Loren
>People on the minority side of scientific opinion often accuse their
>opponents (scientists on the majority side) of being blinded by
>philosophical commitments. These philosophical commitments, so the
>accusation goes, make the "majority" scientists unwilling or incapable
>of seeing and fairly evaluating data which challenges their theories.
Chris
Of course, often the majority is right, but not always. We can't tell who's
right by whether they are in the majority or not.
I think, for example, that the majority view of Quantum Mechanics is
definitely wrong in their interpretation of the observational facts, and
that they are wrong in specifically philosophical ways. In fact, their
interpretation essentially *is* a philosophical view, and one that cannot,
even in principle, be validated empirically, because indeterminism has no
empirical distinguishing factors by which it can possibly be tested. That
is, by the very definition of indeterminism, there is nothing about it that
makes it imply any particular *observable* facts that could be used to test
it. This is because deterministic systems can emulate *indeterministic*
systems to *any* degree of observational accuracy, by merely including
factors that are not (yet) observable to us but which produce the
apparently indeterministic behavior that we *do* observe. For derogatory
reasons (I think), these are called "hidden variables" in relation to
Quantum Mechanics. In other sciences, they are simply called "unknowns," or
factors that we have not yet established the nature of. The Copenhagen
interpretation is circular in its protection of itself, because it simply
regards such factors as being non-existent, thus inhibiting research that
might establish the existence and nature of these unknowns.
Nevertheless, I agree that we cannot simply automatically say that the
majority opinion in science is unable or unwilling to see the truth because
of philosophical biases when we happen to disagree with this opinion. Also,
observe that *if* someone comes up with a good scientific conceptualization
of sub-quantum factors that give Quantum Mechanics a demonstrably
deterministic basis, those who now accept the Copenhagen interpretation
will more or less readily change their views. Thus, though they believe as
they currently do for philosophical reasons, and despite the lack of
evidence *for* their position, there is also a current lack of strong
*empirical* evidence *against* their position. Thus, their error is that
they are holding an unproved (and unprovable) position, but *not* that they
are rejecting positive evidence.
How does this apply to the evolution debate? In this case, the core issue
*is* scientific, and there *is* evidence for evolution. Many opponents of
NET (Naturalistic Evolutionary Theory) often argue on specifically
*non-*scientific grounds against it. Others at least *try* to argue against
it on the basis of evidence, or on the basis of claims of flaws in NET (and
still others mostly just *pretend* to be arguing on the basis of evidence
or by pointing out flaws in pro-NET arguments).
In my own case, the same philosophical premises that lead me to disagree
with the majority (Copenhagen) interpretation of Quantum Mechanics also
lead me to *agree* with the majority scientific opinion with respect to
evolution. On of these philosophical premises is the burden of proof
principle, which requires that indeterminists prove their case and that
those who accept microevolution prove their claims that macroevolution is
somehow fundamentally, *qualitatively* different from merely multiple steps
of microevolution. The supporters of the Copenhagen interpretation agree
that matter in the large is deterministic, so they have the burden of
proving that subatomic behavior of matter is an exception. Otherwise,
parsimony requires that we presume determinism in everything *until*
evidence against it arises. Similarly, once a creationist or contemporary
ID theorist *agrees* that the genetic material of an offspring may be
different from that of the parent organism(s), then the claims that
macroevolution is different become exceptional and require special positive
evidence. If there is no evidence *against* the proposition that evolution
in nature is just *all* microevolution (or recombination and/or accretion
of existing genetic material), then we have to presume, until *evidence*
suggests otherwise, that that's simply what biological evolution *is* (on
Earth, at least).
In principle, this could be wrong, but this is the way to bet until and
unless real contrary empirical evidence is in fact found. Unfortunately, if
real evidence against NET theory is found, it may be buried for a long time
in the mountains of bad argument against naturalistic macroevolution from
the likes of Phillip Johnson and Duane Gish, bad argument motivated nearly
always and almost entirely by *their* bad philosophical premises (including
the ones that allow them to ignore the fact that the non-naturalism
requires special evidence and argument because of the metaphysically
radical nature of its claims).
(Indeed, one of the main reasons I do not hold *any* such beliefs is that
they *do* require such evidence and argument. "But, isn't it unfair to
impose such a burden on one side of an argument?" someone may say. No,
because there is no *requirement* that non-naturalism be accepted at all.
Those who make positive claims have the burden of proof. The obvious way to
avoid the burden of proof for non-naturalism is not to claim that
non-naturalism is true. The extra burden of proof is inherent in the
*claims* being made, not in standards arbitrarily imposed from outside. If
this burden of proof cannot be carried, the obvious solution is to drop the
claims, not to complain because one has adopted such radical claims that no
philosophical or empirical validation is known even to be possible.)
People like Johnson need to do a lot more than refute local naturalistic
evolution to prove non-naturalism. They need to prove something such as
that life, *as such*, could not exist naturalistically in the entire known
(*and* unknown) universe. And yet, their focus is merely on disproving
naturalistic evolution here on Earth and then, assuming that they have done
so, leaping, without logical support, across the metaphysical and
epistemological chasm between the natural Universe and their non-natural
"Intelligent Designer."
Because *they* are the one's making all the radical claims, they naturally
have the most burden of proof, *both* scientifically and philosophically,
so they are not in a good position to complain that everyone is rejecting
their ideas merely because of philosophical bias. Undoubtedly, there are
supporters of evolution who don't really understand either the scientific
or the philosophical issues and who rather blindly uphold evolution. But
very few of these people are on lists like these, and they don't change the
basic epistemological requirements that ID theory (and, especially,
non-naturalism) must satisfy.
In short, if they don't like the epistemological demands imposed on them by
their claims, they should just drop the claims. They definitely should not
be claiming that the ordinary standards of evidence and logic held by
ordinary supporters of NET should be lowered just so such beliefs will
become "scientifically" acceptable.
The standards supported by Johnson, Gish, Steve Jones, and others are
unacceptably weak; they would allow us to take as established scientific
knowledge all manner of lunatic ideas that have no empirical support. This
would defeat the purpose of having such standards in the first place:
Limiting acceptable theories to those for which there is some basis in
reality that we know of. If random, arbitrary ideas can be accepted as
scientific knowledge, the whole idea of scientific knowledge is
fundamentally debased.
I, for one, will not accept such degeneration of the idea of scientific
knowledge (and philosophical knowledge, for that matter) just so people
like Johnson and Jones can have their *religious* beliefs passed off as
science. That does not seem like a good trade-off at all. It may be
unfortunate (in the views of some) that science does not give precedence to
people's personal pre-scientific religious beliefs, but that's just the way
science is. If you want to support the idea that the Earth rests on the
back of a giant turtle, *or* the idea that the Universe and life were
created by a metaphysically transcendent "Intelligent Designer," you simply
take on the burden of proof implied by such claims, and that's all there is
to it. There's no evading it by trying to get the standards lowered so
they will allow unsupported ideas to be accepted as science.
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