I invited Howard to correct me, concerning Griffin's understanding of the
meaning of creation. And he did, by quoting this passage, from one of
Griffin's works that I have not studied (he's pretty prolific, and I have
not made it my life's work to follow his):
"In the first instant of the creation of a particular universe,
accordingly,
divine persuasion could produce quasi-coercive effects. A divine spirit,
brooding over the chaos, would only have to think "Let there be X!" (with
X
standing for the complex, interconnected set of contingent principles
embodied in our world at the outset, constituting its fine tuning). From
then on, however, the divine persuasive activity would always face
competition from the power embodied in the habits reflecting these
contingent principles, so that divine persuasion would never again, as
long
as this world exists, be able to guarantee quasi-coercive results. In this
way, process theism, while maintaining that God's agency in our universe
is
always persuasive, can nevertheless account for the remarkable contingent
order on which our particular universe is based." Reenchantment, p. 218.
This is fascinating, for at first glance it might appear that Griffin has
broken the old process rule that God does not create ex nihilo, a rule that
I think Ian Barbour may even be rethinking, though I don't want to get into
that right now. Certainly it is more than I expected Griffin to say, and I
have long held myself that genuine contingency in nature *requires* coercive
divine power.
In fact I still hold that position, and I take the passage above to be
evidence that Griffin is pushing the envelope of his own view--that's meant
as a friendly comment, not a harsh criticism, b/c we all have to push the
envelope from time to time. Let's see exactly what I mean. First of all,
Griffin clearly accepts the evidence for genuine contingency in nature, as
seen for example in cosmic fine tuning. This is in itself significant, for
there has been a tendency until fairly recently for process thinkers to
downplay or ignore the "fact" of the big bang (if I may call it that, as I
think one might). Twenty years ago, one might have had the impression that
process thinkers tried awfully hard to be "scientific" in their thinking, in
that they fully accepted biological evolution; but at the same time, they
tried awfully hard to avoid dealing with the implications of having a
universe with a finite age, full of evidence suggesting fine tuning. (One
might say that they have been the mirror image of the ID approach.) I would
agree that this is changing, and I am actually quite interested to see what
effect this will ultimately have on the position.
Next let's look at this sentence: "A divine spirit, brooding over the
chaos, would only have to think "Let there be X!" (with X standing for the
complex, interconnected set of contingent principles embodied in our world
at the outset, constituting its fine tuning)." I call attention here to the
words "only" and "at the outset." A divine spirit would "only" have to
think about order, and somehow it's imposed on--forgive me, that's too
coercive--and somehow it's, well, somehow it becomes a "set of contingent
principles embodied in our world at the outset." I think it's fair to say
at this point, that this sounds suspiciously like creatio ex nihilo, at
least it sounds pretty coercive to me. To embody certain principles in our
world, indeed certain *contingent* principles in our world, surely does
suggest that God is determining the nature of nature. Apparently this
happened without the resistance of "matter," or whatever we call that
primordial stuff--and again, I think this sounds suspiciously like creatio
ex nihilo.
OK, so this "persuasive" activity, as Griffin still wants to call it,
happens "at the outset" (presumably of our present universe). Here I want
to ask, if God can be *this* persuasive, at least "at the outset," then why
bother to insist (as I think Griffin still does, again I invite correction)
that it is only our *present* universe that "began" at this point, "at the
outset." Surely, I suggest, a God capable of this type of "persuasion"
(which we dare not call "coercion") could also "persuade" the primordial
stuff itself to exist. Or, to put it another way: if the primordial stuff
is coeval with God, but does not really possess the properties of "nature as
we know it" until God "persuades" it to become something specific "at the
outset," then it isn't really very important in itself--that is, I see no
role for it to play theologically, or physically (since it isn't the nature
we know), and I wonder why Griffin doesn't simply want to "go the whole hog"
and admit that God probably "persuaded" it to exist also, "at the outset."
As with the many worlds hypothesis--which elsewhere I have called the
functional equivalent of a God-of-the-gaps for atheists--this idea of a
pre-existentent formless stuff, which God subsequently orders, seems to be
just a convenient way to avoid the conclusion that God is "omnipotent" or
something like that. (Those familiar with Timaeus will recognize that this
is precisely how primordial matter functions for Plato, to avoid the
conclusion that God is omnipotent.) It really seems to have no cash value
here, since (as I have already argued) Griffin does seem to require a very
great power on God's part to order nature "at the outset," and I do wonder
what's the point. At least God is allowed to exert great power "at the
outset," if not also later on.
As for later on, Griffin clearly states that God is less persuasive, for
matter (having been given its nature, my language) is now somewhat
recalcitrant. Griffin does seem to avoid here the Platonic problem of
having a recalcitrant matter from the get-go, and I applaud this, and I am
also very sympathetic with various theologies of self-limitation on God's
part, once the world has been given existence of a certain kind. However,
my own theological persuasion (we seem to be using this word quite a bit)
aligns with that of Ted Peters, whose article about the creation and
resurrection (in Russell, ed., Physics, Philosophy, and Theology) gives
cogent reasons for linking belief in creatio ex nihilo (which I take to be a
reasonable conclusion from science, as well as from theology) with belief in
the resurrection. Indeed, he argues, the latter (in the Christian
understanding, not the Jewish) came first and led to acceptance of the
former. This is all to say that, I begin to think Christianly about the
natural world by reflecting on the empty tomb and the glorified body of
Jesus--without both of which, in my view, we would not be thinking
Christianly about anything, since there would be no Christian church. In
other words, I begin by accepting a profound miracle, a deep mystery, that
opens the door for me to accept another profound miracle, a deep
mystery--though one that seems justified scientifically, the miracle of the
absolute origination of the world. What this means for me, I let Peters
state (277): "What does it take to raise the dead? What does it take to
consummate history into a new and everlasting kingdom? It takes mastery
over the created order. It takes a loving Father who cares, but who is also
a creator whose power is undisputed and unrivaled."
Finally, let me turn these words back on Griffin. What does it take to
"persuade" the primordial stuff to take on an "interconnected set of
contingent principles embodied in our world at the outset, constituting its
fine tuning"? It takes mastery over the created order. Sorry if this
sounds too much like transcendence in the traditional sense, too much like
"omnipotence" (sorry for the language, someone please give Whitehead an
opportunity to leave the room). Even Griffin sees this, I suggest, when he
admits that God's persuasion at the outset "could produce quasi-coercive
effects."
I respect David Griffin greatly--he knows this, we've had some
conversations including a very lengthy talk, one-on-one over dinner.
Indeed, when Howard asked me several months ago who I would recommend to
present the case for process theism, Griffin was my answer, and my
enthusiastic answer. I think I understand his reasons for rejecting
"omnipotence," I am learning more about his brand of process theology, and I
love the Christian love that I see emanating from him as both a thinker and
a person (the world would be a better place if there were more David
Grifiins). But when it comes to the doctrine of creation, *especially* but
not solely as it intersects with what science tells us about the nature of
nature, I find myself more and more convinced that classical theism is
right.
Indeed, when it comes to process theism, I am--shall we say--unpersuaded?
Ted Davis
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