RE: [asa] Dawkins new book

Dave,

What metaphysics is required to drop a stone and measure how it falls? I am sure the founders of quantum mechanics never realized the intellectual quagmire that they will be leading us into? The notions of space and time were there before Kant thought of them as a priori concepts. I think metaphysics comes after the facts. It is not hard to conceive that new discoveries will definitely alter our currently supposed scientific metaphysics.

Moorad
________________________________________
From: dfsiemensjr [dfsiemensjr@juno.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 11:46 PM
To: Alexanian, Moorad
Cc: schwarzwald@gmail.com; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book

Moorad,
There is a problem that you have not addressed. One requires a
metaphysical foundation to do science. That it is normally tacit and
implicit does not change the "reality". I can note that probably the most
difficult task a human being will face is making express the underlying
metaphysical and epistemological commitments held.
Dave (ASA)

On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 21:40:51 -0400 "Alexanian, Moorad"
<alexanian@uncw.edu> writes:
> I think we have to make clear that we deal with the real thing first
> and that the metaphysics follows afterwards. We deal first with
> existing things and we develop a metaphysics to make sense of our
> experiences, sensations, and memories. It is false to study a
> certain aspect of reality and use the metaphysics implied by that
> aspect of reality to regulate the whole of reality. For instance,
> studying the physical aspect of Nature may imply a metaphysics,
> viz., physicalism or materialism. However, it is nonsensical to use
> that metaphysics, derived from the physical, to regulate the
> nonphysical or even the supernatural aspects of Nature.
>
> Moorad
> ________________________________________
> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
> Behalf Of Schwarzwald [schwarzwald@gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:09 PM
> To: asa@calvin.edu
> Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book
>
> Heya Dave,
>
> It's not a question of being able to certainly demonstrate an
> objective truth (I'd point out there are some philosophers who take
> the position that things like 'pain' and 'beliefs' don't really
> exist, or that we are radically mistaken about them - which is for
> all practical purposes means they don't exist) - it's about what's
> even possible to be true given the commitments of the worldview. For
> materialist-naturalism, objective moral values, purposes, and
> meanings are not available even potentially. And by this I mean,
> insofar as someone says "Well, perhaps there are objective and
> external/fundamental moral values, purposes, and meanings to life
> and reality", they are rejecting the materialist-naturalist
> worldview. To even search for these things is to question or reject
> the truth of the stated philosophy.
>
> As for consistency, I'd question that (certainly whether the
> awareness and consistency shows up in practice) - but its what the
> position naturally entails commitment to that I'm pointing out here.
> The consistency is a secondary issue. As with attaining an ethos,
> consistency is fairly cheap to come by; a solipsist can manage it. A
> nihilist can. In fact, a lunatic can.
>
> Finally, I'm not disputing here the idea of 'objective enough facts
> to fit into a system' - because, again, I'm not questioning the
> ability for someone to develop "an ethos", full stop. Coming up with
> a set of rules and standards just isn't all that much of a
> challenge. Making the set consistent may be more of a challenge,
> depending on the desired level of intricacy, but I'm sure it's still
> possible. But all the consistency and intricacy possible won't
> change what's necessarily intellectually entailed by embracing such
> a perspective.
>
> On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 3:07 PM, dfsiemensjr
> <dfsiemensjr@juno.com<mailto:dfsiemensjr@juno.com>> wrote:
> It's easy to claim objectivity. However, if objectivity were
> objectively demonstrable, everyone would be forced to the same
> position. It doesn't happen. If one gets to ultimate positions, the
> only test available is logical consistency among the assumed
> principles, which are not provable. This is parallel to what we
> encounter in the Euclidean, Riemannian and Lobachevskian geometries,
> incompatible but equally consistent.
>
> Materialism, to my pain, can be a consistent position. From outside,
> I can point out problems. But those inside do not see them as
> insuperable, any more than the theist finds the objections of
> atheists relevant.
>
> As to objectivity, is it a fact that pain is undesirable, although a
> smaller level of pain may have to be endured to avoid greater pain?
> Also, if A can inflict pain on B, then Be can inflict pain on A,
> unless B lacks the power of A, when there is still the possibility
> of revolt or assassination. Are such matters not objective enough to
