Hello Glenn,
-----Original Message-----
From: Glenn Morton
To: Adrian Teo; Asa@Calvin. Edu
Sent: 4/20/2002 7:42 AM
Subject: RE: How and when did we become "men"?
Adrian wrote of Chauvet:
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Adrian Teo [mailto:ateo@whitworth.edu]
>Sent: Friday, April 19, 2002 1:32 PM
>Certainly this arrangement of skulls could be evidence of religious
>activity, but it could also be simply an ancient show-and-tell, a game,
or
>whatever. Don't you think it is uncomfortably speculative to readily
>conclude that this was an altar? Perhaps there needs to be a
>clearly defined
>(a priori of course) set of criteria that have to be met in order
>to for any
>structure or arrangements to be considered evidence of religious
activity,
>but even so, I can imagine that a critic would always be able to find
some
>other plausible explanation for them other than religious.
Glenn: Yes, one can always find reason to doubt whatever one wants to doubt.
We
have holocaust deniers, we have people who doubt the government's
explanations of UFOs, we have YECs who doubt every fact of science, we
have
Geradus d'Bouw, another YEC, who doubts heliocentricity, we have the
example
of many arabic peoples who doubt Bin Laden was behind the 911 attack
preferring instead to blame the Mossad. Yes, we can always have doubt
if we
don't like the obvious conclusion. And we can make those doubts sound so
noble.
AT: Glenn, my point was not to say that we should doubt everything that has
less than 100% mathematical certainty. Instead, I am saying that we should
not readily jump to conclusions unless we have ruled out other possibilities
(to some degree of certainty). Perhaps these scientists have (to their
credit), but it was not clear in the quotes you posted. Sure, it could have
been for religiouse purposes, but the language of the reports you cited
gives the false impression of a high degree of confidence that I thnk is
unwarranted. In fact, such unwarranted confidence is an indication of a
strong bias. It would be perhaps be more helpful if they could give some
rough estimate (and not even necessarily numerical) of the level of
certainty that comes with these conclusions.
Glenn wrote:
THe approach you are taking is one taken by Lewis Binford in
anthropology.
No matter what activity is proposed by an anthropologist, Binford can
find a
reason to discount it. What does that do to our understanding? It makes
all
evidence simply separate and unconnected items, totally unrelated to
anything we know about.
AT: I don't know Binford, but I would not go to his extreme. I am not
casually discounting these evidence that are in fact consistent with the
religious practice hypothesis, but rather, asking to see if there are
perhaps other pluasible explnations that have not been ruled out. You seem
to be way too defensive in your reaction to my post.
GLenn: Now, as I wrote you privately,The same can be said of the 4000 year
old
temples in Malta. Who alive ever saw them used as temples and maybe they
only appear to be places of religious worship? And there is no
historical
record of their use as temples. The base assumption is analogical, that
similarity between modern and ancient objects is due to similarity of
use.
Could this be wrong? Yes, but if we take that approach to history, we
won't
understand much of it. That approach is a road to solipsism and is often
used by people who can find no other reason to reject a conclusion.
AT: 4000 years ago, we have lots of written record of ancient practices. WE
know what the norm is in those days for various civilizations. It is
altogether a different matter when we are speaking about Neanderthal
activities.
Glenn:I would ask why one would doubt the Chauvet Cave example I cited?
AT: So that one does not readily allow one's bias to creep in.
Glenn: Why else
would people take bear skulls (only skulls) into a dark cave and place
one
of them on a big rock in the center of the cave starting a fire behind
it?
AT: Wait a minute! This is a highly suspect argument. Just beacsue one can't
imaigne it to be otherwise does not automatically permit one to conclude
that therefore there are no other possibilities.
Glenn:I don't think it was a picnic. If you can convince me that these
people
weren't people, then ok we need to interpret it another way. But if you
assume they weren't people to begin with, then you have assumed your
conclusion.
AT: Ah, so that is the real issue - that you are commmitted to this theory
that these were human persons, and therefore, are willing to vigorously
defend their activities as human. I have not assumed my conclusion, because
I am not concern about the humanness issue. I am more interested in whether
these arrangements of bones are religious or not. But I realize that this is
your concern, and you wish to defend the arguament that these are humans
like us.
Adrian wrote of Bilzingsleben:
[portions deleted]
>There is a high degree of uncertainty in these conclusions.
>
>I realize that I may be seen as being overly skeptical here, but I
>am making
>these objections in the name of scientific rigor.
Glenn: Of course. I could be wrong. But what you seem to be doing is asking
for
mathematical certitude in a historical science. NO conclusion from
historical sciences can be held to that standard.
AT: No I am not asking for that level of certainty. In your eagerness to
defend your theory, I think you may have misunderstood my point.
GLenn: Apply your skepticism
to
the Bible and you will find that we have no proof of the resurrection,
no
proof that Jesus lived, no proof that Moses was real, no proof of David,
the
exodus, the conquest, Solomon or any other event recorded in the
Scripture.
I can claim that Jesus was a mythical figure inflated to existence by
his
imaginative disciples and there is nothing you can do to prove me wrong.
AT: The skepticism that you are describing is not mine. I am not looking for
mathematical proof. I am looking to systematically compare the data to
competing hypotheses. This is how good science should be conducted. The
person proposing the hypothesis needs to be especially skeptical of any
evidence in favor of his/her hypothesis, and constantly aware of the bias to
view things only in a way that supports one's hypothesis. That is why the
scientist needs to look into the possibility of other explanations that may
better account for the data, and systematically rule those out.
Glenn: To
paraphrase you, There is a high degree of uncertainty in your conclusion
about the resurrection and the existence of Jesus--Of course I make it
all
sound noble by noting that I am only making these objections in the name
of
scientific rigor.
AT: Glenn, you seem to imply that I carry a less-than-honest motivation for
daring to question your conclusions. How does this exercise in mind-reading
further your argument?
Glenn: Live by the same standard you apply. If you are going to apply this
standard
to archaeology, then apply it to the archaeology of the Bible. I don't
think
you will be so happy with the results. If you don't apply this standard
equally to views you like as to views you don't like, then there is a
word
for that kind of behavior.
AT: I can't help but notice an unusual level of defensiveness in your post.
I am perfectly happy with people employing the scientific rigor that I call
for in biblical archaeology. In fact, I expect it. I do not need to believe
in the absolute, total inerrancy of the bible in all its reported historical
facts to believe in the Christ who died and rose again. I do not seek
mathematical certitude in the historical sciences, but I do call for the
wilingness to qualify one's scientific conclusions with some statement about
probability.
Sincerely,
Adrian.
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