Re: A response to Maatman with transcript

From: Steve Petermann (SteveGP@email.msn.com)
Date: Sun Apr 30 2000 - 19:17:10 EDT

  • Next message: Steve Petermann: "Re: A response to Maatman with transcript"

    Howard Van Till notes:
    > But this is a totally different case. In this case the question is, "Why
    is
    > the universe equipped with a set of formational capabilities sufficient to
    > actualize living forms in the course of time"? To which our theistic
    answer
    > is, "Because it is a Creation that was given being by a Creator having
    > unfathomable creativity (to conceptualize an adequate menu of formational
    > capabilities) and unlimited generosity (to give the Creation such richness
    > of being)."
    >
    > In the typical ID claim, on the other hand, the question is, "How did
    > specific biotic system X come to be actualized in time?" To which the ID
    > answer is, "The Intelligent Designer, having chosen to withhold the
    > formational capabilities needed to actualize X, must have imposed that X
    > form on the Creation at some specific time." Having withheld certain
    > formational capabilities at the beginning, the Creator must bridge the gap
    > by a form-imposing intervention at a later time.

    I've heard this type of argument stated before, but it doesn't seem to be so
    much a rational argument against the scheme as a theological value
    judgement. It appears that to some folks the scenario you describe is
    repugnant, to think of a deity who relates to creation thusly( creating
    something and then having to dabble in it to get the right result).
    Whereas this scheme that ID'ers offer may be an inference from their take on
    the situation, I don't think it can be argued down from the standpoint that
    it is theologically repugnant. When I think of a common day analogy it
    doesn't seem so far fetched. I have a child that was created through
    procreation and is now at the age that he wants to be pretty much
    independent from me. I, however, am not will to just stand idly by and let
    "nature take its course" and see him make a mistake with long range
    consequences. Although I appreciate his need for independence from me and
    will for the most part let things run their course, from time to time I
    dabble in his life because of my love for him.

    The notion that God may "dabble" in his/her creation from time to time to
    move things in the right direction is really a theological issue that has to
    stand up to further systematic criticism. I don't think it can be used as a
    rational argument against speculations of ID. Having said that, however, it
    is a notion that shouldn't be framed as a scientific statement either. It
    is a speculation that cannot be affirmed experimentally how ever much it may
    seem to be an inference to the best explanation.

    I would equate the theological or metaphysical propositions that stem from
    ID propositions as the equivalence to a "scientifically based" natural
    theology. In other words, if by evaluating the anthropic principal or
    irreducible complexity one decides that it is reasonable to believe in a
    intelligent agent( a deity ) then how would one describe such a deity?
    Instead, however, of formulating a natural theology as Thomas Aquinas did,
    one would try to formulate a theology from how science understands the
    workings of the universe. Since the ID'ers think that God interacts with
    the universe to create complex designs, then if they speculate on the
    designer they, at the very least, find themselves in a tenuous fence sitting
    position between science and natural theology. If they do that then they
    may have left the scientific arena and are probably out of their specialty.

    The reason to me that ID seems to have an equivalence to the anthropic
    principal is that both appeal to probability. Behe and Dembski claim that
    the odds of random mutations creating the complexity we see is so remote
    that it implies a designer in the mix. I don't know about the mathematical
    basis for their claims, but I know from 25 years of designing machines that
    moving from one design to another is no simple one step process. Typically
    the goal in improving a design is to make as few changes as possible to
    accomplish the improved functionality. This is done for economic reasons.
    But what is invariably found is that it takes a lot of changes done at once
    to make the new function work. I think this is true for living
    functionality as well. While some small changes may improve functionality,
    to make any major improvement requires a very different functional system.
    So the question becomes, "Are there enough iterations to randomly move to a
    new functionality which requires quite a few differences?". The ID'ers say
    no, the Darwinians say yes. How can this be resolved? The ID'ers have
    valid points, but can't prove them except by math models with various
    assumptions. The Darwinians can, however, disprove ID if they can create a
    preponderance of evidence that the detailed evolution of these complex
    systems can be determined.

    Best Regards,
    Steve Petermann

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@novagate.com>
    To: "Steve Petermann" <SteveGP@email.msn.com>
    Cc: <asa@calvin.edu>
    Sent: Saturday, April 29, 2000 7:44 PM
    Subject: Re: A response to Maatman with transcript

    > Steve Petermann notes:
    >
    > > It seems to me, however, that the notion of an outside intelligent agent
    > > actually precludes any ID affirming experiments. Unlike the
    regularities of
    > > nature which can be measured experimentally, an outside intelligent
    agent is
    > > by its nature not experimentally available. An experiment would have
    to be
    > > designed essentially to catch God in the act. So it would be reasonable
    > > that the ID folks couldn't offer specific affirmative suggestions.
    >
    > But the heart of the ID claim is that "We have convincing empirical
    evidence
    > that X was intelligently designed." However, when I asked a leading
    > proponent of ID to tell me exactly what it means "to be (or have been)
    > intelligently designed" I got the reply, "To be (or have been)
    intelligently
    > designed means to be (or have been) designed by an intelligent agent."
    What
    > does that tell me about the action of intelligent design? Exactly nothing!
    > It's the old problem of trying to define 'horse' by saying that "a horse
    is
    > a horsey thing."
    >
    > > It seems
    > > to me that because of this, the real issue becomes reasonableness. I
    don't
    > > know about Behe's claim that no one has offered viable detailed
    Darwinian
    > > explanations for any complex biochemical processes, but if he is right
    then
    > > unless the Darwinians are able to show some successes in explaining
    those
    > > processes like blood clotting then we're stuck with a reasonableness
    > > approach.
    >
    > But is an appeal to ID, where ID remains a totally undefined act, a
    > reasonable approach? Not in my book.
    >
    > > It ends up like the anthropic principle. Is it more reasonable
    > > to explain the extraordinarily rare chance for a life producing universe
    by
    > > believing in a designer or infinite universes?
    >
    > But this is a totally different case. In this case the question is, "Why
    is
    > the universe equipped with a set of formational capabilities sufficient to
    > actualize living forms in the course of time"? To which our theistic
    answer
    > is, "Because it is a Creation that was given being by a Creator having
    > unfathomable creativity (to conceptualize an adequate menu of formational
    > capabilities) and unlimited generosity (to give the Creation such richness
    > of being)."
    >
    > In the typical ID claim, on the other hand, the question is, "How did
    > specific biotic system X come to be actualized in time?" To which the ID
    > answer is, "The Intelligent Designer, having chosen to withhold the
    > formational capabilities needed to actualize X, must have imposed that X
    > form on the Creation at some specific time." Having withheld certain
    > formational capabilities at the beginning, the Creator must bridge the gap
    > by a form-imposing intervention at a later time.
    >
    > > It seems to me that biochemical processes provide an ideal situation for
    > > research. They are simple enough to minimize variables and complex
    enough
    > > to be good test cases. As a design engineer for more than 25 years, I
    find
    > > the ID arguments about irreducible complexity reasonable, but as a
    person
    > > who has embraced Darwinian evolution, I await detailed technical
    responses
    > > to the ID challenges. There's a lot of high level rhetoric going on
    between
    > > the camps, but I hope that something more detailed and substantial will
    be
    > > forthcoming.
    >
    > Frankly, I would bet on the proponents of a universe equipped with a
    robust
    > formational economy to win the day. They have the higher expectations
    > regarding the character of the universe--expectations that fit my
    conception
    > of what a Creation is: fully equipped to accomplish the Creators
    intentions
    > for the timely actualization of the intended types of creatures.
    >
    > Howard Van Till



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