RE: [asa] God, Chance and Purpose

God's knowledge >>>>> Human predictions
 
Moorad

________________________________

From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu on behalf of Brian Harper
Sent: Mon 6/9/2008 11:51 AM
To: David Opderbeck
Cc: Kirk Bertsche; David Campbell; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: [asa] God, Chance and Purpose

At 03:25 PM 6/8/2008, David Opderbeck wrote:

        I think this analogy / experiment breaks down at the start. The computer model "predicts" David's choices because the external observable variables built into the model determine David's choice. Thus, the hypo assumes that observable inputs into David's choices are deterministic, and that David therefore has no free will. Given a set of inputs, David's "decision" is just a matter of calculus. This ignores the possibility that David has some unobservable "mind" or "will" that can supervene to some extent on external causes and make free choices. An internal, unobservable, supervenient "mind" or "will" would mean that it would be impossible to build a computer model that is anything more than probabilistic.
        
        But God is unlike the supercomputer modeling program because God is not limited to the observation of external causes. God can get "inside" a person's "mind" or "will" and know this additional aspect of the causal chain. (Note that this is basically Augustine's defense of human free will in regard to God's foreknowledge). God knows the choices a person will make not only because He can do the calculus of the influence of external factors, but also because He knows the individual person's supervenient will intimately.
        

OK, first of all I agree that it is impossible to build such a computer. It was a thought experiment. *Supposing* that it could be built, it would prove that David was not free. This seems self-evident to me.

Now, I am not sure if I am following you completely here. You seem to be saying that God has available much more information than would a super computer (agreed !) and thus can make a more complete and exact predictions. But I would still maintain that if a person's actions are totally and infallibly predictable, then that person is not free. They might have the perception of freedom, but it isn't real. For example, let us suppose we add Dave's criticism about my computer model. Suppose that God, after using all of his extra knowledge about external and internal factors lets us know what the prediction is. Can we then on a whim choose something else?

        On Sat, Jun 7, 2008 at 9:37 PM, Brian Harper <harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:
        

                Okay, let me propose a thought experiment. Suppose you and I got together and observed David over a long period of time. We took our observations and, with the help of a developed model and a super computer, were able predict every thing that David did. What he ate for breakfast, what color shirt he wore on Tuesday etc. etc. What would you conclude about David? That he has free will?
                
                
                
                

                        On Jun 6, 2008, at 10:27 AM, David Campbell wrote:
                        
                        

                                If I ask Timothy (who is 3) if he wants a piece of chocolate or a
                                
                                
                                piece of lettuce, I know what his answer will be (at least if he is
                                
                                
                                paying attention), even though he is free to choose.

                        =

        --
        David W. Opderbeck
        Associate Professor of Law
        Seton Hall University Law School
        Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology

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Received on Mon Jun 9 12:32:49 2008