:
1) A statement that "all theories
are false" is inconsistent and incorrect,
because the statement is itself a theory, so if the
statement is true, then at least one theory is true, and the
statement is false.
2) A statement that "all theories
are uncertain" is not internally inconsistent because when
you say "if
you are correct, then your own theory is uncertain and you can't be certain
about its truth" the claimer will agree that "yes, this is
what I said."
#1 is logically self-refuting,
but this isn't the claim usually being made by relativists. Instead
they claim #2 (which is not logically self-refuting) by saying "we
can never be certain about anything" or,
with more humility, "I'm not certain that we can ever be certain
about anything."
In fact, I agree with #2 because "proof
is impossible." But the difficulty with postmodernism
is that "if a good idea is taken to extremes...
there may be undesirable consequences," as explained later. Yes, "proof is
impossible" but rationally
justified confidence is possible,
and sometimes "a high degree of confidence
(which is almost a certainty) is justified."
Unfortunately, some
Christians claim that "relativism
is self-refuting" in a well-intended
but futile attempt to find a simple flaw in postmodern relativism. I
think serious flaws do exist, but they are not simple and obvious, so careful
thinking is required.
On the other
hand, a claim that "it's
wrong to say someone is wrong" is logically inconsistent, as discussed later
when we ask "Is it wrong to say ‘I think you're wrong’?" and
we compare
The New Tolerance with
Conventional Tolerance. }
We began this page by asking"Do
scientists create reality?" and
we've been looking at relationships between confidence and truth, including
these: when
strong confidence seems justified, this confidence will not affect a human-independent
reality; and
when a general humility seems justified and we are not highly confident about
any current theory,
truth
does exist
even though
we don't
know what
is
true.
a
scientific example: In
1600, based on the best available evidence and logic, a sun-centered theory
deserved an intermediate status, and it received a mixed reception. Some
scholars argued for it, others were against it, and everyone was able to support
their view with evidence, logic, and philosophy. During a 200-year period,
from 1500 to 1700, the human consensus changed from almost-certainty (but with
a mismatch between confidence
and truth, due to
widespread belief
in a theory
that
was wrong) to intermediate levels of confidence (that gradually, due to new
evidence and improved analysis, shifted in favor of a sun-centered theory)
back to almost-certainty (with belief in a theory that we now claim, with
a high degree of confidence that approaches certainty, actually is true). But
during these changes in humanly constructed theories about truth, the actual
truth — which
was determined by human-independent reality, by the actual motions of the earth,
planets, and sun — remained
what it was, unchanged by human debates.
a spiritual
example: Based
on the Bible, Christians claim that God created the universe, and Jesus was
resurrected
from the dead. * Are these claims
true or false? This depends only
on reality, on what actually happened in history. Because these claims
are about independent reality, their truth or falsity does not depend on
what you or I choose to believe. But
each of us has a worldview, which includes our beliefs about claims made
in the Bible, and this "personally
constructed internal reality" does influence our attitudes and actions. {* But
we should be cautious about other claims — such as those made in
1633
(about
an
earth-centered
solar system) and 2007 (about a young earth) — that are not important theologically,
and have
led
to
a
common
perception of inherent conflict (and even "war") between science
and
religion. These
claims about "science in the Bible" are discussed in Science-Religion
Conflict? (flat earth & Galileo) and an
introduction to modern conflicts
caused by young-earth
claims and Biblical Theology
for young-earth
Christians. }
Confidence
and Faith
Can
we have faith without proof? Yes,
we have faith if we have personal confidence in God, as explained
in a page that asks "Why isn't
God more obvious? Can we prove God?" and concludes with a summary:
Truth
does exist, even though we cannot know with absolute certainty what this
truth is. ...
Despite the impossibility
of proof, evidence [historical, scientific, personal, interpersonal]
can affect our estimates for the plausibility of various worldviews. ...
I'm not advocating a spiritual
agnosticism that claims "if there is not enough evidence for certainty,
the most rational decision is to not decide." ... I'm merely suggesting
that we humbly recognize the limits of logical persuasion and the impossibility
of proof, and see
our world as an environment that permits free decisions and provides
opportunities for living by faith in whatever worldview a person has
decided to construct
and accept. ...
