At first, I was reluntant to pursue this thread further, since it
may appear to some to have only tangential relation to an "evolution"
reflector. But then again, I concluded that the existence of moral
obligation IS very relevant to the topic: any evolutionary view must account
for it, and naturalistic evolution, in my view, cannot sufficiently do so.
Before Russell pats his atheistic/materialistic self on the back too
soon, several critical issues remain for him to resolve (which presupposes
that they must be specifically and directly addressed).
(1) Russell has not given any specific response to the distinction
drawn between what is ontologically posited and what is epistemologically
"proveable." What kind of an ONTOLOGICAL connection does the naturalistic
evolutionaist have to justify a universal moral obligation? My contention:
there is none.
(2) Russell fundamentally misunderstands the nature of what must be
"demonstrated" here. I am looking for a logical CONNECTION between a
philosophical system (whether it be theistic or naturalistic) and the
resulting parameters and grounds for morality. In logical terms, what is
sought is the LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN the "if" and the "then" (i.e., "if
>? >? >? then"). What a system like orthodox Christian theism does is
provide a logical (and ontological) ground for justifying the claim to
universal morality: IF a transcendent, personal, and creator God exists,
THEN there is an objective (and ontological) basis for universal morality.
Russell's response, however, is to say that this rests upon a "huge
assumption" regarding the existence of God. He then asserts, "If [God's
existence] cannot be proven (and it hasn't), then the logic goes right out
the window and Christian morality becomes just as subjective as any other."
But in doing this, Russell is illegitimately demanding (and falsely
assuming) that the "if" component has to be PROVEN before the CONNECTION
between the "if/then" can be legitimized. This is simply not the case.
Whether the "if" is ACTUALLY true or not is irrelevant to the question
regarding the plausibility of the LOGICAL CONNECTION.
In fact, when put in simple syllogistic terms, Russell's "illogical"
response becomes apparent:
P1: If a transcendent God exists, then an objective, universal
moral obligation exists. [G > M]
P2: A transcendent God exists. [G]
Therefore, an objective, universal moral obligtion exists.
Now Russell wants to say that unless premise 2 is PROVEN, Christian
morality is "as subjective" as any other. But, again, the whole point is
whether the CONNECTION in the hypothetical (i.e., premise 1) is warranted,
not whether the Christian God exists. (Actually, this is HALF the point.
The other half is in response to Russell's own implied hypothetical: "If a
transcendent God does NOT exist, a universal moral obligation still exists."
What I (and some others) are saying is that THERE IS NO PLAUSIBLE LOGICAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 'IF' AND THE 'THEN' IN THIS IMPLIED HYPOTHETICAL.
Russell has given some PERSONAL reasons for his own morality, but he hasn't
yet given any sufficient basis for his claim about UNIVERSAL moral OBLIGATION.)
As a result, Russell is mistaken is claiming that it is a
"contradiction" to talk of a "logical ground for universal morality." To
the contrary, a transcendent "creator" theism not only DOES provide a
logical ground for universal morality, it is the ONLY system that can do so.
And any purely naturalistic attempt to substantiate a universal moral
obligation simply goes BEYOND the range of the philosophic merit of the system.
It is NOT ironic that it took a THEIST to realize this (and it
shouldn't necessarily be ironic for an atheist/materialist to come to the
point of recognizing it as well).
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Rich Knopp, M.Div., Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy and Christian Apologetics
Lincoln Christian College and Seminary
Lincoln, IL. 62656
"If God didn't exist, He would want us not to believe in Him."
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