"Howard J. Van Till" wrote:
> I had said:
>
>
>
> Griffin's position is (1) that God's action is
> never coercive/overpowering (he rejects
> supernaturalism because it demands a violation of
> the very nature of God and the God/world
> relationship), and (2) that God's action can
> nonetheless be variable, within the limits of (1).
> Hence, God responds to prayer, but not with action
> in the category of supernatural (coercive
> overpowering) intervention. I believe that his
> position is also that non-coercive divine action
> is an essential element in everything that
> happens.
>
>
> George replied:
>
>
> But can God _withhold_ the non-coercive action so
> that something _doesn't_ happen? Could he have kept the
> powder from detonating in Oswald's gun, not by inserting a
> supernatural thumb between the firing pin & the primer but
> by not "persuading" the necessary chemical reactions to take
> place?
>
> No, I think not.
> If so, then God seems no less culpable than in traditional
> doctrines of providence: He could have kept JFK from being
> killed but didn't. If not, then God doesn't seem to have
> much choice in what happens in the world.
>
> Limited choice only. The action of the world that is in relationship
> to God must be authentic, not controlled by an external power.
>
> In correspondence with a process theologian recently I commented: "As
> I understand you, you're saying: (1) love is essential to God, (2)
> freedom is essential to creatures, (3) relationship to creatures is
> essential to God, and (4) God's relationship to creatures, therefore,
> is necessarily characterized by kenotic love that will not violate
> any creaturely freedom."
> He responded that I had correctly understood his position.
That's the one I'm exploring here.
One thing significantly missing from this list is anything about
_God's_ freedom. & one consequence of that is that the use of the term
kenotic is inappropriate. In its proper usage that stems from Phil.2:7
it means that God voluntarily limits divine action. That is something
quite different from the idea that God simply can't do some thing.
Kenosis has become a popular term & it's understandable that process
theologians would want to use it but in doing so they change the meaning
of it.
(& more is involved there than just word usage. This is
symptomatic of a natural theology which has come loose from its moorings
in any unique revelation & wants to be seen as a general expression of
timeless truth.)
Another point: In earlier writings you've spoken of creation as
being "gifted by God from the outset with all of the form-producing
capacities necessary ..." (S & CB 8, 1996) & similar things. You're
going to have a problem saying anything like this in a process context.
The difficulty is not just that there's no process "outset" but that the
world & its capacities cannot be seen as the work of God alone. Thus
God cannot have "gifted" creation with "all" of its form-producing
capacities.
Shalom,
George
George L. Murphy
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
"The Science-Theology Interface"
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