JB>
> Mark Hartwig and Stephen Meyer have written about the philosophy of science as
> it relates to the question of intelligent design (in an appendix to "Of Pandas
> and People", from which the quotes are taken). The question is, "What makes a
> concept or explanation scientific?" Most scientists would assert that,
> whatever the answer, intelligent design (ID) is NON-scientific. ID is thus
> "ruled out of court" for explanatory purposes.
>
> There are some problems with this, however. I'll explain what they are,
> according to the authors, and then ask questions based upon that:
>
> 1. ID is used elsewhere in science
>
> "One problem is that [this view] ignores areas of scientific investigation
> where intelligent design is a necessary explanatory concept. The search for
> extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) is one example....Archaeology would meet
> the same fate. Archaeologists routinely distinguish manufactured objects
> (e.g., arrowheads, potsherds) from natural ones (e.g., stones), even when the
> differences between them are very subtle...But if we arbitrarily assert that
> science explains solely by reference to natural laws, if archaeologists are
> prohibited from invoking an intelligent manufacturer, the whole archaeological
> enterprise comes to a grinding halt."
>
> Question: So why should ID be ruled out of court when it is used elsewhere in
> science?
I agree, ID is used elsewhere in science. Archaeology and SETI are good
examples.
But IMO, scientists who argue for ID in biology have a disadvantage
compared to scientists who search for ID in archaeology and SETI. Let me
go out on a limb and put it this way:
Archaeologists and SETI-ists use a fairly objective criteria to
differentiate between designed objects and non-designed objects
(or signals). This criteria (1) is agreed upon by most
practitioners; and (2) is defined _prior_ to examining new objects
(or signals).
I do not think that ID-advocates in biology have achieved this yet,
although they are close.
(Obviously, there are "borderline cases" in archaeology (and potentially
in SETI also) where practitioners can disagree. And the criteria for
differentiating designed from non-designed objects can change, based upon
new discoveries. Nevertheless, it is generally true that archaeologists
and SETI-ists have a more objective, well-defined, and widely agreed-upon
criteria than biologists do.)
Several months ago in this discussion group, Mike Behe argued for
"irreducible complexity" as a criteria for ID. This criteria is objective
and can be defined prior to examining new biological systems. The only
drawback with this criteria is that many scientist believe that biological
evolution CAN produce irreducibly complex systems. (I brashly argued this
point with Mike Behe back then, even though it IS his area of expertise.)
I'd like to see some ID-biology criteria advanced which is both specific
(specific like "irreducible complexity") --- much more specific than
simply "... natural processes could not do it" --- and generally agreed
upon by scientists. I believe this can be achieved, and it would help
advance the discussion. (Perhaps you will suggest that the lack of a
widely agreed-upon criteria (such as irreducible complexity) is due to
willful blindness on the part of evolutionists, but I don't want to put
words in your mouth. :-)
---------------------------------------------
JB> 2. Confusing laws and explanations
>
> "A second problem with limiting science to blind, natural regularities is that
> it confuses laws and explanations....[Example] If a historical geologist
> wanted to explain the unusual height of the Himalayas, invoking natural laws
> would be of little use. Natural laws alone cannot tell us why the Himalayas
> are higher than, say, the Rocky Mountains. That would require discovering
> antecedent factors that were present in building the Himalayas, but not in
> other mountain building episodes....[I]gnoring the role of causal events in
> scientific explanation has created a false dichotomy between agency--or
> intelligent design--and the laws of nature. The fact that scientific
> explanations may invoke laws doesn't mean that agency is somehow ruled out.
>
> There is a distinction, they write, between "inductive" science and
> "historical" science. The first asks questions about how the natural world
> generally operates; the second asks how things CAME TO BE. The former looks
> for natural laws in the everyday world; the latter seeks to reconstruct past
> events. "Intelligent agents may have left traces of their activity in the
> natural world. The historical scientist need not turn a blind eye to them."