God wants us to live by faith...
by making daily decisions on the basis of trust in God's character and
promises.
A strong faith is consistent with a humble
recognition that other people, thinking rationally, can reach different conclusions
about the worldview they have chosen to "live by faith."
SUMMARY
When there is
a question or discussion about truth, ask yourself:
Are we thinking about the
truth (which
is determined by reality) or a
truth-claim (which is a human theory about reality)?
Is the reality analogous to movements
in the solar system (human-independent reality) or is it like driving
on a specified side of the road (humanly constructed reality)? These
two types of reality have different characteristics, and claims that are
rational for one type can be silly for the other type.
For either type of reality, the certainty
of logically rigorous proof is impossible, but logically justifiable
confidence is possible.
For human-independent reality,
a high level of confidence in a theory cannot make it true. But even
though we cannot control the independent reality of our solar system, we
(individually and in groups)
do "construct our reality" when we construct our worldviews and
partially construct our situations. { I say "partially" because
some aspects of our situations are beyond our control. } But
even though the truth of a theory is not affected by our confidence that
the
theory is true (or is false), our confidence — if it is based
on a solid foundation of evidence and logic — may be an indication
that the theory is true (or is false).
The questions, "does God exist?" and "does
God set standards for our behavior?", are about independent realities. But
another question, "should we use the standards of God (as described in
the Bible) as the basis for our individual and societal behavior?", is
about humanly constructed reality.
more
about Reality 101 — Personal Commentary
In
contrast with the main "Reality 101" which is foundational summary
of basic ideas, the sections below — about Postmodernism and Reality
909 — is a personal commentary. It
contains ideas that I hope will stimulate your thinking, but is rough-and-incomplete,
is not self-contained (since it assumes you're already familiar with
the basic ideas of modernism and
postmodernism that are described in other
pages), and is not intended to provide an in-depth
comprehensive
analysis of the complex issues being examined. But
I think you'll find it interesting and useful.
Reflections
on Postmodernism (and Modernism)
Postmodernism and Language
Postmodernists emphasize
the importance of language, which affects how we think and how we interact
with each other. Yes, language is important in our thinking,
communicating, and constructing of theories, as discussed in "Using
Precise Language" above. Postmodernists are skillfully using
language to support their views and increase their influence. Non-postmodernists
should pay more attention to the uses of language in society.
Where's the proof?
When people ask "Where
is the proof?" instead of "Where is the evidence?", they are implying that
the evaluation standard should be the 100% certainty of proof, instead
of a high level of rationally justifiable confidence based on a
logical evaluation of evidence. Unfortunately, the use of an unreasonably
high standard (if we demand proof) tends to reinforce the skepticism of
relativism and postmodernism, as discussed below.
Modernism and Confidence
appropriate
humility is not the same as maximum humility: Sometimes the
evidence for a truth-claim is so strong that, for practical purposes, it
seems rational to adopt a feeling of certainty about the truth of this claim,
to consider it "proved beyond a reasonable doubt." For example,
some claims made by science — that the earth is roughly spherical,
rotates, and orbits the sun once a year, or that heavier-than-air objects
will fall through air toward the earth — seem so well established that
it is difficult, and it might be unwise, to avoid thinking of them as "facts" about
which we can be certain. For these claims, it is appropriate to say "there
is very little rational justification for humility."
Although a claim of "certainty" cannot
be justified by rigorous logic, I think that — despite the protests
of skeptics — we can have a high degree of rationally justified confidence
in most of the truth-claims made by modern science. {details:
The Limits of Logic, Radical Relativism}
But for balance, we should
also acknowledge the limitations of science:
A reason for caution is
the recognition that some theories we once thought were correct (re:
planetary
motions and
other phenomena) are now considered wrong. Similarly, some of our
current theories could also be wrong.
