Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

Hi Merv,

You wrote:
> But again, I find myself in full agreement with your main thrust that
> "hard" science has no ultimate philosophical privilege on objectivity
> over other fields of knowledge excepting perhaps in precision of
> instrumentation. Please comment if this summary statement mis-states you.

I think the way I'd express it is that one simply can't jump from one philosophical framework to another when one wishes to compare the physical sciences with other fields of investigation.

If, for instance, one is going to take dealing with external reality as the basis of the claim "scientific knowledge is objective" then, guess what, Christian theology ALSO deals with an external reality and should be likewise taken as objective on that basis.

And, for instance, if one is going to argue that theology deals with ideas "in the head" and is therefore subjective, well, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Scientific concepts exist "in the head" too - and if that's the only criterion being evaluated, then scientific concepts are subjective in exactly the same sense.

What I find problematic about SOME philosophical claims in respects of knowledge is that they reveal gross ignorance as to how fields of inquiry other than the physical sciences actually work. Worse, they often reveal quite a dearth of understanding as to how the physical sciences themselves actually work. Worse again, they often suggest a degree of bias in favor of the physical sciences and against other fields of inquiry. Such "worst case" philosophies of science are, it seems to me, little more than a selectively appropriation of a grab-bag of disparate philosophical arguments intended to justify a bias.

So my position would be that it is fine to take a particular position on perception, on philosophy of language, on epistemology, on the nature of reality, etc, etc, BUT one should take a position and stick with it. And here's where I think I can give a two fold answer to your question about the physical sciences and philosophical privilege.

First, the physical sciences ARE (to some extent) philosophically privileged in the sense that we have very good reason to accept their findings as substantially true. THEREFORE any philosophy which would suggest that the physical sciences do NOT give us reliable knowledge is, by virtue of that fact, enormously questionable.

Second, the physical sciences ARE NOT philosophically privileged in the sense that it's simply not permissible to adopt one philosophical position in respects of the physical sciences and another in respects of other fields of inquiry. The physical sciences simply can't be isolated in their own little philosophical bubble so that they are spared the critiques directed elsewhere. Nor can one selectively apply arguments FOR the legitimacy of the physical sciences.

I think the bottom line is that one ought not to preferentially apply philosophical argument in favor of the physical sciences and against other forms of inquiry. In this sense the physical sciences deserve no philosophical privilege. But one still must have a philosophical position that allows one to account for the physical science's success.

So I hope that sort of clarifies my position?

Blessings,
Murray.

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Received on Sun Nov 30 21:56:14 2008