Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

To me the most fascinating aspect of quantum mechanics, is the effects on
the system by the presence of an observer. And it just made sense to think
that the only way this could work is if both the observer and the system are
part of the same deterministic universe.

And apparently yes that is the case, deBroglie-Bohmian mechanics does
explain this quantum weirdness.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#2s

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Hewlett" <john.hewlett@usa.com>
To: <asa@calvin.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2005 11:42 PM
Subject: Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

> My love/hate relationship with QM. I think it is interesting, but it
> bothers me because it seems, I don't know how to put it, distant, and yet
> it is at work all the time. Now Superposition and entanglement. I haven't
> given these alot of thought, but is there any hope what so ever for these
> postulates from an indeterministic perspective?
>
> John
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "jack syme" <drsyme@cablespeed.com>
> To: "Loren Haarsma" <lhaarsma@calvin.edu>, "_American Sci Affil"
> <asa@calvin.edu>
> Subject: Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)
> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 21:00:22 -0500
>
>>
>> I am going to go with Option 2. Not only because I am a Calvinist,
>> ( I agree with George that reformed theology doesnt necessarily
>> mean humans have no free will.), but because completely
>> deterministic theories explain (as far as I know) the thorny
>> problems of superposition and entanglement.
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Loren Haarsma" <lhaarsma@calvin.edu>
>> To: "_American Sci Affil" <asa@calvin.edu>
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 3:30 PM
>> Subject: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)
>>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > I have two general questions for the group on this topic.
>> >
>> > SETTING UP THE PROBLEM:
>> >
>> > As John Hewlett pointed out in an earlier email, from about the time
>> > of
>> > Newton until the time of Bohr, the "laws of nature" were thought by
>> > most
>> > scientists to be completely deterministic.
>> > Bohr and most scientists following him have interpreted quantum
>> > mechanics as including a mix of determinism and indeterminism.
>> > However,
>> > from Bohr's time until the present, there have been and are some
>> > physicists who offer "hidden variable" interpretations of quantum
>> > mechanics which are still completely deterministic.
>> >
>> > If the laws of physics are fully deterministic, this is often thought
>> > of
>> > as being antithetical to traditional notions of human free will
>> > (although
>> > this is open for debate). We might FEEL like we consciously choose to
>> > do
>> > something, but our choices are REALLY determined by the laws which
>> > govern
>> > the motions of fundamental particles --- perhaps even in some cases by
>> > those undetectable but nevertheless deterministic quantum hidden
>> > variables.
>> > If physical determinism does overthrow traditional notions of free
>> > will,
>> > this is often thought of as being antithetical to Christian
>> > theology ---
>> > although this also is open for debate.
>> > It's also worth pointing out that even if you maintain the "standard"
>> > interpretation of quantum mechanics, that some events truly are
>> > indeterministic, some philosophers have pointed out that this does not
>> > necessarily give you free will. Some have argued that if
>> > fundamental-laws-of-physics-are-all-deterministic is antithetical to
>> > traditional notions of free will, then
>> > fundamental-laws-of-physics-which-include-both-determinism-and-indeterminism
>> > are just as antithetical.
>> >
>> >
>> > FIRST QUESTION:
>> >
>> > Despite the fact that the time from Newton to Bohr covers several
>> > centuries, I'm not aware of many Christians who have wrestled
>> > theologically with the prospect that the fundamental laws of nature
>> > might
>> > be fully deterministic . A few have, and I'm aware of three general
>> > categories of answers:
>> >
>> > (Option 1) Add a dualistic immaterial soul to the mechanistic
>> > body/brain, and have the soul be the source of free will as
>> > traditionally
>> > defined.
>> >
>> > (Option 2) Challenge the notion that the traditional view of free will
>> > is a necessary view for Christian theology. Following the sort of
>> > approach of theologian Jonathan Edwards, re-examine and re-define what
>> > we
>> > mean by "free will." Edwards, for example, wrote: "With respect to the
>> > grand inquiry, 'what determines the will?' ... It is sufficient to my
>> > present purpose to say, it is that motive which, as it stands in view
>> > of
>> > the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." (A Careful and
>> > Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will,
>> > Part
>> > 1, section 2) (It might be worth noting that, although Edwards knew
>> > science, his work was probably more motivated by a Calvinist theology
>> > of
>> > God's sovereignty than by scientific considerations.)
>> >
>> > (Option 3) Challenge the notion that deterministic laws of physics
>> > really are antithetical to more-or-less traditional concepts of human
>> > free
>> > will. This is how I understand some of Donald MacKay's writings (e.g.
>> > "Behind the Eye," "Man as a Mechanism").
>> >
>> >
>> > Question: What other approaches have you folks encountered? Or what
>> > significant expansions of one of those three approaches listed above?
>> >
>> >
>> > SECOND QUESTION:
>> >
>> > Is anyone familiar with good evolutionary / adaptationist defenses of
>> > the "traditional" notion of free will?
>> > The idea here is: Suppose our conscious thoughts really CAN influence
>> > our behavioral choice --- which is how we traditionally understand free
>> > will. It makes a lot of sense that such an ability would be adaptive
>> > and
>> > evolutionarily selective. However, suppose this conscious "ability" to
>> > affect our choices is an illusion because our choices are REALLY
>> > determined by the underlying physical laws acting on the particles in
>> > our
>> > brains. It that case, our conscious choice-making would not truly be
>> > adaptive, would it? It would seem to be epiphenomenon. It seems
>> > almost
>> > beyond belief (but not impossible) that anything so remarkable as
>> > consciousness would be merely an evolutionary epiphenomenon, and not
>> > actually adaptive.
>> > So, do any of you know of writings which have expanded on this
>> > argument?
>> >
>> >
>> > Thanks.
>> >
>> >
>> > Loren Haarsma
>> >
>> >
>
> --
> ___________________________________________________________
> Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com
> http://promo.mail.com/adsfreejump.htm
>
Received on Thu Mar 24 05:45:37 2005