Note: I replied as follows to George offline, thinking it was online, and
then we agreed to put this back online:
*Can science explain the choices that human beings make? To a certain
extent it can, bringing out the various factors that influence those choices
& explaining why they're effective. But ultimately no - science isn't going
to be able to give a precise explanation for why Nebuchadrezar chooses
to lay seige to Jerusalem instead of Rabbah ( Ez.21:18-22). But does it
have to?*
George, thanks for taking the time to make these very helpful
observations. I think we're talking on somewhat different tracks here,
though. I didn't mean to suggest that, if science can't explain human
choices fully, the rest of the explanation *must* be "God." I was trying to
focus more on the question of whether we can conclude that the cause of an
observed phenomenon is the result of a conscious choice rather than the
result only of the operation of natural laws.
Here you all will have to excuse me for putting my lawyer hat on, but maybe
it will help clarify or add a different perspective. (And this has gotten
kind of long winded, so I hope you'll all forgive me for that as well -- I'm
not trying to prove a point so much as I find this all very interesting.)
The law is very concerned with questions of causation. In the recent drug
product liability cases that have been in the news, for example, the justice
system has to answer these kinds of questions: What caused the plaintiff's
heart attack -- was it genetic, or was it a dangerous side effect of the
prescription medication he was taking? Or did the plaintiff cause his own
problems through overeating and lack of exercise? Or if it was a
combination of all those factors, how should the judge or jury weight each
factor in order to determine the drug manufacturer's share of liability? As
a lawyer, a big part of my professional culture and training involves
determining when an event is caused, in whole or part, by human action
rather than by "natural" events. We have a notion in the law of a "chain of
causation," which can be broken by "intervening" or "superceding" causes.
So, I tend to think of the operation of natural laws as a chain of
causation. I know this analogy can't be pressed very far because of quantum
mechanics and the uncertainty principle, but it still seems sound to me at a
basic level, and it seems to be how natural scientists operate at a
practical level. When natural scientists examine a phenomenon, they try to
suss out the physical causes of the phenomenon. At a macro level, Science
seeks to do this through the entire chain of causation, all the way back to
fundamental physical laws (and perhaps, in the case of some cosmological
science, before that to the cause of the physical laws).
If a human choice is inserted into the chain of causation, it seems to me
that the resulting phenomenon no longer falls purely into the realm of the
natural sciences. Like you said, science (I'd clarify and say the natural
sciences) can't fully determine the causes of things like Nebuchadnezzar's
choice of which city to attack. So, if a conscious decision of an
autonomous agent is involved, at some point the chain of causation is
interrupted and the natural sciences are incapable of determining fully the
truth of what happened. (Footnote -- I think I'd distinguish this from
Michael's comment about his collie puppy -- natural science, as I understand
it, presumes some sort of determinism for non-human choices; otherwise, the
concept of natural selection would make no sense at all.)
But even if the natural sciences are incapable of fully explaining a chain
of causation that involves human choice, as a general matter human beings
are highly competent to determine that a human choice intervened in or
superceded on the chain. If we were to visit Lebanon today, we wouldn't
throw up our hands and say "the laws of physics clearly suggest all these
buildings shouldn't suddenly explode; I have no idea why that happened."
Instead, we'd immediately recognize that the buildings were destroyed
through a human choice. And, natural science could come right back into the
picture and help determine what sorts of bombs were used and such.
So, here's where I wanted to bring in the *imago Dei* concept. If we can
determine when a human choice has intervened in or superceded on the chain
of causation, why, in principle, can't we determine, at least some of the
time, when a Divine choice has done so? Our very ability to make free
choices (or to use your typology, to exercise the "R" or Reason), is part of
the *imago Dei*. In this sense, we are "like God," and it seems reasonable
to expect that we would at least sometimes be able to recognize when God
acts to change a chain of causation. We certainly wouldn't call this kind
of recognition "natural science," but it seems as much an area of rational
investigation as other "soft" sciences like psychology or anthropology.
The biggest objection I can see to this is that (setting aside process
theology), there are *no* events in any chain of causation that are not
"caused" in some sense by God. But, it seems to me that there has to be
some way to distinguish "ordinary" causation by God -- causation that is
fully consistent with the natural laws He established at creation -- from
"extraordinary" causation by God that intervenes in or supercedes on what
was otherwise probable given those natural laws. A miracle like the
resurrection of Christ seems to me to fall into that latter category. Yet
we are quite capable of recognizing in an event like the resurrection that
some agent apparently has made something happen. Perhaps we need revelation
to explain who that agent was and why the event was caused to occur, but
reason tells us there apparently was a conscious cause of the event.
