Re: Classification scheme for ID debate

Keith Walker (Keith_R_Walker@compuserve.com)
Tue, 7 Oct 1997 09:01:26 -0400

George Murphy writes:
>Yes, they (creation and providence) were kept distinct. More on this
later. But
>providence cannot be because of "the Fall".

I was not saying that providence is because of 'the Fall'. Simply that one
of the theological reasons why providence and creation have been maintained
as distinct theological/conceptual categories is the Fall. It seems that I
can't have communicated that clearly because your later comments on MacKay
also operate on the basis that providence, as I am understanding, it only
began after Gen 3. What MacKay is saying about the Fall is that it had
cataclysmic effects on the way the world is. Things are different this
side of the Fall.

>Without providence,
>creation understood purely as origination could not endure or do
>anything.

Indeed, it was a similar trap that Jonathan Edwards fell into with his
formulation of providence. For him objects only existed in the moment to
be created again in the next moment. Whilst his view maintained the close
and direct involvement of God with his creation it left no real room for
secondary causality.

> Much more needs to be said about a Fall, but I don't think that
>is determinative for our topic. If one makes the present processes of
>nature too dependent on sin, one is in in danger of denying the goodness
>of creation & effectively making the devil the creator of the present
>world - doing for all creation what Flacius was understood to be doing
>for human nature in the 16th century. (N.B. I am not accusing anyone
>with heresy here, but just noting the danger of a train of argument.)

On the other hand if one doesn't take account of the Fall and its
consequences one has lost a biblical worldview. However, MacKay's point
does not actually make the present processes dependent upon sin and the
devil, but rather on the judgment of God. He is saying that it was a
divine creative/judicial fiat which brought about a new providential order.
That distinction places both MacKay and me well away from any risk of
trespassing into heresy.

Given that much more could be said about the Fall, could I ask you to say a
little more about it. I wonder, in particular, how the Fall might be
properly taken into account in scientific theorising about origins.

Keith Walker