Subj: Re: Marxism and Darwinism
From: hadley@reliant.yxi.com (Tedd Hadley)
Ted:
> What I mean is I don't understand a definition of "free will"
> that says we make decisions based on nothing. It seems
> contrary to experience and common sense.
Bertvan, I don't define "free will" as making decisions based on nothing. It
is an action based on existing information. You and I might have the same
information, but my "will" commits me to one action, and yours commits you
to another. I'm trying to find out if you believe the force which committed
us each to different actions performed a real choice, or were those decisions
merely the inevitable result of different molecules and neural connections in
each or our respective brains? If you think it was a real choice, can
science define, predict, manipulate or explain "free will"? Do you consider
"free will" a force "within the universe" or from without?
Ted:
> Why must creativity be necessarily explained by looking outside
>the universe? Again, that seems contrary to experience and common
>sense. What I'm getting at in both cases is that a definition of "free
>will" and "creativity" that invokes the "super" natural has more
>problems with it than one that doesn't.
Bertvan:
I'm not the one who believes unexplainable forces are outside the universe.
I was under the impression you believed any God who could occasionally
override "the laws of nature", would have to be outside the universe, and
considered "supernatural". If "free will" were able to sometimes override
laws of nature, such as instincts and bodily functions as examples, how is
that any less "supernatural" than God doing it? And if "creativity" is able
to produce something completely new in the universe, how is that any less
"supernatural" than God creating it? My understanding of "free will" and
creativity are no greater than my understanding of God. One explanation
doesn't create more problems than the other -- for me. I'm an agnostic, but
I have no problem with the possible existence of God.
Ted:
> No, if God was an entity outside the universe, he could
> certainly effect the universe. However, if his actions
> were consistent, he would appear indistinguishable from
>a natural law.
Bertvan:
I don't have a definition of God, and wasn't even aware God was required to
be consistent.
Bertvan:
> > Are the "laws of nature" human concepts, or something more?
>> Divine?
Ted:
> They are descriptions or characteristics of the universe in
> a form which humans can understand and communicate.
Bertvan. Is it a matter of faith that all laws of nature can be understood
and communicated by humans? Can you guarantee others don't exists which
aren't humanly understandable?
> As for the uniformitarian assumptions, must we all adopt
> the same assumptions, or are we each free to choose our own?
No, I don't believe assumptions are adopted out of thin
air. Assumptions follow from observations. Unreliable
observations lead to bad assumptions, reliable observations
to good assumptions.
Bertvan;
In any case we each to "choose" our own assumptions based upon the
observations as we each interpret them. Who is to decide which assumptions
are "superior"? You? Me? The majority? Or whoever can manage to
intimidate people into accepting their "superior" assumptions?
Ted:
> Let's assume I said nothing about presuppositions. How can
>creation be distinguished from non-creation? In other words,
>is it possible to look at something complex and decide that
>it occurred naturally even without knowing what mechanism
>could have done it?
Bertvan:
By "created" I suppose you mean designed. I look at something and conclude
that it looks designed. I accept the obvious until I see a reason to think
otherwise -- even if I don't know who or what might have designed it. You
look at the same thing and decide it occurred naturally -- even if you don't
know the mechanism.
Bertvan
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