> fit into a system, whether theistic or atheistic? I acknowledge that
> there is a difference if God is the ultimate judge, but this is not
> necessary for a system as objective as possible to human beings.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 01:10:38 -0400 Schwarzwald
> <schwarzwald@gmail.com<mailto:schwarzwald@gmail.com>> writes:
> Heya Dave,
>
> As I've said in another thread, I do not deny that one can have a
> 'well worked out system' of ethics. I'm pointing out what that
> 'system of ethics' means once it's denied that there is objective
> purpose and good/value at work in the universe - and it means
> something radically different to do "good" on an atheist-naturalist
> scheme/ethos [where 'good' means 'acting in accordance with given
> ethical system X'] than "good" means on non-naturalist schemes
> [where 'good' speaks to objective standards that are right or wrong
> regardless of what a human individual happens to subjectively judge,
> be this a theistic system or a non-naturalist 'force'/'reality'.]
>
> Even the claim that these systems can "do remarkably well" are
> suspect to me. Remarkably well? By what standard? Another subjective
> one? Stalin's government, according to some subjective standards,
> performed remarkably well in the "moral" area. And he certainly had
> a good handle on "social and governmental sanctions pushing
> conformity".
>
> That's not to say I find nothing to admire in someone working out a
> very intricate, balanced, internally consistent system of ethics.
> Just as, say, I can admire a sci-fi or fantasy author writing source
> material for a fictional world that intricately and intensely
> describes a fictional culture's values, beliefs, ethics, etc. In
> fact, I have to admire them almost equivalently - because in the
> end, they matter about as much in most ultimate ways. In fact, the
> fantasy author may have an edge - at least they tend to come up with
> fun costumes and engaging stories, though I hear the conventions are
> embarrassing.
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 11:39 PM, dfsiemensjr
> <dfsiemensjr@juno.com<mailto:dfsiemensjr@juno.com>> wrote:
> As a person who has studied and taught ethics, I have to note that
> one does not have to be a theist to develop a strong ethical
> approach. For a common basis, pleasure has been often held to be
> foundational for determining right and wrong. The Mills and Bentham
> produced a utilitarianism on the basis of the maximum pleasure for
> the maximum number. This requires, on the opposite side, reducing
> negative feelings to the greatest extent possible. With social and
> governmental sanctions pushing conformity, one can do remarkably
> well in the moral area.
>
> A different standard was promoted by Logical Positivism about a half
> century ago. Right and wrong were determined by the intensity of
> feeling generated. This was the usual basis of demonstrations on
> various campuses. It is, for obvious reasons, no longer commonly
> accepted, but emotion can still trump reason for many. If A can
> persuade B, C, and a bunch of others to join his mob, he'll claim
> the moral high ground and cannot be persuaded otherwise.
>
> There are other approaches to devising ethical standards without
> calling in supernatural sources and sanctions. So one may be an
> atheist and have a well worked out system. I cannot say that this is
> true of Dawkins, who seems not to have thought matters through
> carefully.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Fri, 23 Oct 2009 16:14:44 -0400 Schwarzwald
> <schwarzwald@gmail.com<mailto:schwarzwald@gmail.com>> writes:
> Heya George,
>
> I'd have to disagree here, at least in a certain way. You point out,
> rightly, that evil has no fundamental place in the worldview of
> Dawkins and therefore there is no moral obligation to respond to it.
> I'd further add that evil and good are not objective realities for
> atheists of that (very common) bend - at most they're subjective
> judgment calls, or the just-so-happens rules of a chosen ethos.
>
> But if evil and good aren't objective realities, and if there are no
> objective moral responsibilities when it comes to good and evil...
> in what sense are we talking about 'good' and 'evil' anymore? Those
> words are drained of all their typical meaning. Dawkins' "gut
> reaction" to what you list may be "negative", it may even be "evil",
> but they can't be "evil" based on the philosophy he's committed
> himself to. The gut reaction - his subjective view - is the
> beginning and end of what "good" and "evil" can really be for him.
> Ted is right that, for Dawkins regarding good/evil, "there is no
> such thing."
>
> Now, others may respond that Dawkins and others do in fact call
> certain things "evil" and "bad", or "moral" and "immoral", etc. I'd
> simply point out that it isn't the mere speaking or writing of the
> words that matters, but their content - and once those words are
> qualified to be consistent with the philosophy committed to, they
