>From: "Ted Davis" <tdavis@messiah.edu>
> I invited Howard to correct me, concerning Griffin's understanding of the
> meaning of creation. And he did, by quoting this passage, from one of
> Griffin's works that I have not studied:
Ted, thanks for your thoughtful and carefully crafted reply. In response to
one my selections from Griffin [re God's initial, "Let there be this kind of
universe!" followed by God's interacting with it non-coercively] ending with
the words:
> "In this
> way, process theism, while maintaining that God's agency in our universe
> is always persuasive, can nevertheless account for the remarkable contingent
> order on which our particular universe is based." Reenchantment, p. 218.
You replied:
> This is fascinating, for at first glance it might appear that Griffin has
> broken the old process rule that God does not create ex nihilo, a rule that
> I think Ian Barbour may even be rethinking, though I don't want to get into
> that right now. Certainly it is more than I expected Griffin to say, and I
> have long held myself that genuine contingency in nature *requires* coercive
> divine power.
Actually Griffin maintains rather strong reasons for rejecting creation ex
nihilo. He sees ex nihilo as the grounding for supernatural (coercive)
intervention. Remember, the concept of "coercive" action applies to forcible
action on something that already has its specific form of being, not to the
act of selecting/actualizing the whole system (within the limits of
applicable metaphysical principles).
> In fact I still hold that position, and I take the passage above to be
> evidence that Griffin is pushing the envelope of his own view--that's meant
> as a friendly comment, not a harsh criticism, b/c we all have to push the
> envelope from time to time. Let's see exactly what I mean. First of all,
> Griffin clearly accepts the evidence for genuine contingency in nature, as
> seen for example in cosmic fine tuning. This is in itself significant, for
> there has been a tendency until fairly recently for process thinkers to
> downplay or ignore the "fact" of the big bang (if I may call it that, as I
> think one might).
Griffin makes no argument against the idea of a big-bang as the initial
event of this particular cosmic era. But, of course, the scientific concept
of this particular universe "beginning" at a singularity does not
necessarily entail the theological concept of creatio ex nihilo. In fact,
contemporary cosmologies often consider this universe to be but one member
of a much larger category.
> Twenty years ago, one might have had the impression that
> process thinkers tried awfully hard to be "scientific" in their thinking, in
> that they fully accepted biological evolution; but at the same time, they
> tried awfully hard to avoid dealing with the implications of having a
> universe with a finite age, full of evidence suggesting fine tuning. (One
> might say that they have been the mirror image of the ID approach.) I would
> agree that this is changing, and I am actually quite interested to see what
> effect this will ultimately have on the position.
>
> Next let's look at this sentence: "A divine spirit, brooding over the
> chaos, would only have to think "Let there be X!" (with X standing for the
> complex, interconnected set of contingent principles embodied in our world
> at the outset, constituting its fine tuning)." I call attention here to the
> words "only" and "at the outset." A divine spirit would "only" have to
> think about order, and somehow it's imposed on--forgive me, that's too
> coercive--and somehow it's, well, somehow it becomes a "set of contingent
> principles embodied in our world at the outset." I think it's fair to say
> at this point, that this sounds suspiciously like creatio ex nihilo, at
> least it sounds pretty coercive to me.
Perhaps it would help to make a distinction between "giving the
World-in-relationship-to-God its particular form of being in a new cosmic
era" and "giving being to a world from absolutely nothing."
> To embody certain principles in our
> world, indeed certain *contingent* principles in our world, surely does
> suggest that God is determining the nature of nature.
Yes, the nature of this particular cosmic era. But that does not necessarily
entail creatio ex nihilo.
> Apparently this
> happened without the resistance of "matter," or whatever we call that
> primordial stuff--and again, I think this sounds suspiciously like creatio
> ex nihilo.
See above. But "resistance" is not, as I understand it, the issue. It a
question of the essence of God-and-a-World as the Ultimate Reality.
> OK, so this "persuasive" activity, as Griffin still wants to call it,
> happens "at the outset" (presumably of our present universe). Here I want
> to ask, if God can be *this* persuasive, at least "at the outset," then why
> bother to insist (as I think Griffin still does, again I invite correction)
> that it is only our *present* universe that "began" at this point, "at the
> outset."
OK so far, if I'm correctly following you.
