Re: [asa] God as Cause

*If I ask the question, "What is the genetic/paleontological/etc. evidence
on the origin of humans?", then I should examine the physical evidence,
regardless of theological or other ideas about the origin of humans. I can
then consider how that answer meshes or clashes with theological or other
answers.*

This goes, I think, to another core problem, which is the classic rift
between empirical science and the humanities. My problem with this is that
I don't see why we should care what the "genetic/paleontological/etc.
evidence" is in itself. What we should care most about is what the truth
is.

If the argument is that the best way to get at the truth is to first
completely segregate the theological / genetic / paleontological / etc.
evidence and then later to try to integrate those different strands of
evidence, I need to understand the justification for that epistemic claim,
and I also need to understand the justification for the underlying claim
that it's even possible to make such a segregation. To me, that approach
smacks of the radical enlightenment's segregation of the
theological/metaphysical/philosophical/emotive from the empirical, whereby
the empirical is only ultimately what really counts as knowledge. That
project, IMHO, is dead, and rightly so. In my legal scholarship, I try to
take an interdisciplinary approach. Why should the epistemic foundations of
"science" be immune from non-empirical truth claims?

*> Do the points I mentioned in the prior email relating to
creation constitue a coherent argument for MN?*

Personally, I think the argument concerning the regularity of creation is
one of the strongest in favor of MN. But here's a problem I see with it:
the argument assumes, without demonstrating, that God's expressly creative
activity should look the same as his current "rest" from creative activity.
Whatever we make of the "days" of creation, the seventh day on which God
"rested" signals some sort of change in God's creative activity -- at least,
Jewish and Christian theology has always maintained that God's sabbath rest
is somehow meaningful with regard to God's relation to the creation. It
seems plausible to assert that nature did not necessarily follow the
"normal" pattern during the first six "days," and that the regularity of
nature in which God does not normally act outside of secondary causes
becomes fully established only after man is created and God "rests" on the
seventh day.

It seems to me, then, that the "regularity" argument concerning secondary
causes also rests on a highly uncertain hermeneutical / exegetical
question: what is the nature of God's creative activity before and after
the sabbath "rest?" Taking the scriptural revelation and the historic
teachings of the Church into account, is it more reasonable to assume that
God acted in creation only through secondary causes before the sabbath rest,
or not? It seems to me that there are good reasons to say "not," or at
least "not entirely."

One howl of protest to this line of thought is that it sounds like the YEC
line that science can't investigate origins because God's creative activity
during the first six days is beyond the pale of empirical science. That's a
valid howl, I think. But it doesn't have to be the case that the first six
"days" are some kind of impenetrable mystery. It could also be that, in the
first six "days," God establishes the regular order of creation, but *also *at
times interrupts that order to carry out his creative activity. Thus, we
can investigate that period rationally, but we will only progress towards
truth if we include the scriptural / theological presupposition about the
distinction between God's six "days" of expressly creative activity in
contrast to the current sabbath "rest" into account. My sense is that this
is where Plantinga and others like Clouser would head.

I don't say that the above is my position, but I would say that it seems to
answer the "regularity" argument in favor of MN, or at least to render that
argument not the slam-dunk it's often represented to be.