> are in essence empty. And if they dig in their heels and argue that
> they believe that these things are objectively and truly evil or
> immoral, etc, the they are being inconsistent - and either the
> philosophy, or the 'truly evil/immoral' judgments, will have to go
> to correct that.
>
> And, just to be a little pedantic myself: That there may be a "gut
> reaction" of "evil" to things such as genocide, child rape, or
> Bernie Madoff does nothing to make me think "oh, well, even if they
> don't believe in evil those things will still be viewed as bad -
> that much is secure". A person can get over their gut reactions, and
> the 20th century illustrated just how successful such "getting over"
> can be even on national levels. The idea (not promoted by you,
> George, so don't take this as targeting you) that "everyone knows
> murder, or dishonesty, etc are wrong and will therefore at least act
> as if these things are truly bad" is painfully naive.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 1:21 PM, George Murphy
> <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com<mailto:GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com>> wrote:
> Ted -
>
> A couple of things here. 1st I'll point out pedantically that while
> atheists do have a "problem of evil," Bernie is right that they
> don't have a "theodicy problem." Theodicy is "justifying God" &
> those who don't believe in God can't be concerned about that.
>
> 2d, I haven't read a great deal of Dawkins & you may well be able to
> point out some place where he says literally that there are no such
> things as good & evil. But even if he makes that claim in the
> abstract, I suspect that his gut reaction to news of genocide, child
> rape or Bernie Madoff is that they're evil. The difference is that
> Christians believe that there is a reason to say that such things
> are evil that stems from fundamental aspects of their worldview &
> for Dawkins there isn't. (Which in itself doesn't prove that
> Christians are right, as Bernie may want to point out but doesn't
> have to because I've already done so.) & so there is no moral
> obligation to respond to
> such things - which gets back to the point I made earlier about
> bases for ethics. (& again, as Tom Pearson pointed out, this
> doesn't apply to all atheists.)
>
> Shalom
> George
>
http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm<http://home.roadrunner.com/%7E
scitheologyglm>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Ted Davis" <TDavis@messiah.edu<mailto:TDavis@messiah.edu>>
> To: <asa@calvin.edu<mailto:asa@calvin.edu>>; "Bernie Dehler"
> <bernie.dehler@intel.com<mailto:bernie.dehler@intel.com>>
> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 12:42 PM
> Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book
>
> >>>> "Dehler, Bernie"
> <bernie.dehler@intel.com<mailto:bernie.dehler@intel.com>
> > 10/23/2009 12:27 PM >>> writes:
>
> >
> > There's an atheist book club meetup that I will likely join, and
> they are reviewing Dawkin's latest book "The Greatest Show on
> Earth." I glanced at the book the other day. I think most of it
> looks like evidence for evolution (what's new?), but I did notice an
> interesting section on theodicy. (And yes, it looked like it may be
> shallow in not bringing forth and quoting the best arguments from
> the critics.)
> >
> > Anyways, Dawkins mentioned that for believers, there's a thing
> called 'the problem of evil.' He says 'they even have a name for
> it- theodicy.' At first I thought that was kind of patronizing to
> say 'they even have a name for it' then as I thought about it more I
> realized that theodicy was something only that God believers have to
> deal with. I know that is obvious, but it wasn't that clear in my
> mind before, esp. from seeing it from the other side now (not as a
> Christian).
> >
> > ***
> >
> > Ted responds abruptly. Hold the phone, Bernie. There is nothing
> "obvious" about this, unless you simply fail to think about it for
> more than a moment or two. The existence of suffering and evil
> causes great problems for all of us, including atheists. I mean
> great intellectual problems, not only emotional or existential
> problems. For the kind of atheist that Dawkins represents (there
> are other types of atheism that I am not including), there simply is
> no such thing as "good" and "evil," "right" and "wrong." There is
> no such thing. Therefore, we have no moral obligation (please
> reread these three words half a dozen times before continuing) to do
> anything about suffering and what believers call "evil." None.
> That, I venture to say, Bernie, is "the problem of evil" in another,
> equally serious form: for Dawkins, it's a problem that there is no
> category of "evil" at all. Therefore, there is no obligation to
> respond morally to it. A lot of unpleasant things happening d!
>
> oe!
> >
> > s not create a moral obligation to do something. That's a
> problem, Bernie. A big one.
> >
> > Ted
> >
> >
> >
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Received on Sun Oct 25 09:05:04 2009