Re: [asa] God, Chance and Purpose

At 12:33 PM 6/9/2008, you wrote:
>Brian said: But I would still maintain that if a person's actions
>are totally and infallibly predictable, then that person is not
>free. They might have the perception of freedom, but it isn't real.
>For example, let us suppose we add Dave's criticism about my
>computer model. Suppose that God, after using all of his extra
>knowledge about external and internal factors lets us know what the
>prediction is. Can we then on a whim choose something else?
>
>I respond: I think it depends on the inputs that make the
>prediction possible. If the inputs only relate to environmental
>factors and physical brain states, then it seems to me that inputs
>determine behavior and the person is not really free. If the inputs
>include "mind" as something that supervenes on other causes, then
>there is a possibility that the person is (relatively) free. I
>think, in principle, that we can't even conceive of a supercomputer
>that could "read" an immaterial supervenient mind, because we can
>only conceive of computers that exist in the material world and
>compute physical states. However, since God is not subject to this
>restraint, it seems to me possible in principle that God can "read"
>an immaterial, supervenient mind. The person's choice, then, is not
>determined by material inputs, which to me is one way of defining
>"free." I don't think it makes any sense to say a person is "free"
>not to choose what a person has already chosen.

I guess I'm a little sorry that I brought up computers at all since
it has clouded my claim which is that predictability, regardless how
or why it comes about, is counter to freedom. If someone is capable
of predicting what I will do in 5 seconds then obviously I am not
free to do anything else. Once again, the obvious counter to this is
to inform the person of the prediction. I think freedom must include
the capability of doing something completely arbitrary, for no reason
at all. As I have already said, this seems self-evident to me. If
everyone else disagrees then I guess I am messed up on this. About
your last sentence, that is called changing your mind ;-),

>Concerning God letting us know what the prediction is -- that
>depends, I think. At times in scripture, God predicts contingent
>results, such that the outcome differs depending on how people
>choose to respond to God. At other times, God seems to ordain
>certain results. Here you get into discussions about God's
>permissive will, God's decrees, etc.

How can God predicting contingent results depending on how people
choose make any sense at all if God already knows how we are going to
choose? When Jonah gave the message "Forty more days and Ninevah will
be overturned" there was no contingency offered. This prophesy did
not come true so apparently God changed his mind? Did God know in
advance he would change his mind?

>On Mon, Jun 9, 2008 at 11:51 AM, Brian Harper
><<mailto:harper.10@osu.edu>harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:
>At 03:25 PM 6/8/2008, David Opderbeck wrote:
>>I think this analogy / experiment breaks down at the start. The
>>computer model "predicts" David's choices because the external
>>observable variables built into the model determine David's
>>choice. Thus, the hypo assumes that observable inputs into David's
>>choices are deterministic, and that David therefore has no free
>>will. Given a set of inputs, David's "decision" is just a matter
>>of calculus. This ignores the possibility that David has some
>>unobservable "mind" or "will" that can supervene to some extent on
>>external causes and make free choices. An internal, unobservable,
>>supervenient "mind" or "will" would mean that it would be
>>impossible to build a computer model that is anything more than probabilistic.
>>
>>But God is unlike the supercomputer modeling program because God is
>>not limited to the observation of external causes. God can get
>>"inside" a person's "mind" or "will" and know this additional
>>aspect of the causal chain. (Note that this is basically
>>Augustine's defense of human free will in regard to God's
>>foreknowledge). God knows the choices a person will make not only
>>because He can do the calculus of the influence of external
>>factors, but also because He knows the individual person's
>>supervenient will intimately.
>OK, first of all I agree that it is impossible to build such a
>computer. It was a thought experiment. *Supposing* that it could be
>built, it would prove that David was not free. This seems self-evident to me.
>Now, I am not sure if I am following you completely here. You seem
>to be saying that God has available much more information than would
>a super computer (agreed !) and thus can make a more complete and
>exact predictions. But I would still maintain that if a person's
>actions are totally and infallibly predictable, then that person is
>not free. They might have the perception of freedom, but it isn't
>real. For example, let us suppose we add Dave's criticism about my
>computer model. Suppose that God, after using all of his extra
>knowledge about external and internal factors lets us know what the
>prediction is. Can we then on a whim choose something else?
>
>>On Sat, Jun 7, 2008 at 9:37 PM, Brian Harper
>><<mailto:harper.10@osu.edu>harper.10@osu.edu> wrote:
>>Okay, let me propose a thought experiment. Suppose you and I got
>>together and observed David over a long period of time. We took our
>>observations and, with the help of a developed model and a super
>>computer, were able predict every thing that David did. What he ate
>>for breakfast, what color shirt he wore on Tuesday etc. etc. What
>>would you conclude about David? That he has free will?
>>
>>
>>
>>>On Jun 6, 2008, at 10:27 AM, David Campbell wrote:
>>>
>>>>If I ask Timothy (who is 3) if he wants a piece of chocolate or a
>>>>piece of lettuce, I know what his answer will be (at least if he is
>>>>paying attention), even though he is free to choose.
>>>=
>>
>>
>>
>>--
>>David W. Opderbeck
>>Associate Professor of Law
>>Seton Hall University Law School
>>Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
>
>
>
>--
>David W. Opderbeck
>Associate Professor of Law
>Seton Hall University Law School
>Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology

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Received on Mon Jun 9 15:30:19 2008