A potential source of error
is the widespread assumption of methodological naturalism in
science, which guarantees that — no matter what is being studied,
or what is the evidence — the scientific conclusion must always be
that "it happened due to natural causes." But if anything in the
history of nature happened due to a non-natural cause, a naturalistic assumption
will force scientists to reach a false conclusion about this part of the
history. {details:
Searching for Truth in a Closed Science}
Modern versus Postmodern? (Coexistence
and Partial Agreement)
Currently, postmodernism supplements
modernism, but has not replaced it. Both perspectives exert strong
influence. To some extent, the type of reality affects
the type of influence. Modernism, which emphasizes the authority
of science, is more influential for questions about independent realities. And
postmodernists try to dominate discussions about the process by which constructed
realities are constructed.
But there are overlaps and interactions. For
example, most postmodernists prefer to believe the naturalistic conclusions
required by the naturalistic assumptions of the current scientific establishment. And
both perspectives can use the authority of naturalistic "scientific conclusions" (which
are actually nonscientific assumptions) as a basis for for labeling other
views "unscientific," thereby marginalizing these views and minimizing their
influence in society.
Pluralism is not Relativism
pluralism is
not the same as relativism: The existence
of many views (pluralism) does not indicate that all of these views are
equally credible (as claimed in extreme relativism), any more than the
existence of many answers on a multiple-choice exam indicates that we can
have no basis for thinking that any of the answers is more plausible than
the other answers.
Some
of the main claims of Christianity (such as the deity
and resurrection of Jesus) are rejected by other religions, and these mutually
exclusive
claims cannot
both be
correct. For some claims — for those that are unique to Christianity,
so the claims of Christianity and other religions are
mutually
exclusive — a "one
way" approach is not only
logically
justified, but is logically necessary; for these claims, either Christianity
is correct (and other religions are wrong) or Christianity is wrong. { But
some exclusivist claims/attitudes are not logical or helpful, and I think Christians
should cooperate with non-Christians more often, and more effectively, in our
mutual pursuit of goals that we agree will be beneficial for individuals and/or
society. }
A Postmodern View of Truth (Do
we create truth?)
Some perspectives on truth blur
the line between belief and reality. For example, "Postmodernism
affirms that whatever we accept as truth and even the way we envision truth
are dependent on the community in which we participate. ... There is no absolute
truth; rather, truth is relative to the community in which we participate." (Stanley
Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism) { Even though Grenz is
reporting on postmodernism "from the outside" and (like me) is not a proponent,
I think he accurately summarizes postmodernist views. }
The first sentence correctly
acknowledges the fact that human beliefs are constructed by humans. But
the second sentence confuses these beliefs with reality. It would be
correct to say "beliefs about truth are relative to the community..." but
he says "truth is relative to the community" thereby
equating truth with belief, with "whatever we accept
as truth." This definition of truth is a serious error because
confidence in a truth-claim cannot make the claim true. { As emphasized
in Part 1, to avoid confusion we must distinguish between human-independent
reality and humanly constructed reality. } Is it rational to reject relativism?
As explained earlier,
one claim of relativism — that proof is impossible — is justified,
and most non-relativists agree. If we cannot challenge postmodern
relativism by arguing that it logically refutes itself, should we accept
it? No, because there are other reasons for rejecting relativism
in its more eqaqxtreme forms. We should not move from reasonable moderate
relativism to unreasonable radical relativism. We
should avoid the undesirable consequences that occur when — if
someone declares that "if you cannot claim certainty, you can claim nothing" — a
good idea is taken to extremes. For the important questions in life,
most rational people will agree that even though the certainty of logically
rigorous proof is impossible, we can (and should) aim for a rationally
justified confidence. A reasonable amount of relativism is logical
and wise, but "too much" is foolish.
Is it
wrong to say "I think you're
wrong"?
New Tolerance and Conventional Tolerance
A claim that "it's wrong
to say that someone is wrong" certainly seems intolerant, even though
it's often made "in the name of tolerance"; in addition,
it may be self-refuting (logically?
morally?) because the claimer is doing something — saying "it's
wrong to..." — that
he has declared to be wrong.