On 1/10/07, David Campbell <pleuronaia@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I would ask David C., on what scientific basis he makes the above claim?
> > What 'science of everyday life' has he accessed to make this claim?
> > Probably such a 'science' has escaped his mind.
>
> I'm not precisely sure exactly which claim you refer to. The claim
> that everyone uses natural methods all the time (though not only
> natural methods) is based on every observation that I make. Everyone
> I know walks, drives, etc. to get places; no one simply waits for the
> Spirit to transport them where they need to go (cf. Philip's meeting
> with the Ethiopian), even though I and many people I know believe that
> He could do this. I read things rather than expecting them to be
> revealed to me supernaturally. I extract, amplify, and sequence DNA,
> assuming that the chemistry and physics governing each step of the
> process do not change, though I may also pray for the process to work.
>
> > David Opderbeck's statement that "Belief in intentional action by
> > autonomous agents requires some sort of meta-natural presuppositions" is
> > right on the mark. The gigantic problem is that natural scientists will
not
> > (and possibly cannot) recognize it. They simply cannot 'get outside' of
a
> > naturalistic framework to assess it!
>
> Within the process of doing science, they cannot address this issue.
> Whether they recognize that it is an issue depends on their
> understanding of philosophical issues. I'd guess that the average
> understanding of philosophy/religion among natural scientists is no
> better than that of the general public. Getting a degree in science
> leaves little time for other fields unless one makes a particular
> effort.
>
> > "You are not just using natural methods. But you are using natural
> > methods." – David C.
> >
> > Perhaps this was a typo?
>
> No. You are using natural methods, but you are not only using natural
> methods.
>
> > It is only the theology or the philosophy in/of people here at ASA that
> > allows them to step outside of their naturalistic assumptions, cosmology
> > included, to seek a balance whereby scientism isn't simply the norm.
>
> Theology or philosophy is necessary to assess the assumptions.
> Naturalistic is not the best word, because of the confounding of
> philosophical naturalism with so-called methodological naturalism.
> The assumption that a purely empirical approach can be useful within a
> particular context in no way implies that a purely empirical approach
> must be used for everything.
>
> >>You are not just using natural methods. But you are using natural
> methods. Therefore, the claim that using natural methods inherently
> entails materialism is wrong. <<
>
> >That's not the [claim] Plantinga and later IDists make. The claim
> isn't that any use of "natural methods" entails materialism. The
> claim is that a complete, absolute, a priori exclusion of direct
> divine agency entails materialsm. Plantinga and later IDists would
> say that there may or may not be direct divine agency evident in any
> given phenomenon; it may well be that some phenomena can be described
> solely in terms of secondary causes. However, there is no reason,
> they would say, to attribute everything in nature to secondary causes
> alone, and good epistemic reasons not to do so. <
>
> However, they also claim that TE is inherently materialistic because
> of its use of natural methods. That would only be true if using
> natural methods entailed materialism. The expectation that many
> things in nature ought to be inexplicable in terms of secondary causes
> can also reflect the assumption that explanation by secondary causes
> implies materialism.
>
> >>The main points of Genesis 1-2 are that all things are part of God's
> creation and that He has given man a special role in caring for
> creation. <<
>
> >Ah, there's the rub! Of course I agree with you, and I think
> Plantinga would as well. The question, though, is whether Genesis 1-4
> conveys anything more than these "main points." <
>
> True; in the context I wanted to examine the implications of those
> points rather than address secondary points; also, I think it is very
> important to remember that the others are secondary.
>
> >Let's assume for a minute that Gen. 2:7 unequivocally teaches that an
> individual human, Adam, was separately created by God as the
> progenitor of the human race.[...] If God revealed this fact to us,
> would we be justified in making conclusions about the origins of man
> that a priori exclude this fact? I can't see how. Any knowledge
> claim about the origins of man that excluded this fact would
> necessarily be inaccurate, probably grossly so. <
>
> It depends on how conclusive a conclusion you want. Accepting the
> hypothetical scenario for discussion purposes, it would not be
> unreasonable to say, e.g., "Let's see what the evidence from genetics
> on this." In turn, depending on the results, one might make
> statements such as "Genetic evidence agrees with this", "Genetic
> evidence suggests that this must have happened prior to x years ago",
> "Genetic evidence does not match well with this. Perhaps there was
