Re: [asa] Dawkins new book

From: dfsiemensjr <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
Date: Sat Oct 24 2009 - 23:46:17 EDT

Moorad,
There is a problem that you have not addressed. One requires a
metaphysical foundation to do science. That it is normally tacit and
implicit does not change the "reality". I can note that probably the most
difficult task a human being will face is making express the underlying
metaphysical and epistemological commitments held.
Dave (ASA)

On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 21:40:51 -0400 "Alexanian, Moorad"
<alexanian@uncw.edu> writes:
> I think we have to make clear that we deal with the real thing first
> and that the metaphysics follows afterwards. We deal first with
> existing things and we develop a metaphysics to make sense of our
> experiences, sensations, and memories. It is false to study a
> certain aspect of reality and use the metaphysics implied by that
> aspect of reality to regulate the whole of reality. For instance,
> studying the physical aspect of Nature may imply a metaphysics,
> viz., physicalism or materialism. However, it is nonsensical to use
> that metaphysics, derived from the physical, to regulate the
> nonphysical or even the supernatural aspects of Nature.
>
> Moorad
> ________________________________________
> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
> Behalf Of Schwarzwald [schwarzwald@gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:09 PM
> To: asa@calvin.edu
> Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book
>
> Heya Dave,
>
> It's not a question of being able to certainly demonstrate an
> objective truth (I'd point out there are some philosophers who take
> the position that things like 'pain' and 'beliefs' don't really
> exist, or that we are radically mistaken about them - which is for
> all practical purposes means they don't exist) - it's about what's
> even possible to be true given the commitments of the worldview. For
> materialist-naturalism, objective moral values, purposes, and
> meanings are not available even potentially. And by this I mean,
> insofar as someone says "Well, perhaps there are objective and
> external/fundamental moral values, purposes, and meanings to life
> and reality", they are rejecting the materialist-naturalist
> worldview. To even search for these things is to question or reject
> the truth of the stated philosophy.
>
> As for consistency, I'd question that (certainly whether the
> awareness and consistency shows up in practice) - but its what the
> position naturally entails commitment to that I'm pointing out here.
> The consistency is a secondary issue. As with attaining an ethos,
> consistency is fairly cheap to come by; a solipsist can manage it. A
> nihilist can. In fact, a lunatic can.
>
> Finally, I'm not disputing here the idea of 'objective enough facts
> to fit into a system' - because, again, I'm not questioning the
> ability for someone to develop "an ethos", full stop. Coming up with
> a set of rules and standards just isn't all that much of a
> challenge. Making the set consistent may be more of a challenge,
> depending on the desired level of intricacy, but I'm sure it's still
> possible. But all the consistency and intricacy possible won't
> change what's necessarily intellectually entailed by embracing such
> a perspective.
>
> On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 3:07 PM, dfsiemensjr
> <dfsiemensjr@juno.com<mailto:dfsiemensjr@juno.com>> wrote:
> It's easy to claim objectivity. However, if objectivity were
> objectively demonstrable, everyone would be forced to the same
> position. It doesn't happen. If one gets to ultimate positions, the
> only test available is logical consistency among the assumed
> principles, which are not provable. This is parallel to what we
> encounter in the Euclidean, Riemannian and Lobachevskian geometries,
> incompatible but equally consistent.
>
> Materialism, to my pain, can be a consistent position. From outside,
> I can point out problems. But those inside do not see them as
> insuperable, any more than the theist finds the objections of
> atheists relevant.
>
> As to objectivity, is it a fact that pain is undesirable, although a
> smaller level of pain may have to be endured to avoid greater pain?
> Also, if A can inflict pain on B, then Be can inflict pain on A,
> unless B lacks the power of A, when there is still the possibility
> of revolt or assassination. Are such matters not objective enough to
> fit into a system, whether theistic or atheistic? I acknowledge that
> there is a difference if God is the ultimate judge, but this is not
> necessary for a system as objective as possible to human beings.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 01:10:38 -0400 Schwarzwald
> <schwarzwald@gmail.com<mailto:schwarzwald@gmail.com>> writes:
> Heya Dave,
>
> As I've said in another thread, I do not deny that one can have a
> 'well worked out system' of ethics. I'm pointing out what that
> 'system of ethics' means once it's denied that there is objective
> purpose and good/value at work in the universe - and it means
> something radically different to do "good" on an atheist-naturalist
> scheme/ethos [where 'good' means 'acting in accordance with given
> ethical system X'] than "good" means on non-naturalist schemes
> [where 'good' speaks to objective standards that are right or wrong
> regardless of what a human individual happens to subjectively judge,
> be this a theistic system or a non-naturalist 'force'/'reality'.]
>
> Even the claim that these systems can "do remarkably well" are
> suspect to me. Remarkably well? By what standard? Another subjective
> one? Stalin's government, according to some subjective standards,
> performed remarkably well in the "moral" area. And he certainly had
> a good handle on "social and governmental sanctions pushing
> conformity".
>
> That's not to say I find nothing to admire in someone working out a
> very intricate, balanced, internally consistent system of ethics.
> Just as, say, I can admire a sci-fi or fantasy author writing source
> material for a fictional world that intricately and intensely
> describes a fictional culture's values, beliefs, ethics, etc. In
> fact, I have to admire them almost equivalently - because in the
> end, they matter about as much in most ultimate ways. In fact, the
> fantasy author may have an edge - at least they tend to come up with
> fun costumes and engaging stories, though I hear the conventions are
