On Thu, 04 Apr 2002 11:42:14 -0700 "John (Burgy) Burgeson"
<hoss_radbourne@hotmail.com> writes:
> Dave wrote: " If (2), we have the problem of what the deity was doing
>
> earlier, what kind of "finger-twiddling" engaged it in eternity
> past. More
> difficult a problem, what triggered the sudden initiation of matter?
> How
> could it take an eternity of discursive reasoning by this deity to
> come up
> with a desire to "create"? ... To summarize, in addition to all the
> problems
> process theology has with orthodox theology, I think it falls apart
> from
> purely philosophical problems. I see it as at root irrational."
>
> I may have a problem with PT, but #2 above does not seem to be a
> problem.
> "Finger twiddling" is a pejorative term, of course, but it can apply
> as well
> to conventional supernatural theism. And whil "what initiated" is,
> indeed a
> question we have no possibility of addressing, at least in this
> life, there
> are many such questions that may be asked, and this one does not
> seem (to
> me) to be different in kind from others. Difficult? I'd assert that
> it is
> simply not possible for finite and limited humanity. It is also not
> possible
> for me to jump up to the moon, but I don't worry much about that.
>
Burgy,
Your claim that finger twiddling is a problem for "conventional
supernatural theism" can only happen if the deity is in time with its
concomitants of space and matter. If the implications are worked out, the
view is virtually indistinguishable from process theology, however much
that may be denied. I contend that the only kind of eternity which can
properly apply to the deity apart from the incarnation is a timeless one.
Only then can there be a creation de novo of a universe. "What initiated"
is no problem here, but it is a grave problem if somehow time antedates
creation--one of three parts to my reductio argument.
Dave
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