On Sun, 31 Mar 2002 20:29:46 -0500 "Howard J. Van Till"
<hvantill@novagate.com> writes:
I had said:
Consider three concepts of what constitutes "Ultimate Reality":
1. Traditional Christian Theism: UR = God alone, no World. (It is not
essential to God to be in relationship to a World; the existence of a
World is optional to God. Hence, creatio ex nihilo.)
Dave: But here there is a covert suggestion that there had to be a time
before the creation.
hvt: I didn't intend to make any covert suggestions here. Do you have a
way to avoid that in a specification of traditional Christian theism's
specification of UR?
I recognize that you did not deliberately introduce the notion of time
before creation, but, in the context of your other remarks, I see it
there. In general, we are so much creatures of time and space that it is
virtually impossible for us to present an atemporally eternal spirit
without complicated qualifications.
Back to the last post:
2. Maximal (or ontological) Naturalism: UR = World alone, no God. (The
World is self-existent and needs no relationship to God for its being.
Hence, no creation.)
3. Panentheism [briefly stated: the world is in God, but God is more than
the world] :
UR = God + World (It is essential to God to be in relationship to a
World; in order for a world to have being it must be in relationship to
God; the relationship need not be symmetric, but neither could be what it
is without the other).
Dave: But, as a matter of fact, we have a world which necessarily has a
relationship to its Creator. The question is whether God is somehow
dependent on the creation or is independent--Creator or demiurge?
hvt: I don't think we can reduce this to a binary either/or choice:
Either Christian Creator or Plato's demiurge. There's lots of conceptual
space between those two extremes.
Sorry, I tried to use 'demiurge' generically for all the approaches that
limit the deity apart from his own purpose. It does not have to be a
restriction on using available material, as Plato suggested.
Back to the last post:
Note that for panentheism, some form of World (not necessarily this
particular universe, which may be only one of many possible worlds to
which God could be related) is always present within God. This particular
world may be "temporal" but the larger sense of "World" need not be.
Given that possibility, it appears to me that the problem of the Eternal
being constrained by the mere temporal disappears. It also suggest an
answer to the question, What was God doing before the Big-Bang (the
temporal beginning of this particular universe)?
Dave: On this last, I suspect that Augustine's wisecrack in answer to the
question what God was doing before he created: "He was making hell for
those who ask such questions."
Then let me phrase it formally: there was no before the creation of
time-space-matter, represented by the Big Bang.
hvt: Augustine's wisecrack answer is of no value here.
Dave: I note that there is a relevant difference between a timeless
deity and one temporally eternal. The latter, which panentheism demands,
involves an infinite regress or sorts. The former does not. I think
Aristotle's eternal pair of Pure Form and Prime Matter make better sense
than the process view.
Back to the last post:
If I understand correctly, panentheism, although it rejects creatio ex
nihilo, nonetheless retains the concept of God as Creator in the sense of
God choosing and maintaining the 'being' of this particular universe.
Dave: But constrained by the "other," whence I refer to it as demiurge.
Not quite Plato's view, but akin.
hvt: Yes, quite different. For panentheism's God, being in relationship
to another is an essential quality, not a competitive or diminishing
factor.
In other words, this places a constraint on the deity, akin to the
constraints we recognize. That is, it is insisting that God reflect human
nature. Though subtle, it is making a deity in the image of man.
Recognized or denied, this is a form of idolatry.
Back to the last post:
hvt: In the original context of this discussion, the term "coercive"
denoted the idea of a transcendent God, by supernatural intervention,
overpowering a creature (thereby coercing it to behave in a manner
inconsistent with its being). Gravity is an interaction between two
creaturely entities, each of which is acting in a manner entirely
consistent with its creaturely being. That makes comparisons of this sort
difficult.
Dave: But "coercive" does not necessarily imply supernatural
intervention. It may be just the way the world works.
hvt: Help me understand how "coercive" and "supernatural intervention"
differ. I was using the two terms as interchangeable.
We're evidently using language differently. You hold coercion to be
supernatural intervention. I considered it more broadly as a restriction
that cannot be overcome despite effort.
Howard
Dave
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