> Bertvan:
>> Does materialistic science admit the possibility that "free
>> will", "creativity" or "God" might have any power to interact
>> with the real world of molecules, atoms or physical forces ? I
>> was under the impression that since Descartes, science has
> >declared them to occupy two different realms, with no possible
> >Interaction between the two. I can't ask you to speak for "science",
> >but how do you think 20th century science, or more specifically
> >Neo Darwinist biology, would generally answer?
Ted:
> Answers must depend on definitions. The only coherent definition
>of "free will" I can think of means that the human will is
>not constrained by other humans. This is quite compatible with
>materialistic science. To argue that the human will is not
>constrained by anything is not consistent with what we think or
>feel.
Bertvan:
Hi Ted. What do you believe to be the "constraints" on "free will"? If you
define "free will" as merely the inevitable results of atoms, molecules and
neural connections in our brain, I would have to protest that wouldn't fit my
definition of "free". In arguing that unconstrained "free will" is not
"consistent with what we think or feel", surely you can only speak for
yourself. Some of us think and feel differently.
Ted:
>One way to define "creativity" is the process of arriving at
> patterns of thought or expression that have not existed in
> the universe before. This is also quite compatible with
>materialistic science.
Bertvan:
Did "patterns of thought or expression that have not existed in the universe
before" come from outside the universe? Or were they merely random
rearrangements of existing patterns of thought or expression?
Ted:
>God, if an entity having real affects on matter and energy, is
> within the realm of science. God, if an entity outside the
>universe having no affect on the universe, is outside the realm
>of science as long as science has no hope of discerning things
>outside the universe. God, if an entity outside the universe
>but affecting the universe, will be either interpreted as a law
>of the universe -- if his actions are consistent -- or as a
>chaotic effect -- in which case uniformitarian assumptions will
>begin to break down.
Bertvan:
For me "free will" and "creativity" are easier to define than God, and I'd
like to include them in this discussion about what has the power to effect
the universe. I'm not sure what the above paragraph says, but since you
define yourself as an atheist, I assume you are saying God could have no
power to effect the universe, because that would violate the laws of nature.
Are the "laws of nature" human concepts, or something more? Divine? As for
the uniformitarian assumptions, must we all adopt the same assumptions, or
are we each free to choose our own?
> Bertvan:
>> Are you saying "the tools of science" can examine all questions?
>> Even those they have declared to be "outside the realm of
>> science"?
Ted:
> I believe so. Do you have an example in mind that we can
>test?
Bertvan:
1. The origin of life
2. The nature of consciousness
3. The origin of conscience
4. Whether the universe is open or closed
5. The nature of free will and creativity
6. The origin of complexity
7. What lies beyond infinity
8. The nature and origin of time
9. The nature of thought
I agree that scientists can discuss all of the above, and some scientists
have great confidence about eventually explaining some of them. Are we
forced to accept that optimism as an accomplished fact?
> Bertvan:
> > It is generally the agnostic position that humans are incapable
>> of understanding whatever created life, the Earth or the universe.
>> That doesn't prevent us from acknowledging it was apparently
>> created (or sprang spontaneously into existence) and the evidence
>> convinces me that creation was the result of a rational design.
>> A rational design might well include teleology.
Ted:
> Can creation be distinguished from non-creation? If not,
> then it would seem teleology is a presupposition, not an
>inference.
Bertvan:
I'm not sure what that means. Is a presupposition different from an
assumption?
> Bertvan:
> >> Materialism assumes the "laws of nature" are absolute. Non
> >> materialism is comfortable with the probabilistic nature of
> >> quantum physics.
>
> Ted:
> >Materialists are perfectly comfortable with quantum physics.
>I don't know what you mean, here.
Bertvan:
Another way of looking the laws of nature might be that they are all
relative, rather than tidy mathematical equations. A force of nature
ensures that particles cannot escape from the nucleus of an atom. Except
sometimes they do, and in a manner that is unpredictable for individual
atoms. The speed of light might not be a specific number, but an
approximation. An approximation which could be minutely affected by many
things -- God," free will" or forces about which we know nothing. We've
discovered that light doesn't always travel in a straight line. Rupert
Shelldrake thinks of the "laws of nature" as entrenched habits. Like all
habits, they might be susceptible to small modifications. Thoughts are
generally confined to individual consciousness, unless communicated in some
known physical manner. The Princeton Anomalies Lab claims to detect tiny,
but statistically measurable ESP effects. As a materialist, I'm sure you
insist these measurements imply the "supernatural" and must be in error, no
matter how many times they are repeated. As a non materialist I can keep an
open mind. You speak of "materialist assumptions of science". I assure
you I do not criticize your assumptions. They are as valid for you as mine
as mine are for me. Would you insist that all scientists adopt your
assumptions?
Bertvan
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