Re: [asa] God as Cause

>> If I ask the question, "What is the genetic/paleontological/etc. evidence on
 the origin of humans?", then I should examine the physical evidence,
 regardless of theological or other ideas about the origin of humans. I can
 then consider how that answer meshes or clashes with theological or other
 answers. <<

> This goes, I think, to another core problem, which is the classic rift
> between empirical science and the humanities. My problem with this is that
> I don't see why we should care what the "genetic/paleontological/etc.
> evidence" is in itself. What we should care most about is what the truth
> is.

I see at least two reasons to care what the
genetic/paleontological/etc. evidence is in itself. One is that
someone may happen to be interested in such topics. Of course that
doesn't mean that anyone else has to care, but if someone wants to
find out what that evidence may be, it must be pursued honestly and
not to promote an agenda, even if the agenda is correct.
More importantly, if one is interested in the overall truth, it is
necessary to make sure that the component information in your model is
truthful. There almost certainly will be parts of that information
that don't fit in well, but that does not justify making up
information that fits better nor a priori dismissal (as opposed to
considered and explained dismissal).

> If the argument is that the best way to get at the truth is to first
> completely segregate the theological / genetic / paleontological / etc.
> evidence and then later to try to integrate those different strands of
> evidence, I need to understand the justification for that epistemic claim,
> and I also need to understand the justification for the underlying claim
> that it's even possible to make such a segregation.

No; the argument is that the best way to get at the truth is to
investigate the evidence (including theological, etc.) regardless of
whether it seems to point in the direction we want it to. One
cannot strictly segregate doing science from metaphysical issues.
However, one can do science irrespective of metaphysical
considerations. I can do an experiment no matter what (or whether) I
think philosophically about the process, and the results tend to be
the same, although often different spins and/or misrepresentations may
be seen in my report of the results if I am already committed to a
particular result.

Doing science entails certain metaphysical assumptions, including the
idea that an external world exists, that it behaves in regular ways,
that we can meaningfully observe it and infer patterns, and that this
activity is worthwhile. Probably most scientists haven't thought
about that, but they act as though those principles are true, and the
generally successful results strongly suggests that those principles
are true (though certainly not proving that they are exhaustive; the
principles cannot be derived from within the framework they provide
and also cannot address the question of whether beings or events
outside their ken exist). Christianity provides a basis for those
assumptions while asserting that they are far from exhaustive; atheism
typically takes them as axioms.

> the argument assumes, without demonstrating, that God's expressly creative
> activity should look the same as his current "rest" from creative activity.
> Whatever we make of the "days" of creation, the seventh day on which God
> "rested" signals some sort of change in God's creative activity -- at least,
> Jewish and Christian theology has always maintained that God's sabbath rest
> is somehow meaningful with regard to God's relation to the creation. It
> seems plausible to assert that nature did not necessarily follow the
> "normal" pattern during the first six "days," and that the regularity of
> nature in which God does not normally act outside of secondary causes
> becomes fully established only after man is created and God "rests" on the
> seventh day.

I agree that some difference is to be expected (while incidentally
noting that this argument causes problems for a young earth scenario
because it hinges on the understanding of day 7 as ongoing, a view
well justified by Hebrews). However, God's consistency (especially
emphasized in, e.g., a Reformed context; less so in, e.g.,
dispensationalist circles) argues for a general similarity in activity
through all time, as does Jn. 5:17. Part of the problem is our idea
of rest-we tend to think of comfortable naps rather than the fruitful
labor that was the ideal for Eden and Canaan. There's also the
problem of forgetting that God is just as much at work in natural
processes as in supernatural ones, such that "God made" is assumed to
mean "miraculously". [Calvin has some comment on this issue in
reconciling the perceived definition of bara as creation ex nihlo with
the earth bringing forth.] A key issue here is the intent and
categories of Genesis 1. If you try to force the categories of
organisms into a statement about the method of producing modern
taxonomic divisions (e.g., every species/family/phylum/etc. is created
separately), you are not only tangential to the primarily theological
intent of the Bible but also you clash with the scientific evidence.
(If you assert that "God worked in a special way at these points, but
I don't know exactly how that would manifest itself in terms of
scientific data", you are closer to the theological intent and not
setting up a clash with science.) However, if you see it as a
catalogue of the major categories of things-the heavens, the sea and
sky, the land, stuff in the heavens, in the sea and sky, and on land,
and finally humans as spiritual entities-the point is that God made
them all and there are no more categories left to fill. Whether
scientific data suggest that the making used secondary means or not in
any given situation then becomes of minor theological importance,
though obviously it is important for the practice of the science.

Note on the theological intent of the Bible-The Bible does to varying
degrees in different passages touch on several other issues, but the
primary purpose is theological ("Scripture principally teaches what
man is to believe concerning God and what duties God requires of
him.") The primarily theological nature does not make, e.g., the
historicity irrelevant, but it does mean that historical, scientific,
etc. statements need to be understood within the context of their
theological purpose and not as modern historical, scientific, etc.
statements.

I don't disagree that Plantinga correctly identifies problems with a
materialistic viewpoint, or for that matter with approaches that apply
some materialistic-like assumptions about constraints on God's
abilities while not being fully materialistic (deism, process
theology, etc.). I disagree with the attempts to label all forms of
TE as materialistic, with the usually unanalyzed assumption that ID
(or YEC) is the Christian approach, and with the frequent absence of
Christianity from ID and YEC.

-- 
Dr. David Campbell
425 Scientific Collections
University of Alabama
"I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
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