Bertvan@aol.com writes
in message <e3.2498be0.2600f00b@aol.com>:
>
> Bertvan: I don't define "free will" as making decisions based
> on nothing. It is an action based on existing information.
> You and I might have the same information, but my "will" commits
> me to one action, and yours commits you to another. I'm trying
> to find out if you believe the force which committed us each
> to different actions performed a real choice, or were those
> decisions merely the inevitable result of different molecules
> and neural connections in each or our respective brains? If
> you think it was a real choice, can science define, predict,
> manipulate or explain "free will"? Do you consider "free
> will" a force "within the universe" or from without?
Ted:
I prefer the former -- results of the motion of atomic
particles -- because the latter doesn't make sense to me.
One's will never functions like a random generator. We
examine the choices and based on our experiences we
pick the one we feel is right. Thus our will is a direct
function of what we observe, what we've experienced and
our genetic makeup. Those, in turn, appear to depend directly
on other factors within the universe. The dependency chain
continues and no where do I see it necessary to postulate a
dependency on something outside the universe, nor on a
previously undiscovered force.
> Ted:
> > Why must creativity be necessarily explained by looking outside
> >the universe? Again, that seems contrary to experience and common
> >sense. What I'm getting at in both cases is that a definition of "free
> >will" and "creativity" that invokes the "super" natural has more
> >problems with it than one that doesn't.
>
> Bertvan:
> I'm not the one who believes unexplainable forces are outside
> the universe. I was under the impression you believed any God
> who could occasionally override "the laws of nature", would have
> to be outside the universe, and considered "supernatural". If
> "free will" were able to sometimes override laws of nature, such
> as instincts and bodily functions as examples, how is that any
> less "supernatural" than God doing it? And if "creativity" is
> able to produce something completely new in the universe, how
> is that any less "supernatural" than God creating it? My
> understanding of "free will" and creativity are no greater than
> my understanding of God. One explanation doesn't create more
> problems than the other -- for me. I'm an agnostic, but I have
> no problem with the possible existence of God.
Ted:
If "free will" and "creativity" can not be explained naturally,
then a supernatural explanation is the only one available
it seems to me. Could you explain why "free will" & "creativity"
*need* explanations that do not ultimately involve the energy
and the motions of atoms? I know that it is human nature to
want to believe that we are much greater than atoms & energy
but I'm not convinced that is true.
> Bertvan:
> > > Are the "laws of nature" human concepts, or something more?
> > > Divine?
>
> Ted:
> > They are descriptions or characteristics of the universe in
> > a form which humans can understand and communicate.
>
> Bertvan. Is it a matter of faith that all laws of nature can
> be understood and communicated by humans? Can you guarantee
> others don't exists which aren't humanly understandable?
Ted:
No, I meant that "laws of nature" are not physical entities,
they are abstractions of characteristics of the universe.
Of course there may be laws we know nothing about, but
by definition, that law must have an observable affect
(or it would be indistinguishable from a non-law) and so there's
always the possibility we will eventually learn that law.
It is not faith, but history that tells us that human perception
is being continually enhanced by technology to be able to observe
smaller and smaller affects. In your prior example of ESP
affects at Princeton, technology will improve to the point
where all scientists will conclude either a) ESP is a real
law (albeit weak), or b) prior experiments gave misleading
results due to the limitations of the equipment.
> > As for the uniformitarian assumptions, must we all adopt
> > the same assumptions, or are we each free to choose our own?
>
> No, I don't believe assumptions are adopted out of thin
> air. Assumptions follow from observations. Unreliable
> observations lead to bad assumptions, reliable observations
> to good assumptions.
>
> Bertvan;
> In any case we each to "choose" our own assumptions based upon
> the observations as we each interpret them. Who is to decide
> which assumptions are "superior"? You? Me? The majority? Or
> whoever can manage to intimidate people into accepting their
> "superior" assumptions?
Ted:
Assumptions are critiqued by the reliability of the observation.
Any assumption can be tested by simply exposing the observation
to criticism.
Of course our assumptions are influenced by our experiences,
but our experiences involved the same process -- observation
followed by assumption -- and each assumption we have
can be tested in the exact way: by exposing the observation
to critique. Assumptions are judged superior or inferior by
the realiability of the observations that led to them. Let's
think of some examples if you disagree.
> Ted:
> > Let's assume I said nothing about presuppositions. How can
> >creation be distinguished from non-creation? In other words,
> >is it possible to look at something complex and decide that
> >it occurred naturally even without knowing what mechanism
> >could have done it?
>
> Bertvan: By "created" I suppose you mean designed.
Yes.
> I look at something and conclude that it looks designed. I
> accept the obvious until I see a reason to think otherwise --
> even if I don't know who or what might have designed it.
Ted:
In other words, it appears that you let your "gut reaction" be
the measure of truth. That's not very reliable, in my experience
and I do not trust my ability to distinguish design from
non-design solely on gut feeling. Snowflakes look designed--
they are far too regularly shaped to be naturally caused.
However, I now realize that "regularly-shaped" is not a
characteristic solely of design. The Grand Canyon looks designed--
it is far to awesome and beautiful to be a naturally caused.
However, I now realize that "awesome and beautiful" is not a
characteristic solely of design. In fact, learning about mutation
and natural selection leads me to believe that not even extreme
complexity is enough to reliabily conclude design.
The only way I can think of to conclude design is to learn more
about the designer. Once you know what the designer does, what
his/her strengths and limitations are, you can much more reliably
detect his/her work. This, by the way, is how scientists detect
human design in nature.
> You look at the same thing and decide it occurred naturally --
> even if you don't know the mechanism.
Ted:
No, see above. Human design can be easily detected in
nature. However, without knowing what kind of designer
we're looking for, I doubt very much we have any hope
of distinguishing his/her work from natural mechanisms.
There's also this trend in history that goes like this:
1. Postulate a designer for a phenomenon
2. Discover a natural explanation for the phenomenon.
3. Look very embarassed.
I don't see any really good reason to conclude that
people in the 20th century can't make the same mistake.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Mar 15 2000 - 13:20:27 EST