Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

My love/hate relationship with QM. I think it is interesting, but it bothers me because it seems, I don't know how to put it, distant, and yet it is at work all the time. Now Superposition and entanglement. I haven't given these alot of thought, but is there any hope what so ever for these postulates from an indeterministic perspective?

John

----- Original Message -----
From: "jack syme" <drsyme@cablespeed.com>
To: "Loren Haarsma" <lhaarsma@calvin.edu>, "_American Sci Affil" <asa@calvin.edu>
Subject: Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 21:00:22 -0500

>
> I am going to go with Option 2. Not only because I am a Calvinist,
> ( I agree with George that reformed theology doesnt necessarily
> mean humans have no free will.), but because completely
> deterministic theories explain (as far as I know) the thorny
> problems of superposition and entanglement.
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Loren Haarsma" <lhaarsma@calvin.edu>
> To: "_American Sci Affil" <asa@calvin.edu>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 3:30 PM
> Subject: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)
>
>
> >
> >
> > I have two general questions for the group on this topic.
> >
> > SETTING UP THE PROBLEM:
> >
> > As John Hewlett pointed out in an earlier email, from about the time of
> > Newton until the time of Bohr, the "laws of nature" were thought by most
> > scientists to be completely deterministic.
> > Bohr and most scientists following him have interpreted quantum
> > mechanics as including a mix of determinism and indeterminism. However,
> > from Bohr's time until the present, there have been and are some
> > physicists who offer "hidden variable" interpretations of quantum
> > mechanics which are still completely deterministic.
> >
> > If the laws of physics are fully deterministic, this is often thought of
> > as being antithetical to traditional notions of human free will (although
> > this is open for debate). We might FEEL like we consciously choose to do
> > something, but our choices are REALLY determined by the laws which govern
> > the motions of fundamental particles --- perhaps even in some cases by
> > those undetectable but nevertheless deterministic quantum hidden
> > variables.
> > If physical determinism does overthrow traditional notions of free will,
> > this is often thought of as being antithetical to Christian theology ---
> > although this also is open for debate.
> > It's also worth pointing out that even if you maintain the "standard"
> > interpretation of quantum mechanics, that some events truly are
> > indeterministic, some philosophers have pointed out that this does not
> > necessarily give you free will. Some have argued that if
> > fundamental-laws-of-physics-are-all-deterministic is antithetical to
> > traditional notions of free will, then
> > fundamental-laws-of-physics-which-include-both-determinism-and-indeterminism
> > are just as antithetical.
> >
> >
> > FIRST QUESTION:
> >
> > Despite the fact that the time from Newton to Bohr covers several
> > centuries, I'm not aware of many Christians who have wrestled
> > theologically with the prospect that the fundamental laws of nature might
> > be fully deterministic . A few have, and I'm aware of three general
> > categories of answers:
> >
> > (Option 1) Add a dualistic immaterial soul to the mechanistic
> > body/brain, and have the soul be the source of free will as traditionally
> > defined.
> >
> > (Option 2) Challenge the notion that the traditional view of free will
> > is a necessary view for Christian theology. Following the sort of
> > approach of theologian Jonathan Edwards, re-examine and re-define what we
> > mean by "free will." Edwards, for example, wrote: "With respect to the
> > grand inquiry, 'what determines the will?' ... It is sufficient to my
> > present purpose to say, it is that motive which, as it stands in view of
> > the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." (A Careful and
> > Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will, Part
> > 1, section 2) (It might be worth noting that, although Edwards knew
> > science, his work was probably more motivated by a Calvinist theology of
> > God's sovereignty than by scientific considerations.)
> >
> > (Option 3) Challenge the notion that deterministic laws of physics
> > really are antithetical to more-or-less traditional concepts of human free
> > will. This is how I understand some of Donald MacKay's writings (e.g.
> > "Behind the Eye," "Man as a Mechanism").
> >
> >
> > Question: What other approaches have you folks encountered? Or what
> > significant expansions of one of those three approaches listed above?
> >
> >
> > SECOND QUESTION:
> >
> > Is anyone familiar with good evolutionary / adaptationist defenses of
> > the "traditional" notion of free will?
> > The idea here is: Suppose our conscious thoughts really CAN influence
> > our behavioral choice --- which is how we traditionally understand free
> > will. It makes a lot of sense that such an ability would be adaptive and
> > evolutionarily selective. However, suppose this conscious "ability" to
> > affect our choices is an illusion because our choices are REALLY
> > determined by the underlying physical laws acting on the particles in our
> > brains. It that case, our conscious choice-making would not truly be
> > adaptive, would it? It would seem to be epiphenomenon. It seems almost
> > beyond belief (but not impossible) that anything so remarkable as
> > consciousness would be merely an evolutionary epiphenomenon, and not
> > actually adaptive.
> > So, do any of you know of writings which have expanded on this argument?
> >
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> >
> > Loren Haarsma
> >
> >

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