Re: A response to Maatman with transcript

From: George Murphy (gmurphy@raex.com)
Date: Sun Apr 30 2000 - 20:48:41 EDT

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    Steve Petermann wrote:
    >
    > Howard Van Till notes:
    > > But this is a totally different case. In this case the question is, "Why
    > is
    > > the universe equipped with a set of formational capabilities sufficient to
    > > actualize living forms in the course of time"? To which our theistic
    > answer
    > > is, "Because it is a Creation that was given being by a Creator having
    > > unfathomable creativity (to conceptualize an adequate menu of formational
    > > capabilities) and unlimited generosity (to give the Creation such richness
    > > of being)."
    > >
    > > In the typical ID claim, on the other hand, the question is, "How did
    > > specific biotic system X come to be actualized in time?" To which the ID
    > > answer is, "The Intelligent Designer, having chosen to withhold the
    > > formational capabilities needed to actualize X, must have imposed that X
    > > form on the Creation at some specific time." Having withheld certain
    > > formational capabilities at the beginning, the Creator must bridge the gap
    > > by a form-imposing intervention at a later time.
    >
    > I've heard this type of argument stated before, but it doesn't seem to be so
    > much a rational argument against the scheme as a theological value
    > judgement. It appears that to some folks the scenario you describe is
    > repugnant, to think of a deity who relates to creation thusly( creating
    > something and then having to dabble in it to get the right result).
    > Whereas this scheme that ID'ers offer may be an inference from their take on
    > the situation, I don't think it can be argued down from the standpoint that
    > it is theologically repugnant. When I think of a common day analogy it
    > doesn't seem so far fetched. I have a child that was created through
    > procreation and is now at the age that he wants to be pretty much
    > independent from me. I, however, am not will to just stand idly by and let
    > "nature take its course" and see him make a mistake with long range
    > consequences. Although I appreciate his need for independence from me and
    > will for the most part let things run their course, from time to time I
    > dabble in his life because of my love for him.
    >
    > The notion that God may "dabble" in his/her creation from time to time to
    > move things in the right direction is really a theological issue that has to
    > stand up to further systematic criticism. I don't think it can be used as a
    > rational argument against speculations of ID. Having said that, however, it
    > is a notion that shouldn't be framed as a scientific statement either. It
    > is a speculation that cannot be affirmed experimentally how ever much it may
    > seem to be an inference to the best explanation.
    >
    > I would equate the theological or metaphysical propositions that stem from
    > ID propositions as the equivalence to a "scientifically based" natural
    > theology. In other words, if by evaluating the anthropic principal or
    > irreducible complexity one decides that it is reasonable to believe in a
    > intelligent agent( a deity ) then how would one describe such a deity?
    > Instead, however, of formulating a natural theology as Thomas Aquinas did,
    > one would try to formulate a theology from how science understands the
    > workings of the universe. Since the ID'ers think that God interacts with
    > the universe to create complex designs, then if they speculate on the
    > designer they, at the very least, find themselves in a tenuous fence sitting
    > position between science and natural theology. If they do that then they
    > may have left the scientific arena and are probably out of their specialty.
    >
    > The reason to me that ID seems to have an equivalence to the anthropic
    > principal is that both appeal to probability. Behe and Dembski claim that
    > the odds of random mutations creating the complexity we see is so remote
    > that it implies a designer in the mix. I don't know about the mathematical
    > basis for their claims, but I know from 25 years of designing machines that
    > moving from one design to another is no simple one step process. Typically
    > the goal in improving a design is to make as few changes as possible to
    > accomplish the improved functionality. This is done for economic reasons.
    > But what is invariably found is that it takes a lot of changes done at once
    > to make the new function work. I think this is true for living
    > functionality as well. While some small changes may improve functionality,
    > to make any major improvement requires a very different functional system.
    > So the question becomes, "Are there enough iterations to randomly move to a
    > new functionality which requires quite a few differences?". The ID'ers say
    > no, the Darwinians say yes. How can this be resolved? The ID'ers have
    > valid points, but can't prove them except by math models with various
    > assumptions. The Darwinians can, however, disprove ID if they can create a
    > preponderance of evidence that the detailed evolution of these complex
    > systems can be determined.

            1) It's correct that ID is a variety of independent natural theology, though
    the IDers often deny that they're interested in that enterprise. (Cf. Dembski's recent
    book, my review of which I posted here.) That is one of the reasons I think the ID
    movement is a theologically dangerous enterprise.
            2) The de facto natural theologies practised by IDers are both more coy and
    more naive than that of Aquinas. The IDers like to claim that the Intelligent Designer
    wouldn't necessarily have to be God (though the caveat is often dropped) but they also
    think that they are reaching their conclusions without prior theological resuppositions.
    Thomas did natural theology without appeal to revelation but at least concludes each of
    his arguments by saying "& this all people call God" - i.e., acknowledging that there is
    some prior conception of what is meant by God.
            3) My qualification that it is _independent_ natural theology - i.e., with no
    appeal to revelation - which is dangerous is important. The ID argument would be quite
    different if they were to state up front that their belief in intelligent design is
    based on acceptance of biblical witness to God's purpose for creation & that they are
    then seeking to understand the working out of that purpose by scientific investigation.
    That would not change the scientific status of ID claims. It would, however, require
    IDers to face theological issues they now avoid, such as whether a God who acts as they
    think in creation is really what the biblical picture of God points to.
            4) It's unfortunate that almost everyone in this debate, proponents & opponents
    of ID alike, are willing to do what theology they do in terms of "theism" with no
    reference to distinctively Christian understandings of God, creation, or providence.
    The best arguments for a kenotic (non-dabbling) understanding of divine action, e.g.,
    are christological - the very idea of kenosis comes from Phil.2:5-11. Such a view has
    to be evaluated with explicit reference to God's revelation in Christ. Whether or not
    we dabble in our children's lives may make a useful illustration but can't be the basis
    for our theology.
                                            Shalom,
                                            George

    George L. Murphy
    gmurphy@raex.com
    http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/



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