Re: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

I am going to go with Option 2. Not only because I am a Calvinist, ( I
agree with George that reformed theology doesnt necessarily mean humans have
no free will.), but because completely deterministic theories explain (as
far as I know) the thorny problems of superposition and entanglement.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Loren Haarsma" <lhaarsma@calvin.edu>
To: "_American Sci Affil" <asa@calvin.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 3:30 PM
Subject: Determinism and Free Will (and Quantum Mechanics)

>
>
> I have two general questions for the group on this topic.
>
> SETTING UP THE PROBLEM:
>
> As John Hewlett pointed out in an earlier email, from about the time of
> Newton until the time of Bohr, the "laws of nature" were thought by most
> scientists to be completely deterministic.
> Bohr and most scientists following him have interpreted quantum
> mechanics as including a mix of determinism and indeterminism. However,
> from Bohr's time until the present, there have been and are some
> physicists who offer "hidden variable" interpretations of quantum
> mechanics which are still completely deterministic.
>
> If the laws of physics are fully deterministic, this is often thought of
> as being antithetical to traditional notions of human free will (although
> this is open for debate). We might FEEL like we consciously choose to do
> something, but our choices are REALLY determined by the laws which govern
> the motions of fundamental particles --- perhaps even in some cases by
> those undetectable but nevertheless deterministic quantum hidden
> variables.
> If physical determinism does overthrow traditional notions of free will,
> this is often thought of as being antithetical to Christian theology ---
> although this also is open for debate.
> It's also worth pointing out that even if you maintain the "standard"
> interpretation of quantum mechanics, that some events truly are
> indeterministic, some philosophers have pointed out that this does not
> necessarily give you free will. Some have argued that if
> fundamental-laws-of-physics-are-all-deterministic is antithetical to
> traditional notions of free will, then
> fundamental-laws-of-physics-which-include-both-determinism-and-indeterminism
> are just as antithetical.
>
>
> FIRST QUESTION:
>
> Despite the fact that the time from Newton to Bohr covers several
> centuries, I'm not aware of many Christians who have wrestled
> theologically with the prospect that the fundamental laws of nature might
> be fully deterministic . A few have, and I'm aware of three general
> categories of answers:
>
> (Option 1) Add a dualistic immaterial soul to the mechanistic
> body/brain, and have the soul be the source of free will as traditionally
> defined.
>
> (Option 2) Challenge the notion that the traditional view of free will
> is a necessary view for Christian theology. Following the sort of
> approach of theologian Jonathan Edwards, re-examine and re-define what we
> mean by "free will." Edwards, for example, wrote: "With respect to the
> grand inquiry, 'what determines the will?' ... It is sufficient to my
> present purpose to say, it is that motive which, as it stands in view of
> the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." (A Careful and
> Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will, Part
> 1, section 2) (It might be worth noting that, although Edwards knew
> science, his work was probably more motivated by a Calvinist theology of
> God's sovereignty than by scientific considerations.)
>
> (Option 3) Challenge the notion that deterministic laws of physics
> really are antithetical to more-or-less traditional concepts of human free
> will. This is how I understand some of Donald MacKay's writings (e.g.
> "Behind the Eye," "Man as a Mechanism").
>
>
> Question: What other approaches have you folks encountered? Or what
> significant expansions of one of those three approaches listed above?
>
>
> SECOND QUESTION:
>
> Is anyone familiar with good evolutionary / adaptationist defenses of
> the "traditional" notion of free will?
> The idea here is: Suppose our conscious thoughts really CAN influence
> our behavioral choice --- which is how we traditionally understand free
> will. It makes a lot of sense that such an ability would be adaptive and
> evolutionarily selective. However, suppose this conscious "ability" to
> affect our choices is an illusion because our choices are REALLY
> determined by the underlying physical laws acting on the particles in our
> brains. It that case, our conscious choice-making would not truly be
> adaptive, would it? It would seem to be epiphenomenon. It seems almost
> beyond belief (but not impossible) that anything so remarkable as
> consciousness would be merely an evolutionary epiphenomenon, and not
> actually adaptive.
> So, do any of you know of writings which have expanded on this argument?
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> Loren Haarsma
>
>
Received on Wed Mar 23 21:00:59 2005