> Surely, I suggest, a God capable of this type of "persuasion"
> (which we dare not call "coercion") could also "persuade" the primordial
> stuff itself to exist. Or, to put it another way: if the primordial stuff
> is coeval with God, but does not really possess the properties of "nature as
> we know it" until God "persuades" it to become something specific "at the
> outset," then it isn't really very important in itself--that is, I see no
> role for it to play theologically, or physically (since it isn't the nature
> we know), and I wonder why Griffin doesn't simply want to "go the whole hog"
> and admit that God probably "persuaded" it to exist also, "at the outset."
Griffin would argue, I believe, that although the particular character may
be chosen/actualized by God, there are profoundly important metaphysical
principles (regarding the God/World relationship for instance) which are
essential and cannot be superceded or ignored. (I'm sure he could say it
much better.)
> As with the many worlds hypothesis--which elsewhere I have called the
> functional equivalent of a God-of-the-gaps for atheists--this idea of a
> pre-existentent formless stuff, which God subsequently orders, seems to be
> just a convenient way to avoid the conclusion that God is "omnipotent" or
> something like that.
If I understand Griffin correctly, the metaphysical principles (including
the principle of no coercive action, no violation of the World's freedom)
are more important than the idea of some "formless stuff."
> (Those familiar with Timaeus will recognize that this
> is precisely how primordial matter functions for Plato, to avoid the
> conclusion that God is omnipotent.) It really seems to have no cash value
> here, since (as I have already argued) Griffin does seem to require a very
> great power on God's part to order nature "at the outset," and I do wonder
> what's the point. At least God is allowed to exert great power "at the
> outset," if not also later on.
>
> As for later on, Griffin clearly states that God is less persuasive, for
> matter (having been given its nature, my language) is now somewhat
> recalcitrant.
"Recalcitrant" carries the connotation of resistance, disobedience,
defiance, and lack of cooperation. Such notions seem to me foreign to
Griffin's approach. The limitation of divine power follows not from
"recalcitrance," but from the nature of God-and-a-world and the metaphysical
realities that are essential to them. Recall an earlier comment I made: In
correspondence with a process theologian recently I commented: "As I
understand you, you're saying: (1) love is essential to God, (2) freedom is
essential to creatures, (3) relationship to creatures is essential to God,
and (4) God's relationship to creatures, therefore, is necessarily
characterized by kenotic love that will not violate any creaturely freedom."
> Griffin does seem to avoid here the Platonic problem of
> having a recalcitrant matter from the get-go, and I applaud this, and I am
> also very sympathetic with various theologies of self-limitation on God's
> part, once the world has been given existence of a certain kind.
Voluntary self-limitation has its own problems. Is there no particular
circumstance for which God could, for the sake of greater good, choose to
make an exception to a freely self-imposed rule? If God _could_ have
prevented the Holocaust, but for the sake of consistency, chose not to, is
he not culpable?
............ [Let's skip the next paragraph for now]
> Finally, let me turn these words back on Griffin. What does it take to
> "persuade" the primordial stuff to take on an "interconnected set of
> contingent principles embodied in our world at the outset, constituting its
> fine tuning"? It takes mastery over the created order. Sorry if this
> sounds too much like transcendence in the traditional sense, too much like
> "omnipotence" (sorry for the language, someone please give Whitehead an
> opportunity to leave the room). Even Griffin sees this, I suggest, when he
> admits that God's persuasion at the outset "could produce quasi-coercive
> effects."
Mastery? Power to do _anything_? I think Griffin would say, No, not
anything; only those things that are consistent with the overriding
metaphysical principles that characterize God-and-a World. To be without
Absolute Power is not to be powerless.
> I respect David Griffin greatly--he knows this,
> ..... I think I understand his reasons for rejecting
> "omnipotence," I am learning more about his brand of process theology, and I
> love the Christian love that I see emanating from him as both a thinker and
> a person (the world would be a better place if there were more David
> Grifiins).
Well said.
> But when it comes to the doctrine of creation, *especially* but
> not solely as it intersects with what science tells us about the nature of
> nature, I find myself more and more convinced that classical theism is
> right.
>
> Indeed, when it comes to process theism, I am--shall we say--unpersuaded?
That's both honest and respectful. Thanks for taking the time and energy to
craft these comments.
Howard
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