Re: Fwd: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

*Natural laws provide adequate physical descriptions of what happens in the
vast majority of situations, and it is a reasonable assumption to think that
they apply to a given situaiton unless there is strong evidence to the
contrary. This says nothing about what role supernatural agents might play
in the operation of natural laws.*

Dave (the other, other Dave): these are very helpful comments, thank you.
What you describe as methodological naturalism above is what I was
suggesting as "weak" MN. Is your description here really what most folks
mean when they say "methodological naturalism?" I didn't think it would be
MN anymore if supernatural causes are allowed when there is "strong evidence
to the contrary." I thought MN excludes supernatural causes completely.

But if we accept this approach to MN, or call it "weak" MN, I'd still have
some questions about the notion of "strong evidence to the contrary." In
particular, and at the risk of sounding lawerly again: (1) why do
supernatural explanations always bear the burden of proof; (2) what counts
as "evidence"; (3) what counts as "strong" evidence; and (4) what counts as
evidence to the "contrary"? As one very important example, can a religious
scripture or belief provide grounds for questioning the assumption that
natural laws adequately describe a particular phenomenon or event? It seems
very difficult to me, in many cases that matter to religious belief, to
apply this kind of presumption in a way that doesn't lead to an inconsistent
epistemology.

I understand the pragmatic value of segregating scientific investigation
from other ways of knowing in this way. It avoids the tempataion to say
"God did it" whenever a natural explanation isn't readily apparent, it helps
us decide who gets funding dollars for scientific research, it helps courts
define what is constitutionally permissible in public schools, and it allows
the professional science guild to maintain its identity (and, I would say,
power). I'm wrestling, though with whether this kind of distinction is
anything other than merely pragmatic.

On 8/21/06, David Campbell <pleuronaia@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > So, I was trying to distinguish between a "strong" methodological
> > naturalism
> > > -- one that allows only naturalistic causes -- from a "weak"
> > methodological
> > > naturalism -- one that prefers naturalistic causes but that allows for
> > > divine action that supercedes naturalistic causes.
> >
> > I'm uncomfortable with the distinction between "strong" MN and "weak"
> > MN,
> > because I think the definitions impose arbitrary limits. Suppose for
> > example
> > that we are arguing whether God can act in nature and we conclude that
> > No, He
> > cannot, after having considered only macrosopic phenomena. What about
> > the
> > possibility that God acts at a much deeper level -- via sensitive
> > dependence on
> > initial conditions and/or quantum phenomena? We cannot rule out God's
> > action in
> > nature because our knowledge is not complete. So it seems to me that the
> >
> > Christian practicing in the sciences must proceed via MN, but always be
> > ready
> > to admit that God may be (IS!) acting at some deeper level. I guess that
> > makes
> > me an advocate of weak MN, but I still don't like the distinction.
>
>
> Some distinction is needed between what we call the following three
> assertions:
>
> Everything is, in principle, fully explicable by natural laws.
>
> Natural laws provide adequate physical descriptions of what happens in the
> vast majority of situations, and it is a reasonable assumption to think that
> they apply to a given situaiton unless there is strong evidence to the
> contrary. This says nothing about what role supernatural agents might play
> in the operation of natural laws.
>
> Science refers to the process of investigating and explaining the physical
> world using natural laws. If phenomena exist that do not follow such laws,
> they are not amenable to scientific examination. This does not mean that
> those other methods are less valid, just that they fall outside the
> definition of science as adopted here.
>
> (Natural is used in contrast to miraculous, rather than to artificial, so
> human activities that obey the laws of physics count as natural. The
> contrast to miraculous again is not very good wording, as Christianity and
> many other viewpoints hold that supernatural agents are at work in things
> that obey natural laws as well as in occasions when they are set aside. )
>
> The first of these is more or less equivalent to scientism. The second is
> what I think is usefully labeled as methodological naturalism. The third is
> an assertion that methodological naturalism is the approach used by
> science.
>
> I would take slight exception to the third assertion, in that purported
> regularly predictable supernatural actions can be investigated by science.
> Astrology, parapsychology, etc. claim that anyone ought to be able to
> observe a certain set of results in a given circumstance. In contrast, it's
> impossible to get a statistically meaningful data set on whether Jesus will
> rise again after being executed.
>
> Most scientists are not philosophers and don't think about the philosophy
> of science very much, if at all.
>
>
> --
> > Dr. David Campbell
> > 425 Scientific Collections
> > University of Alabama
> > "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
>
>

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Received on Mon Aug 21 17:07:15 2006