>
> Question: Why should we turn a blind eye to signs of ID in the development of
> life?
I *definitely* agree with this point. There is an important distinction
between laws and explanations, and between inductive and historical
science. Historical explanations need not rely solely on natural laws.
Historical science can include intelligent-intervention steps in its
explanations; if carefully done, science will be no worse for it.
--------------------------------------------------------
JB> 3. Observability and testability
>
> Is ID non-scientific because it is un-observable or untestable? A problem
> arises because Neo-Darwinism is in the same category.
I wouldn't QUITE say that ID and neo-Darwinism are "in the same category."
IMO, the basic difference is this: neo-Darwinism must prove that natural
mechanisms are adequate to account for biological history; ID must prove
that natural mechanisms are INadequate. In one sense, ID has a much more
difficult task, since it must exhaustively examine all natural processes
to prove its point. However, if ID succeeds, it will have _convincingly_
shown that intelligence was involved. On the other hand, even IF
neo-Darwinism succeeds, it will NOT have shown that intelligence was NOT
behind the process.
On the other hand, I agree with this point: both neo-Darwinism and ID
rely on "unobservable events" in their historical models. And I agree,
both testable and untestable versions of ID can be articulated, just as
both testable and untestable versions of neo-Darwinism can be articulated.
JB> "Although neo-Darwinism
> explains many observable features of the living world, it postulates
> unobservable objects and events. For example, the mutational events that
> allegedly produced reptiles, birds, mammals, and even humans have never been
> observed--nor will they ever be. Similarly, the transitional forms that occupy
> the branching points on Darwin's tree of life are also unobservable....The
> unobservable character of Darwinism becomes especially plain when proponents
> try to reconcile the fossil evidence with their theory....[Darwinists] account
> for unobserved fossil forms by invoking unobserved geological processes."
>
> Another query is whether ID is falsifiable. Sure it is: "Experience will show
> that only intelligent agency gives rise to functional information. All that is
> necessary to falsify the hypothesis of intelligent design is to show confirmed
> instances of purely physcial or chemical antecedents producing such
> information."
I disagree with this last quotation. In particular, I do not think that
ID would be falsified by finding just _any_ instance of "functional
information" arising without intelligent agency.
For example, there have been several computer simulations which begin with
simple elements behaving in "atomistic" fashion (interacting with each
other stochastically, controlled by simple algorythms) which evolve into
greater complexity. Perhaps no computer simulation YET gone all the way
from "atomistic elements" to "functional information," but they are headed
in that direction. With enough computer power and the right algorythms,
scientists might eventually produce a system which achieves "functional
information" without intelligent agency --- a computer analog of
abiogenesis.
But even if they did, that would not prove abiogenesis, nor would it
falsify the hypothesis of ID in biology. Those will have to be confirmed
or falsified "in the test tube."
----------------------------------------------------
JB> 4. Is ID merely a religion in disguise?
>
> "Criticizing [ID] on that basis begs the question of whether it is
> scientifically warranted. In science, the origin of an idea is supposed to be
> irrelevant to its validity. What matters is not the source but whether the
> idea is logically consistent and empirically supportable. If it is, what
> justification is there for excluding it from the classroom?"
>
> Question: What justification is there from excluding it from the classroom?
I agree with this point, also. But I have a caveat.
I'm all in favor of teaching students the limits of evolutionary theory.
Certain areas (abiogenesis, origin of complexity) are downright
speculative! Students should be taught both the evidence for it AND the
scientific objections. In that context, the ID model of biological
history can be raised in the science classroom, as an alternative to the
popular, purely naturalistic "guesses."
But many of the arguments --- both for and against ID --- go well beyond
science and are rather philosophical. If THOSE are taught in the
classroom, they should be labeled as philosophical arguments.
-----------------------------
Thanks again for summarizing Hartwig & Meyer.
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"LIFE: (noun) Any set of observables | Loren Haarsma
governed by Murphy's Law." | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu
(--Phillip Spencer, 1992) |