Saying "it's wrong to say someone
is wrong" is
logically inconsistent (and is hypocritical) and claiming "it's
wrong to say ‘I think you're wrong’" is even worse. But
modified versions of this claim — "I think it's wrong to
say someone is wrong" (or "I
think it's wrong to say ‘I think you're wrong’"?) — can
be more difficult to logically analyze, and more difficult to challenge. And
should our analysis distinguish between specific types of behavior, as
when a person says "it's
wrong to say that premarital sex is wrong" without self-contradiction, because
in making this claim he is not doing the particular thing (saying "premarital
sex is wrong")
that he claims is wrong?
Can a choice (and consequent
action) be morally wrong? Almost everyone will think that some choices,
such as murder, are immoral because it's obvious that another person is being
harmed. But other choices, such as sex between unmarried consenting
adults, are controversial. Some people will defend a particular choice,
others will criticize it as immoral and unwise. When critics express
their views and are themselves criticized (because "they're interfering with
the free choice of other people and it's none of their business") they can
respond, "I have a right to hold my views and express them."
Is this — as claimed
by proponents of "the new tolerance" and manifested in "politically correct" laws
about "hate speech" — a question of responsible speech? If it's
wrong to shout "fire" in a crowded theater, is it also wrong to say "you're
choosing to behave in a way that is immoral and unwise"? This is a
good question, but I think the analogy is weak because there are important
differences between the two situations. Whether your actions are verbal
or nonverbal, when someone says "your actions are wrong" the consequences
can be harmful or helpful, or both. Some of the extremes of political
correctness occur when there is a narrow focus on the potential harms of "hate
speech" while the potentially beneficial effects are ignored, and the importance
of free speech is minimized. In my opinion, people should be free
to express their views about moral choices and actions.
Let's compare two views of
tolerance: postmodern and conventional. In a strange twist of language,
a postmodern new tolerance can produce intolerance; this
occurs when the new tolerance — which claims that tolerating
other views (and choices, actions,...) requires an absence of criticism — prevents
some views from being expressed and considered. By contrast, conventional
tolerance — which encourages open communication, a respectful
acknowledgment of disagreements, a mutual commitment to courteous thoughtfulness,
and listening with an intention to understand — promotes attitudes
and actions that usually are beneficial for individuals and for society.
Reality
909
Earlier, in two introductions
and a disclaimer, I say: "I'll look at only
the easy questions, those that can be logically understood" and "[this
page] is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis" and "the
topics it does cover aren't treated with the depth that is deserved." But
humility is more appropriate for some aspects of the page than for others. For
the easy questions — those involving logic (such as two
types of reality and the logical fallacy of
self-refutation) — I think that (considering the relatively
short length of this page) the analysis is comprehensive and logical. {and
the analysis continues in another page} But
the difficult questions — those that are most important, but cannot
be logically understood — are not treated with the depth they deserve.
Hopefully, the logical foundation
in Reality 101 will help us avoid much of the silly dialogue (with each side
misunderstanding the other) that occurs between proponents and opponents
of postmodernism. But questions remain, and they are the focus in the
following post-101 sections. { an IOU: Eventually, I'll return to these
sections and will expand them, or (more likely) I'll find web-pages where
others have examined these questions more carefully. But for now, what
you see below is all there is. }
Religion and Policy
The Bible is clear about some
truth-claims and some principles for living. In other cases — for
example, when we ask "What would Jesus drive?" — it is more difficult
to know what the Bible teaches. In these cases, humility is especially
appropriate, and declarations that a person or group is promoting "the Christian
perspective" should be made with caution, and should be open to questioning. Perhaps
simply saying that it's "a perspective based on (or inspired by) a Christian
worldview," or something like that, might be better.
Should we use Bible-based Christian
principles as a foundation for public policies? This is a difficult
question, and it won't be discussed here except to say that both extremes
seem unwise. We shouldn't have a "theocratic government" that tries
to mandate Christian beliefs. But we shouldn't try to keep Christian
values out of the public sphere because, when making decisions about public
policies, Christian perspectives should be considered just as relevant as
other perspectives. Ethical Systems and Behaviors
The
advantages of different ethical systems can be debated. I think Christian ethical principles and commandments
are best because they come from God, who knows us (he designed and created
us) and wants the best for us. But should nonbelievers be persuaded
by this reasoning? Will they be better people, and will we have a better
society, if they follow ethics from the Bible? Or should they decide that
a nonreligious system of ethics -- such as making decisions based on "the
greatest good for the greatest number of people" -- is better for individuals
and for society?
