Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

Hi Merv,

Just to clarify; I was putting a hypothetical IF - THEN in the paragraph concerned.

To express my hypothetical in general terms; IF one thinks that mental concepts are merely "subjective" constructs bearing NO relation to "objective" facts THEN absurdities follow.

And in particular terms; IF one thinks "yellow" is a subjective mental construct with no relation to the actual colour of sunflowers, THEN it would seem that any claim about the colour of sunflowers is equally valid (or invalid - if we're going to say words have no objective meaning, it doesn't much matter).

Now you're dead right I don't believe that what happens in our heads has no relation to what happens in reality. But I put the contrary position in such absurd terms to demonstrate that, when pushed, nobody else believes this either. Even the most rank post-modern constructivist will step out of the path of an oncoming bus rather than affirm that the big red thing it is merely a subjective mental construct.

Now, the reality is that the relationship between perception and reality is complex in the extreme and I'm not sure that anybody knows how to resolve it. But I'm equally sure that simply interfacing my perception of reality through a scientific instrument isn't the answer.

So even the most certain of empirical observations - even if quantified with absolute precision - do not get us over the Kantian distinction between perception of a thing and the thing itself.

However, the observation that language can be used to get our perceptions "outside of our heads" so to speak, and so "calibrate" them against other people's perceptions of what we assume must be the same object helps us to see that "subjective" is not quite the right term. We might perhaps find a via media on this and suggest my perceptions are "subjective" until I confirm them through social discourse, but even that is not quite an accurate summation of affairs. Consider: if I have truly learned what "yellow" means then I do not need any confirmation AFTER the event that my perception of yellowness is valid - I can bring this socially acquired knowledge TO my observations with no need to socially verify it afterward.

Anyway, I think we have to agree that when we look at Sunflowers there is - despite the philosophical difficulties - general agreement that "yellow" says something "real" or "objective" about the Sunflower and not merely something about what what goes on "subjectively" in our heads.

I might only add that IF "Sunflowers are yellow" is entirely a subjective claim, then it's very curious that we should all be subjective about the same object in much the same way and even have a word ("hallucination") for those that perceive an object otherwise. It turns out that even an utter subjectivist has to pretend that his own perceptions and language about them have some objective referent. He could neither live in the world, nor communicate with others, were he to apply his philosophy in any consistent way.

I hope I got your objection right, and I hope I've clarified my position. Let me know if not.

Blessings,
Murray

Merv wrote:
> Bravo, Bravo, Mr. Hogg! As always, it is a pleasure to read your
> discourse; and I found myself soaking it in with unreserved agreement
> until I reached the paragraph (the last one shown below) in which I
> think you overstate your case, claiming that to think of "objective"
> facts as no more than mental states is to accept all claims of those
> mental states as equally true. I'm going to hazard a guess, Murray,
> that you don't actually think sunflowers are pink or have green polka
> dots, so those notions would have equal claim to validity only if
> someone actually did claim that mental state. Produce somebody who
> actually thinks so, and then we'll talk. I know I may be abusing your
> argument that this "would be" so IF somebody actually did, and so you
> are being hypothetical about it. But there still could be a grain of
> objectivity in these mental states --perhaps making it significant that
> this particular conjecture of yours required a hypothetical example.
>
> But again, I find myself in full agreement with your main thrust that
> "hard" science has no ultimate philosophical privilege on objectivity
> over other fields of knowledge excepting perhaps in precision of
> instrumentation. Please comment if this summary statement mis-states you.
>
> -- argumentative citizen of the [yellow] sunflower state,
> Kansas. ('yellow' modifies flower --not the state [or maybe it
> modifies my mental state?])
> --Merv
>
>
> Murray Hogg wrote:
>> Hi Moorad,
>>
>> You cite Schrödinger's claim "there is no nervous process whose
>> description includes the characteristic 'yellow'" whilst overlooking
>> the obvious counter: that neither is there a nervous process whose
>> description includes the characteristic: 'electromagnetic wavelength
>> of 590 nanometers'.
>>
>> What your attempting to do - in basic terms - is selectively apply a
>> Kantian distinction between noumena (that which really is) and
>> phenomena (that which one perceives to be) to favor your own
>> philosophy of science. This is naughty.
>>
>> On the one hand, when it comes to talking about "yellow things" you
>> want to argue that ones' perception has no relation to what actually is.
>>
>> On the other hand, when it comes to reading the output of a
>> spectroscope you want to argue that one's perception does have a
>> relation to what actually is.
>>
>> Not only is this quite inconsistent BUT it overlooks the fact that, in
>> Kantian terms, science NEVER deals with noumena but only with
>> phenomena - i.e. scientific "data" actually consist solely of our
>> perceptions of reality - never with reality itself - and if you want
>> to dismiss such perceptions as "subjective" mental constructs - well,
>> so much the worse for "science" as you define it.
>>
>> Critical here is to understand that just as I can never go beyond my
>> perception of 'yellow' to ask "what the colour 'really' is" so too I
>> can never go past my perception of the data to ask "what the data
>> 'really' are."
>>
>> Frankly, your simply trying to uncritically privilege certain kinds of
>> empirical observation (the reading of outputs on instruments) over
>> against other types of empirical observation (seeing the color yellow).
>>
>> What's really problematic, however, is to ask what you're actually
>> trying to assert about our use of language.
>>
>> You're claiming that the use of the term "yellow" is "subjective"
>> despite the fact that I learned the meaning of "yellow" through shared
>> social discourse - i.e. in EXACTLY the same what I learned the meaning
>> of "electromagnetic" and "wavelength" and "of" and "590" and
>> "nanometers". So NONE of these terms have a more "objective" referent
>> than any other.
>>
>> Or, to put it another way, the agreement of scientists as to the
>> meaning of "electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers" is based on
>> PRECISELY the same sort of shared social discourse as the meaning of
>> "yellow". Indeed, the only way that scientists can make the claim that
>> "yellow = electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers" is precisely
>> because "yellow" is NOT a "subjective" notion.
>>
>> To take this one step further, if the claim "sunflowers are yellow" is
>> merely a comment about my own mental states and not a claim about the
>> colour of sunflowers then "sunflowers are yellow", "sunflowers are
>> pink", "sunflowers are pink with green polka dots" are ALL equally
>> "true". And, to push this to it's ultimately absurd limit, the
>> following would also all be equally "true": "yellow has an
>> electromagnetic wavelength of 590 nanometers", "yellow has an
>> electomagnetic wavelength of 3.8 nanometers" and "yellow has an
>> electromagnetic wavelength of 3.8 kilograms". These are all equally
>> "true" give your argument because what you've done is assert our terms
>> of discourse (like "yellow") have no objective referent.
>>
>
>
>
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Received on Sun Nov 30 18:28:13 2008