David Opderbeck wrote:
> /Of course it matters since religious purposes/effects may exist but if a
> > valid secular purpose can be found, and one can thus argue that the
> > policy served a primary secular purpose, the court has to reject an
> > establishment clause violation on these grounds./
>
> Sorry, I can't make heads or tails of this sentence.
I am sorry to hear this. Even if religious purposes exist, if the
primary purpose is secular, then the court has to address the secular
purpose.
>
> /So far I have yet to see my hypothetical example addressed such as
> > teaching evolution as a religion./
>
> I addressed it twice; read the thread.
Not really, you argue that motives is what determines purpose. In case
of the hypothetical example, the motives were the same as in Kitzmiller,
only the issue of teaching evolution was not. In other words, there is
more than just the simple idea that the subjective motives of the Dover
board are sufficient to find a establishment clause violation
>
> /Michael Dorf, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law at Columbia University
> > School of Law, argues a very similar argument/
>
> Then Dorf also is wrong.
>
Sure, Dort is wrong, Judge Jones is wrong, I am wrong...
Received on Sun Jan 8 21:44:59 2006
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