RE: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

Hi Murray,

You wrote that, "On the one hand, when it comes to talking about "yellow things" you want to argue that ones' perception has no relation to what actually is." This is not what I said nor could you have concluded that from what I have written. In fact, the statement is that most humans perceive the electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers as the color yellow. Note that this need not be the same for many animals and, in fact, for some intelligent alien who may associate that wavelength with, say, the color blue instead. In addition, these aliens may not perceive the same sensation of our yellow (590 nm) and the proper mixture of our red (760 nm) and our green (535 nm), which we perceive also as yellow. Purely physical devices collect the objective, scientific data and there is no need for social consensus for that. Just pick up the same purely physical equipment and you will measure the same wavelength as anyone else does. That is the true essence of science as defined b!
 y its subject matter as I do.

I agree that our scientific laws and theories are based on the data we obtain from the real thing out there. However, the consistency of the data that we obtain under the same circumstances gives us strong assurance that we are dealing with a consistent aspect of reality.

You write, "There ARE questions in theology which are simply a matter of appeal to concrete data: "did Calvin write so-and-so in the Institues?" for instance." The latter has nothing to do with theology but is just a historical question!

Your statement, "yellow has an electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers", is false. The correct statement is that most humans perceive the electromagnetic wave of wavelength of 590 nm as a color, which they call yellow. Notice that according to the Doppler effect, such waves will appear shifted to the red if the source is moving away from the observer. Therefore, one has to be rather careful in what one says.

Moorad

________________________________

From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu on behalf of Murray Hogg
Sent: Sun 11/30/2008 4:51 PM
To: ASA
Subject: Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

Hi Moorad,

You cite Schrödinger's claim "there is no nervous process whose description includes the characteristic 'yellow'" whilst overlooking the obvious counter: that neither is there a nervous process whose description includes the characteristic: 'electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers'.

What your attempting to do - in basic terms - is selectively apply a Kantian distinction between noumena (that which really is) and phenomena (that which one perceives to be) to favor your own philosophy of science. This is naughty.

On the one hand, when it comes to talking about "yellow things" you want to argue that ones' perception has no relation to what actually is.

On the other hand, when it comes to reading the output of a spectroscope you want to argue that one's perception does have a relation to what actually is.

Not only is this quite inconsistent BUT it overlooks the fact that, in Kantian terms, science NEVER deals with noumena but only with phenomena - i.e. scientific "data" actually consist solely of our perceptions of reality - never with reality itself - and if you want to dismiss such perceptions as "subjective" mental constructs - well, so much the worse for "science" as you define it.

Critical here is to understand that just as I can never go beyond my perception of 'yellow' to ask "what the colour 'really' is" so too I can never go past my perception of the data to ask "what the data 'really' are."

Frankly, your simply trying to uncritically privilege certain kinds of empirical observation (the reading of outputs on instruments) over against other types of empirical observation (seeing the color yellow).

What's really problematic, however, is to ask what you're actually trying to assert about our use of language.

You're claiming that the use of the term "yellow" is "subjective" despite the fact that I learned the meaning of "yellow" through shared social discourse - i.e. in EXACTLY the same what I learned the meaning of "electromagnetic" and "wavelength" and "of" and "590" and "nanometers". So NONE of these terms have a more "objective" referent than any other.

Or, to put it another way, the agreement of scientists as to the meaning of "electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers" is based on PRECISELY the same sort of shared social discourse as the meaning of "yellow". Indeed, the only way that scientists can make the claim that "yellow = electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers" is precisely because "yellow" is NOT a "subjective" notion.

To take this one step further, if the claim "sunflowers are yellow" is merely a comment about my own mental states and not a claim about the colour of sunflowers then "sunflowers are yellow", "sunflowers are pink", "sunflowers are pink with green polka dots" are ALL equally "true". And, to push this to it's ultimately absurd limit, the following would also all be equally "true": "yellow has an electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers", "yellow has an electomagnetic wavelength of 3.8 nanometers" and "yellow has an electromagnetic wavelength of 3.8 kilograms". These are all equally "true" give your argument because what you've done is assert our terms of discourse (like "yellow") have no objective referent.

