Scientists changing their philosophy to fit the data.

From: Loren Haarsma (lhaarsma@ursa.calvin.edu)
Date: Fri Jun 02 2000 - 10:52:31 EDT

  • Next message: Richard Wein: "Re: Scientists changing their philosophy to fit the data."

    People on the minority side of scientific opinion often accuse their
    opponents (scientists on the majority side) of being blinded by
    philosophical commitments. These philosophical commitments, so the
    accusation goes, make the "majority" scientists unwilling or incapable
    of seeing and fairly evaluating data which challenges their theories.

    I'm not just referring to the modern debates over evolution and
    intelligent design. Similar accusations are made by modern proponents of
    steady-state cosmology, cold fusion, certain kinds of
    "alternative" medical therapies, and by certain groups in the
    debate over global climate change, to name just a few modern examples.
    This is nothing new. Accusations of philosophical bias or philosophical
    blindness to data are probably as old as scientific disputes
    themselves. The making of such accusations appears endemic to groups who
    are in the scientific minority for prolonged periods of time. (Not
    that *all* scientific minorities make such accusations. For example, I
    don't believe that Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen or Bell, who were in a
    scientific minority opposing the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
    mechanics, made such accusations against their opponents.)

    How justified are such accusations? Historically, the "scientific
    majority" has, in the face of data, altered its philosophical commitments
    quite a few times. I think it would be instructive to make a list of
    such incidents.

    A few weeks ago, Brian Harper mentioned one example of science
    "changing its philosophy": acceptance of the Principle of Least
    Action. (I've copied the relevant portion of Brian's post at the end
    of this one.)

    I'm interested in expanding the following list. I would also like to add
    interesting/important historical details to the items on this list.

    A) Sometimes scientists alter their whole philosophy of science, their
    understanding of how science "ought to be done" (reminiscent of current
    debates over methodological naturalism).

      A1) Acceptance of Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation.
    Newton was criticized for proposing gravity as a "spooky action at a
    distance." Newton did not offer a formal hypothesis for the mechanism
    of gravitational attraction. Some scientists objected that this was
    bad science. Good science, they claimed, required hypotheses about
    mechanism. Good science, they claimed, only proposed effects of one
    object on another when those objects were in contact (or had some
    obvious medium for exchanging the force). Newton's Law of Universal
    Gravitation violated those widely-held convictions about how science
    ought to be done. But Newton's law was so successful at explaining the
    data that it was quickly accepted by nearly all scientists.

      A2) Acceptance of the indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics.
    Before Quantum Mechanics, almost any scientist or philosopher would
    tell you that one of the hallmarks of good science is Determinism. The
    majority rapidly changed what philosophical commitment with the success
    of Quantum Mechanics at explaining the data.

      A3) Acceptance of the Principle of Least Action, as worked out by
    Maupertuis and Euler (described below).

    B) Sometimes scientists modify a deeply held philosophical/worldview
    belief.

      B1) Acceptance of Big Bang Cosmology.
    Before the success of Big Bang Cosmology, nearly all cosmologists
    shared a strong philosophical preference for Steady State Cosmology ---
    the view that the history of the cosmos should stretch infinitely far
    backwards in time. In fact, it's probably fair to say that many
    modern-day cosmologists still have a philosophical preference for
    steady-state cosmology. Nevertheless, they believe Big Bang cosmology
    because of the evidence.

      B2) Rejection of Vitalism in biology.
    Before a certain time in history, most scientists assumed that some of
    the fundamental principles governing biology where different from those
    in the physical sciences. It was even widely believed that chemicals
    and substances obtained from living organisms could NOT be synthesized
    by physical means (since substances made by physical means would lack
    some "vital element").

    C) Sometimes scientists modify deeply held scientific beliefs which
    border on being philosophical beliefs.

      C1) Acceptance of Plate Tectonics in geology.

      C2) Rejection of the theory of Spontaneous Generation in biology.
    It was once widely believed that certain simple life forms could
    "spontaneously generate" out of mud, decaying food, etc.

      C3) Acceptance of the idea that no mechanical medium ("ether") is
      required for the transmission of electromagnetic waves.

    ----------

    That's enough of a list for now.

    ----------

    Loren Haarsma
    Physics Dept.
    Calvin College

    ----------

    > From: Brian Harper
    >
    > Here is an interesting historical example. One of the greatest, some
    > say *the* greatest principles of science is the principle of least
    > action, a teleological principle. The principle was developed by
    > Maupertuis in the mid to early 1700's, if I remember correctly. It is
    > commonly thought that teleological principles were acceptable at this
    > time. Nothing could be further from the truth. Maupertuis was
    > ridiculed by almost all of the scientific community. His only defender
    > (among well known scientists, as far as I'm aware) was Euler, who later
    > took Maupertuis idea and shaped into the calculus of variations. A
    > similar principle, the principle of least time, was proposed by Fermat
    > at about the same time (a little before), and met with similar ridicule
    > and scorn.
    >
    > To make matters worse, Maupertuis heaped his own abuse and ridicule
    > upon the traditional argument from design (ala Paley). So, the poor guy
    > was caught in the middle, being hammered from both sides. But in the
    > end, Maupertuis and Fermat won, because their principles worked.
    >
    > The point is that principles that scientists might find objectionable
    > from a philosophical point of view are nevertheless accepted, provided
    > they work. Another example of this is the idea that the universe had a
    > beginning.
    >



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