So this is where I end up: whether we call it "science" or not, why can't
human beings use their capacity of reason to investigate whether another
entity with an analogous capacity, such as God, may have intervened in or
superceded on the chain of causation in the development of life in the
universe?
*And George then responded as follows:*
1st, it seems to me that the effect of the freedom of human choice in a
chain of causation is similar to that caused by sensitivity to initial
conditions in chaos theory - & there's nothing "unnatural" about that.
2d, & more significantly: I appreciate your pressing this point because it
brings me to see one of the problems with this use of the *imago
dei*concept. The idea that we are a bit like God tempts us to reverse
the terms
and say that God is a little bit like us, & thus that we can understand to
some extent how God works by analogy with the way we work. This is
especially the case if the imago is identified with our reason. But God's
ways are not our ways &c. In particular (& this is the theme that I've
pursued in science-theology dialogue for 25 years now) God's characteristic
way of working is seen first of all in the cross of Christ, a way that seems
completely irrational and crazy to sinful human beings. It's only when we
have been brought to know God in the cross-resurrection event that our
"sanctified reason" is able to see - in the light of the cross - God at work
in the world. & then we can see that work in things that bear the mark of
the cross, like evolution through natural selection - things that to natural
reason seem to demonstrate the *absence* of God.
(The notion that God is a bit like us is a special case of the *analogia
entis*, the "analogy of being" which Barth so vehemently rejected. I think
this helps us to see why he understood the *imago* in terms of
relationship. Of course that dopesn't mean that reason has nothing to do
with it - it's hard to see how God could have a personal
relationship an entity incapable of reason.)
Shalom
George
Just to clarify the intent of a clumsy statement to which you rightly
objected. My point simply was that the Holy Spirit works faith in believers
but that we can't tell (by scientific means or otherwise) from the way a
person acts & speaks whether she/he really does believe or is a hypocrite.
Shalom
George
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
On 8/23/06, George Murphy <gmurphy@raex.com> wrote:
> I don't think that the *imago dei* concept adds much to the discussion.
> What does *imago dei *mean? The 3 main possibilities - "the 3 Rs" - are
> rationality, regency & relationship. I.e., creating humanity in the image
> of God means either that God endows us with reason, that we are to be God's
> representatives in creation, or that we are created to be in personal
> relationship with God. (These are not mutually exclusive - z.B., we would
> have to be rational in order to represent God adequately.) & in order to
> exercise any of those functions it is precisely the capacities for thought,
> conscious decision making &c - the things involved in mind - that must come
> into play.
>
> There is one further thing though, the ability to trust in God. This is
> an aspect of "relationship" is is one distinguished humanity as God intends
> us to be from humanity as fallen away from God, *justus* from *peccator* -
> 1st Commandment. & whether or not a person really trusts in God or is a
> hypocrite can't be determined externally, & certainly not by scientific
> investigation. All science can deal with is how a person behaves, not why a
> person behaves that way.
>
> Can science explain the choices that human beings make? To a certain
> extent it can, bringing out the various factors that influence those choices
> & explaining why they're effective. But ultimately no - science isn't going
> to be able to give a precise explanation for why Nebuchadrezar chooses
> to lay seige to Jerusalem instead of Rabbah ( Ez.21:18-22). But does it
> have to? The fact that quantum mechanics doesn't enable us to say which
> slit a photon goes through doesn't mean that we have to
> appeal to the idea of God to explain what happens. Perhaps our scientific
> understanding of human choices can be only statistical, like the type of
> understanding that QM gives us. (N.B. I'm not arguing here that human
> freedom of choice stems from QM but only that they're analogous.)
>
> But human persons have to be understood as persons, & personal knowledge
> isn't identical with factual knowledge. (Cf. the German distinction between
> *kennen *& *wissen* .) The better you know a person as a person,
> the better you can understand and perhaps even predict that person's
> choices. Some people - pastors, therapists &c - can be amazingly skilled at
> this.
>
> & finally, however discontened we may be with our inability to understand
> human choices, appealing to the idea of God doesn't answer the question. It
> doesn't tell us help us to understand why a person makes choice A or B.