These questions won't be discussed
here. Instead, I will ask four other questions, and will discuss the
third question. Is ethics a human-independent reality (with standards
decreed by God) or a humanly constructed reality (with standards negotiated
by humans)? What is the relative importance of choosing a particular
ethical system, and of actually living according to the ethical demands of
whatever system is chosen? Would we have a significantly better society
if everyone behaved in a way that promoted the greatest good for the greatest
number of people? Who will be more motivated to behave in this way: Christian
believers or agnostic/atheistic nonbelievers?
In making ethical decisions, usually
most nonbelievers are not highly motivated to behave in a way that would produce
the greatest good for the greatest number of other people. Instead, they
mainly want to promote what is good for themselves, or for a small circle of
family and friends. The other people can fend for themselves. By
comparison, Christians are more motivated -- although it still is a challenge
to "live by faith" instead of following our natural selfish instincts
-- to focus on thinking and behaving in a way that promotes the good of others,
because we know that God wants us to do this, and we believe that eventually
God will reward us, later in this life or in heaven. And we believe that
God spiritually inspires and empowers us, through the Holy Spirit, to do acts
of selfless love.
APPENDIX
The two summaries below are from a page
that asks, Should scientific
method be eks-rated? , and "makes modest recommendations,
based on a simple principle (that if a good idea
is taken to extremes without sufficient balance from rational critical thinking,
there may be undesirable consequences) and an assumption that undesirable consequences should be
avoided."
The Limits of Logic (Summary for
Section 2)
Yes, there are limits. It is
impossible, using any type of logic, to prove that any theory is either true
or false. Why? If observations agree with a theory's predictions,
this does not prove the theory is true, because another theory (maybe even one
that has not yet been invented) might also predict the same observations, and
might be a better explanation. But if there is disagreement between observations
and theory-based predictions, doesn't this prove a theory is false? No,
because the lack of agreement could be due to any of the many elements (only
one of these is the theory being "tested") that are involved in making
the observations and predictions, and in comparing them.
Or the foundation of empirical
science can be attacked by claiming that observations are "theory laden" and
therefore involve circular logic, with theories being used to generate and
interpret the observations that are used to support theories. This
circularity makes the use of observation-based logic unreliable. And
when this shaky observational foundation is extended by inductive generalization,
the conclusions become even more uncertain.
Yes, these skeptical challenges
are logically valid. But a critical thinker should know, not just the
limits of logic, but also the sophisticated methods that scientists have
developed to cope with these limitations and minimize their practical effects. By
using these methods, scientists can develop a rationally justified confidence
in their conclusions, despite the impossibility of proof or disproof.
We should challenge the rationality
of an implication made by skeptics — that if we cannot claim certainty,
we can claim nothing. Modern science has given up the quest for certainty,
and has decided to aim for a high degree of plausibility, for a rational
way to determine "what is a good way to bet."
Radical Relativism (Summary
for Section 3)
An extreme relativist claims that no
idea is more worthy of acceptance than any other idea. Usually, relativism
about science is defended by arguing that, when scientific theories are being
evaluated, observation-based logic is less important than cultural factors. But
if theories are determined mainly by culture, not logic, in a different culture
our scientific theories would be different. And we have relativism.
As with many ideas that seem
extreme, radical relativism begins on solid ground. Most scholars
agree with its two basic premises: the limits of logic and the influence
of culture. But there is plenty of disagreement about balance, about
the relative contributions of logic and culture in science, about how far
a good idea can be extended before it becomes a bad idea that is harmful
to rationality and society.
This section ends by asking, "Does
scientific knowledge improve over time?" Although a skeptic
may appeal to the impossibility of proof and the fallibility of science, "the
best way to bet" seems obvious. To illustrate, imagine a million
dollar wager involving a "truth competition" between scientific
theories from the past, present, and future: from 1404, 2004, and 2104. Would
a relativist
really be willing to bet on theories from 600 years ago? |