Re: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...

*Of course it matters since religious purposes/effects may exist but if a
> valid secular purpose can be found, and one can thus argue that the
> policy served a primary secular purpose, the court has to reject an
> establishment clause violation on these grounds.*

Sorry, I can't make heads or tails of this sentence.

*So far I have yet to see my hypothetical example addressed such as
> teaching evolution as a religion.*

I addressed it twice; read the thread.

*Michael Dorf, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law at Columbia University
> School of Law, argues a very similar argument*

Then Dorf also is wrong.

On 1/8/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> > I think we've beaten this dead horse to a bloody pulp. As we've been
> > over several times before, it doesn't matter what the board argued.
>
>
> Of course it matters since religious purposes/effects may exist but if a
> valid secular purpose can be found, and one can thus argue that the
> policy served a primary secular purpose, the court has to reject an
> establishment clause violation on these grounds.
>
> > The court doesn't have to address every specious argument a party
> > makes (or even every good one).
>
> In this case the issue however was hardly specious but rather essential
>
> > As to running in circles, if that's what I'm doing, it's only because
> > I have to keep chasing you around. I've outlined the relevant law,
> > given quotes from the cases, and provided several hypothetical
> > examples (including the "evolution as religion" example that you try
> > to raise below yet again) showing why my understanding of the case law
> > works and yours doesn't, and given my perspective as a seasoned
> > litigator. I don't want to spend any more time or bandwidth on this.
>
> So far I have yet to see my hypothetical example addressed such as
> teaching evolution as a religion. As the hypothetical examples have
> shown, the existence of a legitimate secular purpose is highly relevant.
>
> Michael Dorf, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law at Columbia University
> School of Law, argues a very similar argument
>
> "*Discerning the Objective Purpose of the Dover Policy: Why it
> Matters Whether Intelligent Design is a Scientific Theory*
>
> But how should courts go about attributing a purpose to the
> proponents of laws mandating the teaching of intelligent design? The
> obvious answer is to ask whether intelligent design is a valid
> scientific theory*"*
>
> *
> and
>
> *
>
> *"*But given the social reality, "intelligent design" is different.
> It is an allegedly scientific theory that bears a striking
> resemblance to religious views. When the government mandates that
> students be taught such a theory, courts are rightly suspicious."
>
> At that point, a court should ask whether intelligent design is, in
> fact, a scientific theory at all. It should do so, not because of
> any general obligation on the part of schools to teach science
> correctly, but simply because if intelligent design is _not_
> science, then the inference is almost inescapable that the state is
> impermissibly acting for the purpose of fostering a religious
viewpoint.
>
> http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20041222.html
>
> Which mirrors my argument that a finding that ID is not science,
> inescapably leads to a ruling that the act was impermissible. Since
> legislative purpose itself cannot be sufficient to find that a
> particular purpose or effect is necessarily religious, especially if a
> valid and primary secular purpose can be identified, these issues and
> questions are highly relevant to have the court address.
>
>
>
Received on Sun Jan 8 21:03:00 2006