Re: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...

David Opderbeck wrote:

> I think we've beaten this dead horse to a bloody pulp. As we've been
> over several times before, it doesn't matter what the board argued.

Of course it matters since religious purposes/effects may exist but if a
valid secular purpose can be found, and one can thus argue that the
policy served a primary secular purpose, the court has to reject an
establishment clause violation on these grounds.

> The court doesn't have to address every specious argument a party
> makes (or even every good one).

In this case the issue however was hardly specious but rather essential

> As to running in circles, if that's what I'm doing, it's only because
> I have to keep chasing you around. I've outlined the relevant law,
> given quotes from the cases, and provided several hypothetical
> examples (including the "evolution as religion" example that you try
> to raise below yet again) showing why my understanding of the case law
> works and yours doesn't, and given my perspective as a seasoned
> litigator. I don't want to spend any more time or bandwidth on this.

So far I have yet to see my hypothetical example addressed such as
teaching evolution as a religion. As the hypothetical examples have
shown, the existence of a legitimate secular purpose is highly relevant.

Michael Dorf, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law at Columbia University
School of Law, argues a very similar argument

    "*Discerning the Objective Purpose of the Dover Policy: Why it
    Matters Whether Intelligent Design is a Scientific Theory*

    But how should courts go about attributing a purpose to the
    proponents of laws mandating the teaching of intelligent design? The
    obvious answer is to ask whether intelligent design is a valid
    scientific theory*"*

*
and

*

    *"*But given the social reality, "intelligent design" is different.
    It is an allegedly scientific theory that bears a striking
    resemblance to religious views. When the government mandates that
    students be taught such a theory, courts are rightly suspicious."

    At that point, a court should ask whether intelligent design is, in
    fact, a scientific theory at all. It should do so, not because of
    any general obligation on the part of schools to teach science
    correctly, but simply because if intelligent design is _not_
    science, then the inference is almost inescapable that the state is
    impermissibly acting for the purpose of fostering a religious viewpoint.

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20041222.html

Which mirrors my argument that a finding that ID is not science,
inescapably leads to a ruling that the act was impermissible. Since
legislative purpose itself cannot be sufficient to find that a
particular purpose or effect is necessarily religious, especially if a
valid and primary secular purpose can be identified, these issues and
questions are highly relevant to have the court address.
Received on Sun Jan 8 20:01:58 2006