Re: Fwd: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

>
> Dave (the other, other Dave): these are very helpful comments, thank
> you. What you describe as methodological naturalism above is what I was
> suggesting as "weak" MN. Is your description here really what most folks
> mean when they say "methodological naturalism?" I didn't think it would be
> MN anymore if supernatural causes are allowed when there is "strong evidence
> to the contrary." I thought MN excludes supernatural causes completely.
>

I don't know what a majority view would be. However, based on
the original definition
the fact that terms such as scientism, philosophical naturalism, etc.
already exist to apply to the assumptions that the physical world is all
there is, and
the need to distinguish between assuming that there is probably no need to
invoke a supernatural violation of natural law in a particular situation
versus rejecting the possibility of supernatural violation of natural law in
any circumstances,
I think defining methodological naturalism solely as "weak MN" is desirable.
If there is strong evidence to the contrary, then MN is probably an
incorrect approach to a situation.

>
> But if we accept this approach to MN, or call it "weak" MN, I'd still have
> some questions about the notion of "strong evidence to the contrary." In
> particular, and at the risk of sounding lawerly again: (1) why do
> supernatural explanations always bear the burden of proof;
>

Historical and everyday experience indicate that violations of natural law
are rare.
Christian (and some other) theological considerations indicate that creation
behaves in an orderly manner.
Biblically, miracles have special roles and occur rarely.
Biblically, miracles seem to minimize violation of natural law-e.g., a wind
parted the sea, but Moses was informed in advance and the timing and
location were just right; the axe head floated but had to be picked up and
repaired; water turned to wine but had to be served in the ordinary way;
bread and fish were multiplied but the diciples had to save the leftovers...
Plenty of bogus claims for supernatural phenomena exist.
The implications of a valid claim of supernatural activity are much greater
than the implications of one more example of things explainable by natural
laws and so require greater scrutiny.

 (2) what counts as "evidence"; (3) what counts as "strong" evidence; and
> (4) what counts as evidence to the "contrary"? As one very important
> example, can a religious scripture or belief provide grounds for questioning
> the assumption that natural laws adequately describe a particular phenomenon
> or event? It seems very difficult to me, in many cases that matter to
> religious belief, to apply this kind of presumption in a way that doesn't
> lead to an inconsistent epistemology.
>

I certainly believe that scripture can provide such grounds. However, it is
necessary to bear in mind the possibility that my interpretation of that
Scripture is incorrect, the possibility that a given event was actually
achieved in some not-yet-understood way in accord with natural law, etc. as
well as the possibility that MN might not work in a given situation.
There's a need to control for insistign that a miracle must have happened in
x situation, when there's no evidence of it.

Perhaps more importantly, it is necessary to remember that it doesn't really
matter whether God did something in a way that violated natural law or not;
it is important to recognize God's sovereignty over all that happens whether
it obeys natural law or not.

> I'm wrestling, though with whether this kind of distinction is anything
> other than merely pragmatic.
>

I don't know that it is more than that, although one might add that it is
empirically useful.

>In this regard, I wonder if there is any flexibility allowed in your
statement that "human activities that obey the laws of physics count as
natural"? Again, as with Keith's approach, I perceive here a conflation of
'physical' and 'natural' (or physics and nature), with no space allowing for
the 'social' (or cultural) as its own sphere of discourse - i.e. that which
is not necessarily (by definition) reducible to natural laws. Also, the
spiritual dimension of human existence is entirely absent from such a (human
- physics - natural) viewpoint, even if one can't quantify or empirically
measure 'spirit' according to physical or natural laws that would satisfy
the demands of natural scientists. There just seems to be an overlap where
natural scientific communication requires a sort of deference of authority
to social scientists, who study human beings and their activities in depth.
Please excuse if this presses a button that affects you as 'anti-science'
rhetoric. It is no such thing, but rather a seeking for clarity about the
necessary boundaries/limitations of naturalism (as David speaks of strong
and weak MN) while natural scientists sometimes refuse to acknowledge those
boundaries/limitations.<
I'm using "natural" in contradistinction to "supernatural" and hence in this
context include social and human activity under that heading, while
acknowledging that there are both supernatural aspects of human nature and
aspects of human behavior that are not very amenable to the sorts of
approaches that work for scientific investigation of other things.

-- 
Dr. David Campbell
425 Scientific Collections
University of Alabama
"I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
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