Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

  I have two general questions for the group on this topic.

SETTING UP THE PROBLEM:

  As John Hewlett pointed out in an earlier email, from about the time of
Newton until the time of Bohr, the "laws of nature" were thought by most
scientists to be completely deterministic.
  Bohr and most scientists following him have interpreted quantum
mechanics as including a mix of determinism and indeterminism. However,
from Bohr's time until the present, there have been and are some
physicists who offer "hidden variable" interpretations of quantum
mechanics which are still completely deterministic.

  If the laws of physics are fully deterministic, this is often thought of
as being antithetical to traditional notions of human free will (although
this is open for debate). We might FEEL like we consciously choose to do
something, but our choices are REALLY determined by the laws which govern
the motions of fundamental particles --- perhaps even in some cases by
those undetectable but nevertheless deterministic quantum hidden
variables.
  If physical determinism does overthrow traditional notions of free will,
this is often thought of as being antithetical to Christian theology ---
although this also is open for debate.
  It's also worth pointing out that even if you maintain the "standard"
interpretation of quantum mechanics, that some events truly are
indeterministic, some philosophers have pointed out that this does not
necessarily give you free will. Some have argued that if
fundamental-laws-of-physics-are-all-deterministic is antithetical to
traditional notions of free will, then
fundamental-laws-of-physics-which-include-both-determinism-and-indeterminism
are just as antithetical.

FIRST QUESTION:

  Despite the fact that the time from Newton to Bohr covers several
centuries, I'm not aware of many Christians who have wrestled
theologically with the prospect that the fundamental laws of nature might
be fully deterministic . A few have, and I'm aware of three general
categories of answers:

  (Option 1) Add a dualistic immaterial soul to the mechanistic
body/brain, and have the soul be the source of free will as traditionally
defined.

  (Option 2) Challenge the notion that the traditional view of free will
is a necessary view for Christian theology. Following the sort of
approach of theologian Jonathan Edwards, re-examine and re-define what we
mean by "free will." Edwards, for example, wrote: "With respect to the
grand inquiry, 'what determines the will?' ... It is sufficient to my
present purpose to say, it is that motive which, as it stands in view of
the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." (A Careful and
Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will, Part
1, section 2) (It might be worth noting that, although Edwards knew
science, his work was probably more motivated by a Calvinist theology of
God's sovereignty than by scientific considerations.)

  (Option 3) Challenge the notion that deterministic laws of physics
really are antithetical to more-or-less traditional concepts of human free
will. This is how I understand some of Donald MacKay's writings (e.g.
"Behind the Eye," "Man as a Mechanism").

  Question: What other approaches have you folks encountered? Or what
significant expansions of one of those three approaches listed above?

SECOND QUESTION:

  Is anyone familiar with good evolutionary / adaptationist defenses of
the "traditional" notion of free will?
  The idea here is: Suppose our conscious thoughts really CAN influence
our behavioral choice --- which is how we traditionally understand free
will. It makes a lot of sense that such an ability would be adaptive and
evolutionarily selective. However, suppose this conscious "ability" to
affect our choices is an illusion because our choices are REALLY
determined by the underlying physical laws acting on the particles in our
brains. It that case, our conscious choice-making would not truly be
adaptive, would it? It would seem to be epiphenomenon. It seems almost
beyond belief (but not impossible) that anything so remarkable as
consciousness would be merely an evolutionary epiphenomenon, and not
actually adaptive.
  So, do any of you know of writings which have expanded on this argument?

Thanks.

Loren Haarsma
Received on Tue Mar 22 15:31:41 2005