Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

I think I follow the gist of your clarifications below --if I'm fuzzy on
some things it's the fault of the reader and not the writer (I've never
read anything of Polanyi, and I'm open to introductory recommendations.)

But you do provoke a flurry of loosely related thoughts.

Can we then toy with the idea that it's the language arts majors, the
linguists, etc. who may have as much claim on attempts at objectivity as
any of the geekiest white coats standing in front of their digitized
readouts?

Also: If it's a matter of quantifiable precision that keeps scientists
indignantly defending their instruments, then we can all remember that
they, courtesy of QM, are the ones who turned "absolute precision" into
an oxymoron in the first place!

Regarding attempts at stable standards in language:

Even in the world of the English major pedagogues, though, there is a
constant vigil against the inevitable creep of lingual evolution. They
try to slow or stop that creep with every red stroke on your term
paper. (An English teacher colleague of mine once bemoaned the
explosion of style manuals, and then proceeded to evaluate different
ones in what I would have to call a very 'Lewisian' inspired appeal to
an undergirding logical standard --an attempt at universality.) But
those who like to embrace the change (whether out of noble motivations,
or just because they lazily revolt against the idea that a word should
only have one correct spelling) happily document the changes and with
barely suppressed glee report on the annual new-comers to the
dictionary. Andrew Clements with his children's lit book 'Frindle' is a
fun read, though he's written better ones IMO. In the end I think every
profession must thrive on its stable nomenclature while yet realizing
that this 'stability' is ultimately an illusion.

But as I sober up after all this celebration of the liberal arts, I am
still glad to have an engineer and not an English major decide what size
rivets are best for holding the airplane wing in place. I guess that's
about like being glad that scientists and instruments don't/shouldn't be
attempting to extend their professional authority over things like God,
meanings, or morals, etc.

Nothing seems to stop us from fantasizing that 'just over there' we
finally have objectivity. Or crying 'subjective!' in another area where
we want to make trouble. I like Koukl's work 'Relativism: with feet
firmly planted in mid-air'. His title says it all. But I'm happy to
jump away from the on-coming bus, just the same.

ASA rambler
--Merv

Murray Hogg wrote:
> Hi Merv,
>
> Just to clarify; I was putting a hypothetical IF - THEN in the
> paragraph concerned.
>
> To express my hypothetical in general terms; IF one thinks that mental
> concepts are merely "subjective" constructs bearing NO relation to
> "objective" facts THEN absurdities follow.
>
> And in particular terms; IF one thinks "yellow" is a subjective mental
> construct with no relation to the actual colour of sunflowers, THEN it
> would seem that any claim about the colour of sunflowers is equally
> valid (or invalid - if we're going to say words have no objective
> meaning, it doesn't much matter).
>
> Now you're dead right I don't believe that what happens in our heads
> has no relation to what happens in reality. But I put the contrary
> position in such absurd terms to demonstrate that, when pushed, nobody
> else believes this either. Even the most rank post-modern
> constructivist will step out of the path of an oncoming bus rather
> than affirm that the big red thing it is merely a subjective mental
> construct.
>
> Now, the reality is that the relationship between perception and
> reality is complex in the extreme and I'm not sure that anybody knows
> how to resolve it. But I'm equally sure that simply interfacing my
> perception of reality through a scientific instrument isn't the answer.
>
> So even the most certain of empirical observations - even if
> quantified with absolute precision - do not get us over the Kantian
> distinction between perception of a thing and the thing itself.
>
> However, the observation that language can be used to get our
> perceptions "outside of our heads" so to speak, and so "calibrate"
> them against other people's perceptions of what we assume must be the
> same object helps us to see that "subjective" is not quite the right
> term. We might perhaps find a via media on this and suggest my
> perceptions are "subjective" until I confirm them through social
> discourse, but even that is not quite an accurate summation of
> affairs. Consider: if I have truly learned what "yellow" means then I
> do not need any confirmation AFTER the event that my perception of
> yellowness is valid - I can bring this socially acquired knowledge TO
> my observations with no need to socially verify it afterward.
>
> Anyway, I think we have to agree that when we look at Sunflowers there
> is - despite the philosophical difficulties - general agreement that
> "yellow" says something "real" or "objective" about the Sunflower and
> not merely something about what what goes on "subjectively" in our heads.
>
> I might only add that IF "Sunflowers are yellow" is entirely a
> subjective claim, then it's very curious that we should all be
> subjective about the same object in much the same way and even have a
> word ("hallucination") for those that perceive an object otherwise. It
> turns out that even an utter subjectivist has to pretend that his own
> perceptions and language about them have some objective referent. He
> could neither live in the world, nor communicate with others, were he
> to apply his philosophy in any consistent way.
>
> I hope I got your objection right, and I hope I've clarified my
> position. Let me know if not.
>
> Blessings,
> Murray
>
> Merv wrote:
>> Bravo, Bravo, Mr. Hogg! As always, it is a pleasure to read your
>> discourse; and I found myself soaking it in with unreserved agreement
>> until I reached the paragraph (the last one shown below) in which I
>> think you overstate your case, claiming that to think of "objective"
>> facts as no more than mental states is to accept all claims of those
>> mental states as equally true. I'm going to hazard a guess, Murray,
>> that you don't actually think sunflowers are pink or have green polka
>> dots, so those notions would have equal claim to validity only if
>> someone actually did claim that mental state. Produce somebody who
>> actually thinks so, and then we'll talk. I know I may be abusing your
>> argument that this "would be" so IF somebody actually did, and so you
>> are being hypothetical about it. But there still could be a grain of
>> objectivity in these mental states --perhaps making it significant
>> that this particular conjecture of yours required a hypothetical
>> example.
>>
>> But again, I find myself in full agreement with your main thrust that
>> "hard" science has no ultimate philosophical privilege on objectivity
>> over other fields of knowledge excepting perhaps in precision of
>> instrumentation. Please comment if this summary statement
>> mis-states you.
>>
>> -- argumentative citizen of the [yellow] sunflower state,
>> Kansas. ('yellow' modifies flower --not the state [or maybe
>> it modifies my mental state?])
>> --Merv

To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
"unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.
Received on Sun Nov 30 20:00:14 2008