If "yellow" just refers to what's in my head, then so too claims about everything else we encounter and speak of. And note that the key concept here is "we" - the problem with theories of the sort you're proposing is that they ignore that the language by which I ascribe properties to objects is EXACTLY the same tool by which I discuss my experiences of objects with others in order to determine whether or not my experience IS objective or subjective.

In that regard, just as EVERY scientist really believes that "yellow" is an objective description, so too every psychologist knows that hallucinations are subjective. Why? Because when one of us claims to observe a yellow object, the rest of us - knowing what the notion "yellow" is supposed to entail - can observe the same object and determine if "yellow" is a correct description. And here let's be very clear; talking about an 'electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers' is simply a more precise way of expressing an idea which is either objective or subjective either way. Measuring the wavelength of light reflected from a Sunflower doesn't magically turn my subjective perception of its color into objective data - all it does is increases the precision by which I make reference to my perceptions.

In contrast, the man who sees giant spiders climbing up the wall can well point to them and say "spiders" - but nobody else is going to share that perception. THAT'S why "yellow" is objective and hallucinations are NOT. It has nothing to do with brain states, and EVERYTHING to do with agreement upon language and its referents obtained through shared social discourse.

Note, by the way, the delicious subtlety which arises here: you can only argue AGAINST the above if you assume the very thing you've been denying: that words have an agreed meaning against which a claim (such as "Sunflowers are yellow") can be objectively evaluated within the arena of public discourse. There are, as Wittgenstein observed, no private languages. To even attempt to argue against it is to assume the very point being made: that language depends upon shared meaning, therefore can't depend simply upon what an individual thinks or "means" and therefore is primarily objective. You can argue that words only refer to one's brain states and meanings therefore utterly "subjective" but if you do, I'll know you don't really believe it.

Taking this one step further, one can see that at least one way of understanding "science" is as a body of shared knowledge communicated by the use of agreed terms. The idea of "physical data" doesn't have to come into it. In that respect it is perfectly possible to claim social and political studies as a form of "science". Indeed, on that basis metaphysics and theology are "science" also. The "data" of theology might be written texts and human experience, but the common practice of theology is to discuss such data using agreed terms.

It's quite true that the fields of study just mentioned differ from what you're calling the "hard" sciences but hardly to the degree you seem to think. There ARE questions in theology which are simply a matter of appeal to concrete data: "did Calvin write so-and-so in the Institues?" for instance. And there ARE examples in the "hard sciences" where theory is not even remotely based on data - Einsteins derivation of relativity on the basis of a thought experiment, for instance. Indeed, physicists so often seek their data AFTER they construct their theories that I'm surprised you can state otherwise with a straight face.

Take the Large Hadron Collider, for instance. This beast was built precisely to find as yet non-existent data to verify a theory which is so confidently held that it was considered appropriate to sink millions of dollars into a project. Goodness, if one wants to built theories on data, HERE is some data which proves that theories don't always START with data. That said, I make only one prediction: if the data DOES confirm the theory (or theories) in question, then in years to come the fact that theory preceded data will be conveniently forgotten and the myth that "the hard sciences start with the data" will remain the creed of the "scientific" faithful.

Blessings,
Murray.

Alexanian, Moorad wrote:
> Don,
>
>
>
> You would have to explain why social science, and, for that matter,
> political science, is science in the same sense as the experimental
> sciences like physics, chemistry, biology, etc. What I am saying is
> that yellow is subjective rather than objective. Note that if that were
> not so, then a psychologist would also consider hallucinations as
> objective. Geology is descriptive of physical objects very much as
> astronomy is based on observation, rather than experiments, of objects
> that lie beyond our earth. Obviously, geology and cosmology are sciences
> but not experimental sciences.
>
>
>
> "Pin-pricks" or NMR collects physical data, which qualifies them as
> scientific. As Schrödinger says, "we may be sure there is no nervous
> process whose objective description includes the characteristic 'yellow
> color' or 'sweet taste,' just as little as the objective description of
> an electro-magnetic wave includes either of these characteristics."
>
>
>
> Let us face it; many disciples attach the word science to their title to
> give it the respectability and objectivity of the hard sciences. Notice
> that terms like "yellow" require a mind to comprehend much as language,
> communication, and abstract concepts. This by no means demeans all the
> kinds of knowledge that would not be characterized as science.
> Metaphysics and theology are all important but they are not, by any
> means, science.
>
>
>
> Moorad

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Received on Sun Nov 30 22:35:43 2008