Re: [asa] God, Chance and Purpose

At 03:25 PM 6/8/2008, David Opderbeck wrote:
>I think this analogy / experiment breaks down at the start. The
>computer model "predicts" David's choices because the external
>observable variables built into the model determine David's
>choice. Thus, the hypo assumes that observable inputs into David's
>choices are deterministic, and that David therefore has no free
>will. Given a set of inputs, David's "decision" is just a matter of
>calculus. This ignores the possibility that David has some
>unobservable "mind" or "will" that can supervene to some extent on
>external causes and make free choices. An internal, unobservable,
>supervenient "mind" or "will" would mean that it would be impossible
>to build a computer model that is anything more than probabilistic.
>
>But God is unlike the supercomputer modeling program because God is
>not limited to the observation of external causes. God can get
>"inside" a person's "mind" or "will" and know this additional aspect
>of the causal chain. (Note that this is basically Augustine's
>defense of human free will in regard to God's foreknowledge). God
>knows the choices a person will make not only because He can do the
>calculus of the influence of external factors, but also because He
>knows the individual person's supervenient will intimately.

OK, first of all I agree that it is impossible to build such a
computer. It was a thought experiment. *Supposing* that it could be
built, it would prove that David was not free. This seems self-evident to me.

Now, I am not sure if I am following you completely here. You seem to
be saying that God has available much more information than would a
super computer (agreed !) and thus can make a more complete and exact
predictions. But I would still maintain that if a person's actions
are totally and infallibly predictable, then that person is not free.
They might have the perception of freedom, but it isn't real. For
example, let us suppose we add Dave's criticism about my computer
model. Suppose that God, after using all of his extra knowledge about
external and internal factors lets us know what the prediction is.
Can we then on a whim choose something else?

>On Sat, Jun 7, 2008 at 9:37 PM, Brian Harper
><<mailto:harper.10@osu.edu>harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:
>
>Okay, let me propose a thought experiment. Suppose you and I got
>together and observed David over a long period of time. We took our
>observations and, with the help of a developed model and a super
>computer, were able predict every thing that David did. What he ate
>for breakfast, what color shirt he wore on Tuesday etc. etc. What
>would you conclude about David? That he has free will?
>
>
>
>>On Jun 6, 2008, at 10:27 AM, David Campbell wrote:
>>
>>>If I ask Timothy (who is 3) if he wants a piece of chocolate or a
>>>
>>>piece of lettuce, I know what his answer will be (at least if he is
>>>
>>>paying attention), even though he is free to choose.
>>
>>=
>
>
>
>
>--
>David W. Opderbeck
>Associate Professor of Law
>Seton Hall University Law School
>Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology

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Received on Mon Jun 9 11:51:47 2008