Re: [asa] God, Chance and Purpose

Brian said: But I would still maintain that if a person's actions are
totally and infallibly predictable, then that person is not free. They might
have the perception of freedom, but it isn't real. For example, let us
suppose we add Dave's criticism about my computer model. Suppose that God,
after using all of his extra knowledge about external and internal factors
lets us know what the prediction is. Can we then on a whim choose something
else?

I respond: I think it depends on the inputs that make the prediction
possible. If the inputs only relate to environmental factors and physical
brain states, then it seems to me that inputs determine behavior and the
person is not really free. If the inputs include "mind" as something that
supervenes on other causes, then there is a possibility that the person is
(relatively) free. I think, in principle, that we can't even conceive of a
supercomputer that could "read" an immaterial supervenient mind, because we
can only conceive of computers that exist in the material world and compute
physical states. However, since God is not subject to this restraint, it
seems to me possible in principle that God can "read" an immaterial,
supervenient mind. The person's choice, then, is not determined by material
inputs, which to me is one way of defining "free." I don't think it makes
any sense to say a person is "free" not to choose what a person has already
chosen.

Concerning God letting us know what the prediction is -- that depends, I
think. At times in scripture, God predicts contingent results, such that
the outcome differs depending on how people choose to respond to God. At
other times, God seems to ordain certain results. Here you get into
discussions about God's permissive will, God's decrees, etc.

On Mon, Jun 9, 2008 at 11:51 AM, Brian Harper <harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:

> At 03:25 PM 6/8/2008, David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> I think this analogy / experiment breaks down at the start. The computer
> model "predicts" David's choices because the external observable variables
> built into the model determine David's choice. Thus, the hypo assumes that
> observable inputs into David's choices are deterministic, and that David
> therefore has no free will. Given a set of inputs, David's "decision" is
> just a matter of calculus. This ignores the possibility that David has some
> unobservable "mind" or "will" that can supervene to some extent on external
> causes and make free choices. An internal, unobservable, supervenient
> "mind" or "will" would mean that it would be impossible to build a computer
> model that is anything more than probabilistic.
>
> But God is unlike the supercomputer modeling program because God is not
> limited to the observation of external causes. God can get "inside" a
> person's "mind" or "will" and know this additional aspect of the causal
> chain. (Note that this is basically Augustine's defense of human free will
> in regard to God's foreknowledge). God knows the choices a person will make
> not only because He can do the calculus of the influence of external
> factors, but also because He knows the individual person's supervenient will
> intimately.
>
>
> OK, first of all I agree that it is impossible to build such a computer. It
> was a thought experiment. *Supposing* that it could be built, it would prove
> that David was not free. This seems self-evident to me.
>
> Now, I am not sure if I am following you completely here. You seem to be
> saying that God has available much more information than would a super
> computer (agreed !) and thus can make a more complete and exact predictions.
> But I would still maintain that if a person's actions are totally and
> infallibly predictable, then that person is not free. They might have the
> perception of freedom, but it isn't real. For example, let us suppose we add
> Dave's criticism about my computer model. Suppose that God, after using all
> of his extra knowledge about external and internal factors lets us know what
> the prediction is. Can we then on a whim choose something else?
>
> On Sat, Jun 7, 2008 at 9:37 PM, Brian Harper <harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:
>
> Okay, let me propose a thought experiment. Suppose you and I got together
> and observed David over a long period of time. We took our observations and,
> with the help of a developed model and a super computer, were able predict
> every thing that David did. What he ate for breakfast, what color shirt he
> wore on Tuesday etc. etc. What would you conclude about David? That he has
> free will?
>
>
>
> On Jun 6, 2008, at 10:27 AM, David Campbell wrote:
>
> If I ask Timothy (who is 3) if he wants a piece of chocolate or a
>
> piece of lettuce, I know what his answer will be (at least if he is
>
> paying attention), even though he is free to choose.
>
>
> =
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> David W. Opderbeck
> Associate Professor of Law
> Seton Hall University Law School
> Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
>
>

-- 
David W. Opderbeck
Associate Professor of Law
Seton Hall University Law School
Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
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