>
>
> Shalom
> George
> http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> *To:* George Murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
> *Cc:* American Scientific Affiliation <asa@calvin.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 22, 2006 3:11 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation
>
>
> *Most importantly - the theological issue ought to be dealt with in terms
> of "creation" rather than "nature." And whatever your anthropology is,
> you'd better have the human mind like the body on the "creature" side of the
> basic re-creator divide. Whatever our minds are, they are not part of God.
> The theological claim which will ultimately be translated into MN is then
> that creation can be understood from within creation, without reference to
> the creator (etsi deus non daretur). *
>
> These are very insightful comments, as always, George, and welcome back.
> Here's my question about this point: I'm not sure distinguishing intential
> human action from "natural" causes is merely a matter of mind/body dualism.
> It seems to me also a matter of theology concerning the image of God in
> humanity. Can we really refer to the products of conscious human decisions
> without reference to the creator if we assert that humans are uniquely
> created in the image of God? I'd suggest this is one of the principal
> things that distinguishes the products of intentional human actions from
> "natural" causes: like God, humans are capable of making conscious
> decisions based on moral and other non-physical considerations (though as
> you note, of course, are minds are not God or part of God).
>
> Setting aside angels and other "spiritual" beings for the moment, humans
> are the only creatures endowed with this level of autonomy, as part
> of bearing the image of God. If a monistic view of the mind/body question
> is tied with strict determinism, I'd suggest that isn't a legitimate option
> for a Christian view of the mind. But for nonreductive physicalists, as
> you've allude to it, human choices supervene the physical properties in
> which they're grounded (in Nancey Murphy's terms, human beings exert
> "downward causation"). It's therefore hard for me to define human choices
> as strictly "natural," even if I hold a monistic view of the mind and body.
> Also, if MN allows for this kind of supervenient activity by humans
> exercising the image of God, it's hard for me to understand why, in
> principle, it can't allow for supervenience by God as well.
>
>
> On 8/22/06, George Murphy <gmurphy@raex.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > I was away for awhile & have been hesitant to jump into the middle of
> this thread but it seems to me that it's going in some odd directions. So -
>
> >
> > To begin with, while I realize that threads can get away from the
> description given in their subject line, it's unfortunate that "Creation and
> Incarnation" in being discussed primarily as a matter of philosophy rather
> than as theology. Perhaps I've missed the references but I don't see
> anything being said about Jesus Christ. & unless Christ - the one born of
> Mary & crucified under Pontius Pilate - provides the fundamental criterion,
> there's little point in talking about either creation or incarnation.
> >
> > Then there's the question of what may constitute a legitimate
> "methodological naturalism," & one of the points being debated is whether or
> not human activities can count as "natural." E.g., when a person is
> healed of a disease because a physician has given her a drug developed by a
> pharaceutical company, can that healing be said to have taken place by means
> of "natural processes"?
> >
> > I'm going to waive here (unless someone objects) the Aristotelian
> distinction between "natural" and "violent" motions. The reason for arguing
> that that healing was not entirely "natural" - & thus a phenomenon that can
> be understood by MN - seems to be a belief that human minds (of the patient,
> doctor, ^ scientist who developed the drug) are themselves not entirely
> "natural" - i.e., not themselves describable by a science consistent
> with MN. To this I reply -
> >
> > 1 Mind-body dualism is, IMO, a respectable view but it is not, even
> among Christians, the only view. (Cf. proponents of nonreductive
> physicalism.) & it seems strange to make our definition of what constitutes
> legitimate science depend on a debated anthropological position.
> >
> > 2) The thought processes, decision making patterns &c of people in
> different situations can be studied phenomenologically by psychologists
> without any presuppositions about the relationships between the mind and the
> physical world.
> >
> > 3) Most importantly - the theological issue ought to be dealt with in
> terms of "creation" rather than "nature." And whatever your anthropology
> is, you'd better have the human mind like the body on the "creature" side of
> the basic re-creator divide. Whatever our minds are, they are not part of
> God. The theological claim which will ultimately be translated into MN is
> then that creation can be understood from within creation, without reference
> to the creator (etsi deus non daretur). How this gets translated into a
> definition of science that is meaningful for non-Christians may be a
> difficult matter, but this is where we should start.
> >
> > 4) Finally, it should be noted that the question of the naturalness of
> human agency doesn't come up in situations in which MN is most strongly
> challenged - cosmology & biological evolution.
> >
> > Shalom
> > George
> > http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
>
>
>
>
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Received on Fri Aug 25 21:55:52 2006
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