Re: [asa] God as Cause

> I would ask David C., on what scientific basis he makes the above claim?
> What 'science of everyday life' has he accessed to make this claim?
> Probably such a 'science' has escaped his mind.

I'm not precisely sure exactly which claim you refer to. The claim
that everyone uses natural methods all the time (though not only
natural methods) is based on every observation that I make. Everyone
I know walks, drives, etc. to get places; no one simply waits for the
Spirit to transport them where they need to go (cf. Philip's meeting
with the Ethiopian), even though I and many people I know believe that
He could do this. I read things rather than expecting them to be
revealed to me supernaturally. I extract, amplify, and sequence DNA,
assuming that the chemistry and physics governing each step of the
process do not change, though I may also pray for the process to work.

> David Opderbeck's statement that "Belief in intentional action by
> autonomous agents requires some sort of meta-natural presuppositions" is
> right on the mark. The gigantic problem is that natural scientists will not
> (and possibly cannot) recognize it. They simply cannot 'get outside' of a
> naturalistic framework to assess it!

Within the process of doing science, they cannot address this issue.
Whether they recognize that it is an issue depends on their
understanding of philosophical issues. I'd guess that the average
understanding of philosophy/religion among natural scientists is no
better than that of the general public. Getting a degree in science
leaves little time for other fields unless one makes a particular
effort.

> "You are not just using natural methods. But you are using natural
> methods." – David C.
>
> Perhaps this was a typo?

No. You are using natural methods, but you are not only using natural
methods.

> It is only the theology or the philosophy in/of people here at ASA that
> allows them to step outside of their naturalistic assumptions, cosmology
> included, to seek a balance whereby scientism isn't simply the norm.

Theology or philosophy is necessary to assess the assumptions.
Naturalistic is not the best word, because of the confounding of
philosophical naturalism with so-called methodological naturalism.
The assumption that a purely empirical approach can be useful within a
particular context in no way implies that a purely empirical approach
must be used for everything.

>>You are not just using natural methods. But you are using natural
methods. Therefore, the claim that using natural methods inherently
entails materialism is wrong. <<

>That's not the [claim] Plantinga and later IDists make. The claim
isn't that any use of "natural methods" entails materialism. The
claim is that a complete, absolute, a priori exclusion of direct
divine agency entails materialsm. Plantinga and later IDists would
say that there may or may not be direct divine agency evident in any
given phenomenon; it may well be that some phenomena can be described
solely in terms of secondary causes. However, there is no reason,
they would say, to attribute everything in nature to secondary causes
alone, and good epistemic reasons not to do so. <

However, they also claim that TE is inherently materialistic because
of its use of natural methods. That would only be true if using
natural methods entailed materialism. The expectation that many
things in nature ought to be inexplicable in terms of secondary causes
can also reflect the assumption that explanation by secondary causes
implies materialism.

>>The main points of Genesis 1-2 are that all things are part of God's
creation and that He has given man a special role in caring for
creation. <<

>Ah, there's the rub! Of course I agree with you, and I think
Plantinga would as well. The question, though, is whether Genesis 1-4
conveys anything more than these "main points." <

True; in the context I wanted to examine the implications of those
points rather than address secondary points; also, I think it is very
important to remember that the others are secondary.

>Let's assume for a minute that Gen. 2:7 unequivocally teaches that an
individual human, Adam, was separately created by God as the
progenitor of the human race.[...] If God revealed this fact to us,
would we be justified in making conclusions about the origins of man
that a priori exclude this fact? I can't see how. Any knowledge
claim about the origins of man that excluded this fact would
necessarily be inaccurate, probably grossly so. <

It depends on how conclusive a conclusion you want. Accepting the
hypothetical scenario for discussion purposes, it would not be
unreasonable to say, e.g., "Let's see what the evidence from genetics
on this." In turn, depending on the results, one might make
statements such as "Genetic evidence agrees with this", "Genetic
evidence suggests that this must have happened prior to x years ago",
"Genetic evidence does not match well with this. Perhaps there was
something unusual in the method of creation, or perhaps there's been
some sort of genetic introgression between humans and other primates,
or..."