> something unusual in the method of creation, or perhaps there's been
> some sort of genetic introgression between humans and other primates,
> or..."
>
> In part, this gets back to the issue of scientism. If I ask the
> question, "What is the genetic/paleontological/etc. evidence on the
> origin of humans?", then I should examine the physical evidence,
> regardless of theological or other ideas about the origin of humans.
> I can then consider how that answer meshes or clashes with theological
> or other answers. I might conclude that genetics, etc. isn't telling
> the whole story, or that the theology needs re-examining, or something
> else. How much weight the various answers get depends highly on my
> philosophical viewpoint, which I need to recognize if I am to arrive
> at a conclusion that is credible to someone else or a conclusion that
> is in line with a particular principle (such as the tenets of
> Christianity).
>
> The principle of doing the work without regard to the desired
> theological conclusion does not apply merely to science-Dorothy L.
> Sayers has some discussions on the nature of work that articulate this
> well (e.g., in remarks on The Man Born to be King, printed as an
> introduction in some editions as well as in various essays and more
> subtly in Gaudy Night and Busman's Honeymoon). Christian work must be
> good work ("as unto the Lord", etc.); insofar as an effort to make it
> an apologetic distracts from the goal of making it good, the
> apologetic goal is harmful (and not met anyway, for bad work is a bad
> testimony). No doubt you have encountered rotten "Christian" fiction
> and well-done though theologically unsound fiction. To investigate
> the relationships of mollusks in a manner honoring God, I need to
> carefully examine the data and ignore claims that all species are
> created separately or, for that matter, that they evolved in a
> particular way.
>
> >Since the interpretation of Gen. 2:7 is so hotly contested (at least
> on lists like this), let's move a step back to a bit of a broader
> picture. For example, if God revealed to us in scripture that human
> beings are all inherently prone to evil, would we be justified in
> making a knowledge claim about human psychology and social behavior
> that humans are fundamentally altruistic and perfectable? Would we be
> wise to use such a knowledge claim to construct social policy that is
> designed mainly to maximize autonomy so that people can perfect
> themselves without restraints? Again, I can't see how. <
>
> Supposing that there were any data suggesting that humans are
> fundamentally altruistic and perfectable (I know of none), then taking
> that into account in social policy would make sense. The task is to
> integrate the two pieces of evidence and figure out how to implement
> them. Accepting the authority of Scripture, you might conclude that
> the hypothetical data show that people try to appear altruistic and
> perfectable but aren't really.
>
> >But interestingly, I think many TE's would agree with me here. If
> we're considering the "science" of social policy, we're more than
> happy to allow our Biblical / theological presuppositions into the
> foundation of our beliefs about what people are really like. <
>
> This is not an accurate contrast with acceptance of evolution on several
counts:
> The interpretation of the Bible as opposed to evolution (as a
> biological process) is much more tenuous than the interpretation of
> the Bible as saying that humans are basically sinful.
> The empirical evidence indicates that people behave as expected if
> they are sinful.
> The question of "what are people really like" is not the same as "what
> is the sociological, etc. evidence as to what humans are like?"
>
> >I think, then, that most of the epistemic arguments by TE's in favor
> of MN are misplaced and/ or not theologically coherent. The principle
> issues are hermeneutical and epistemological. George's hermeneutic is
> consistent, whether it's correct or not. "Generalist" TE books like
> Francis Collins' recent book, in contrast, IMHO lack any such
> consistent hermeneutic. They seem to resort to hand waving and
> mumbling about "allegory" concerning Gen. 1-4 without any explanation
> how this fits into any sort of coherent doctrine of scripture. From
> my perspective as a sort of moderate evangelical, I'd suggest that the
> most important work TE's need to do is to develop a coherent, orthodox
> doctrine of scripture, hermeneutic, and epistemology. <
>
> I agree that Collins is weak on that point, but I'm not sure that
> should be considered as an incoherent argument as opposed to absence
> of argument.
>
> Do the points I mentioned in the prior email relating to creation
> constitue a coherent argument for MN? Not having any special
> theological training, I wouldn't be surprised if I have made mistakes,
> but tell me where.
>
> --
> Dr. David Campbell
> 425 Scientific Collections
> University of Alabama
> "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
>
>
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-- 
David W. Opderbeck
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