SC:
In this regard Phil is correct, as I stated above when referring to Dawkins
and Sagan. But his criticism of the philosophy of science in Darwin on
Trial and in his talks (I havent' had time to read RITB yet), fails to
adequately make this distinction. Here's the issue as I see it, if your
complaint is with someone's metaphysics, don't complain about his physics.
This is an important distinction that doesn't always come across from ID
folk. In this regard, I see a parallel here with the problem that arose
from the justified complaints about "secular humanism". "Secular humanism"
became a rallying cry in the pulpit and local churches and soon the
"secular" part was dropped and the criticism focused on "humanism".
Christianity has a fine and proud history of humanism so this failure to
make a distinction between the practice and philosophy of humanism amounted
to throwing the baby out with the bath water. Lets not do this with naturalism.
SC
><<But science IS naturalism--empiricism is what distinguishes science from
>other forms of philosophy.>>
>I don't have a problem with this, although what is meant by "empiricism"
>should be discussed. When it is used as a delimiter, I cry foul.
Empiricism as a delimiter of science is appropraite and fair. Empirical
evidence is the primary way that belief is justified in the arena of
science. However, in the metaphysical arena empirical justification of
belief is neither required nor often feasible. The problem with so-called
"naturalism" is that it fails to recognize the metaphysical arena. This is
a failure of recognition rather than an errant philosophy of science. For
this reason, "methodological naturalists" should be criticised on their
metaphysics and not on their physics.
JB:
My point is
>this. When you look at a datum and ask "How did this happen?" it is a false
>constriction to say the only answer must be naturalistic. If we observe a
>natural mechanism that explains, fine. But if we observe only complex
>information which looks like other things which are designed, then FINE as
>well. Let's let the data lead us where it will.
Don't you just hate those false constrictions?
I have two comments here: 1. This again is the "evidence from analogy"
argument--we have returned to my original point that analogy does not
constitute evidence. One can make hypotheses from analogies, but then one
must look for independent evidence that the analogous situation actually
behaves like the prototype situation. 2. The alternatives Jim presents
above are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This is not readily admitted
by either Dawkins and Sagan, or by Bell and Johnson. With this we are back
to my quote in the first sentence of this post.
Steve
__________________________________________________________________________
Steven S. Clark, Ph.D. Phone: (608) 263-9137
Associate Professor FAX: (608) 263-4226
Dept. of Human Oncology and email: ssclark@facstaff.wisc.edu
UW Comprehensive Cancer Ctr
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53792
"Now how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? 'Well at that
stage', said my friend, 'we spray it with positrons to increase the charge
or with electrons to decrease the charge.' From that day forth I've been
a scientific realist. So far as I'm concerned, if you can spray them then
they are real". Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 1983
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