In part, this gets back to the issue of scientism. If I ask the
question, "What is the genetic/paleontological/etc. evidence on the
origin of humans?", then I should examine the physical evidence,
regardless of theological or other ideas about the origin of humans.
I can then consider how that answer meshes or clashes with theological
or other answers. I might conclude that genetics, etc. isn't telling
the whole story, or that the theology needs re-examining, or something
else. How much weight the various answers get depends highly on my
philosophical viewpoint, which I need to recognize if I am to arrive
at a conclusion that is credible to someone else or a conclusion that
is in line with a particular principle (such as the tenets of
Christianity).

The principle of doing the work without regard to the desired
theological conclusion does not apply merely to science-Dorothy L.
Sayers has some discussions on the nature of work that articulate this
well (e.g., in remarks on The Man Born to be King, printed as an
introduction in some editions as well as in various essays and more
subtly in Gaudy Night and Busman's Honeymoon). Christian work must be
good work ("as unto the Lord", etc.); insofar as an effort to make it
an apologetic distracts from the goal of making it good, the
apologetic goal is harmful (and not met anyway, for bad work is a bad
testimony). No doubt you have encountered rotten "Christian" fiction
and well-done though theologically unsound fiction. To investigate
the relationships of mollusks in a manner honoring God, I need to
carefully examine the data and ignore claims that all species are
created separately or, for that matter, that they evolved in a
particular way.

>Since the interpretation of Gen. 2:7 is so hotly contested (at least
on lists like this), let's move a step back to a bit of a broader
picture. For example, if God revealed to us in scripture that human
beings are all inherently prone to evil, would we be justified in
making a knowledge claim about human psychology and social behavior
that humans are fundamentally altruistic and perfectable? Would we be
wise to use such a knowledge claim to construct social policy that is
designed mainly to maximize autonomy so that people can perfect
themselves without restraints? Again, I can't see how. <

Supposing that there were any data suggesting that humans are
fundamentally altruistic and perfectable (I know of none), then taking
that into account in social policy would make sense. The task is to
integrate the two pieces of evidence and figure out how to implement
them. Accepting the authority of Scripture, you might conclude that
the hypothetical data show that people try to appear altruistic and
perfectable but aren't really.

>But interestingly, I think many TE's would agree with me here. If
we're considering the "science" of social policy, we're more than
happy to allow our Biblical / theological presuppositions into the
foundation of our beliefs about what people are really like. <

This is not an accurate contrast with acceptance of evolution on several counts:
The interpretation of the Bible as opposed to evolution (as a
biological process) is much more tenuous than the interpretation of
the Bible as saying that humans are basically sinful.
The empirical evidence indicates that people behave as expected if
they are sinful.
The question of "what are people really like" is not the same as "what
is the sociological, etc. evidence as to what humans are like?"

>I think, then, that most of the epistemic arguments by TE's in favor
of MN are misplaced and/ or not theologically coherent. The principle
issues are hermeneutical and epistemological. George's hermeneutic is
consistent, whether it's correct or not. "Generalist" TE books like
Francis Collins' recent book, in contrast, IMHO lack any such
consistent hermeneutic. They seem to resort to hand waving and
mumbling about "allegory" concerning Gen. 1-4 without any explanation
how this fits into any sort of coherent doctrine of scripture. From
my perspective as a sort of moderate evangelical, I'd suggest that the
most important work TE's need to do is to develop a coherent, orthodox
doctrine of scripture, hermeneutic, and epistemology. <

I agree that Collins is weak on that point, but I'm not sure that
should be considered as an incoherent argument as opposed to absence
of argument.

Do the points I mentioned in the prior email relating to creation
constitue a coherent argument for MN? Not having any special
theological training, I wouldn't be surprised if I have made mistakes,
but tell me where.

-- 
Dr. David Campbell
425 Scientific Collections
University of Alabama
"I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
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