Re: Philosophy of Science

Jim Bell (70672.1241@compuserve.com)
02 Feb 96 15:07:47 EST

Steve Clark writes:

<<Here's the issue as I see it, if your
complaint is with someone's metaphysics, don't complain about his physics.>>

But what happens when his physics are skewed by his metaphysics? THAT is the
issue, as I see it.

It would be nice, Steve, if these distinctions were always made, but they're
not. That is really the crux of RITB, which I recommend to you.

<<Empiricism as a delimiter of science is appropraite and fair. Empirical
evidence is the primary way that belief is justified in the arena of
science.>>

When you phrase it that way, fine. But when someone rules out ID on "empirical"
grounds, then a line has been crossed.

<<The alternatives Jim presents
above are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This is not readily admitted
by either Dawkins and Sagan, or by Bell and Johnson. With this we are back
to my quote in the first sentence of this post.>>

I guess I should now say, "Flattery will get you nowhere."

The alternatives ARE mutually exclusive. Impersonal and personal are usually
thought of as opposites. Non-directed and directed cannot accomodate one
another. TEs attempt an accomodationism by plugging a "God did it" at the tail
end of the naturalistic dog, but so far I find that hound has too many fleas.

Jim