> embarrassing.
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 11:39 PM, dfsiemensjr
> <dfsiemensjr@juno.com<mailto:dfsiemensjr@juno.com>> wrote:
> As a person who has studied and taught ethics, I have to note that
> one does not have to be a theist to develop a strong ethical
> approach. For a common basis, pleasure has been often held to be
> foundational for determining right and wrong. The Mills and Bentham
> produced a utilitarianism on the basis of the maximum pleasure for
> the maximum number. This requires, on the opposite side, reducing
> negative feelings to the greatest extent possible. With social and
> governmental sanctions pushing conformity, one can do remarkably
> well in the moral area.
>
> A different standard was promoted by Logical Positivism about a half
> century ago. Right and wrong were determined by the intensity of
> feeling generated. This was the usual basis of demonstrations on
> various campuses. It is, for obvious reasons, no longer commonly
> accepted, but emotion can still trump reason for many. If A can
> persuade B, C, and a bunch of others to join his mob, he'll claim
> the moral high ground and cannot be persuaded otherwise.
>
> There are other approaches to devising ethical standards without
> calling in supernatural sources and sanctions. So one may be an
> atheist and have a well worked out system. I cannot say that this is
> true of Dawkins, who seems not to have thought matters through
> carefully.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Fri, 23 Oct 2009 16:14:44 -0400 Schwarzwald
> <schwarzwald@gmail.com<mailto:schwarzwald@gmail.com>> writes:
> Heya George,
>
> I'd have to disagree here, at least in a certain way. You point out,
> rightly, that evil has no fundamental place in the worldview of
> Dawkins and therefore there is no moral obligation to respond to it.
> I'd further add that evil and good are not objective realities for
> atheists of that (very common) bend - at most they're subjective
> judgment calls, or the just-so-happens rules of a chosen ethos.
>
> But if evil and good aren't objective realities, and if there are no
> objective moral responsibilities when it comes to good and evil...
> in what sense are we talking about 'good' and 'evil' anymore? Those
> words are drained of all their typical meaning. Dawkins' "gut
> reaction" to what you list may be "negative", it may even be "evil",
> but they can't be "evil" based on the philosophy he's committed
> himself to. The gut reaction - his subjective view - is the
> beginning and end of what "good" and "evil" can really be for him.
> Ted is right that, for Dawkins regarding good/evil, "there is no
> such thing."
>
> Now, others may respond that Dawkins and others do in fact call
> certain things "evil" and "bad", or "moral" and "immoral", etc. I'd
> simply point out that it isn't the mere speaking or writing of the
> words that matters, but their content - and once those words are
> qualified to be consistent with the philosophy committed to, they
> are in essence empty. And if they dig in their heels and argue that
> they believe that these things are objectively and truly evil or
> immoral, etc, the they are being inconsistent - and either the
> philosophy, or the 'truly evil/immoral' judgments, will have to go
> to correct that.
>
> And, just to be a little pedantic myself: That there may be a "gut
> reaction" of "evil" to things such as genocide, child rape, or
> Bernie Madoff does nothing to make me think "oh, well, even if they
> don't believe in evil those things will still be viewed as bad -
> that much is secure". A person can get over their gut reactions, and
> the 20th century illustrated just how successful such "getting over"
> can be even on national levels. The idea (not promoted by you,
> George, so don't take this as targeting you) that "everyone knows
> murder, or dishonesty, etc are wrong and will therefore at least act
> as if these things are truly bad" is painfully naive.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 1:21 PM, George Murphy
> <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com<mailto:GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com>> wrote:
> Ted -
>
> A couple of things here. 1st I'll point out pedantically that while
> atheists do have a "problem of evil," Bernie is right that they
> don't have a "theodicy problem." Theodicy is "justifying God" &
> those who don't believe in God can't be concerned about that.
>
> 2d, I haven't read a great deal of Dawkins & you may well be able to
> point out some place where he says literally that there are no such
> things as good & evil. But even if he makes that claim in the
> abstract, I suspect that his gut reaction to news of genocide, child
> rape or Bernie Madoff is that they're evil. The difference is that
> Christians believe that there is a reason to say that such things
> are evil that stems from fundamental aspects of their worldview &
> for Dawkins there isn't. (Which in itself doesn't prove that
> Christians are right, as Bernie may want to point out but doesn't
> have to because I've already done so.) & so there is no moral
> obligation to respond to
> such things - which gets back to the point I made earlier about
> bases for ethics. (& again, as Tom Pearson pointed out, this
> doesn't apply to all atheists.)
>
> Shalom
> George
>
http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm<http://home.roadrunner.com/%7E
scitheologyglm>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Ted Davis" <TDavis@messiah.edu<mailto:TDavis@messiah.edu>>
> To: <asa@calvin.edu<mailto:asa@calvin.edu>>; "Bernie Dehler"
> <bernie.dehler@intel.com<mailto:bernie.dehler@intel.com>>
> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 12:42 PM
> Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book
>
> >>>> "Dehler, Bernie"
> <bernie.dehler@intel.com<mailto:bernie.dehler@intel.com>
> > 10/23/2009 12:27 PM >>> writes:
>
> >
> > There's an atheist book club meetup that I will likely join, and
> they are reviewing Dawkin's latest book "The Greatest Show on
> Earth." I glanced at the book the other day. I think most of it
> looks like evidence for evolution (what's new?), but I did notice an
> interesting section on theodicy. (And yes, it looked like it may be
> shallow in not bringing forth and quoting the best arguments from
> the critics.)
> >
> > Anyways, Dawkins mentioned that for believers, there's a thing
> called 'the problem of evil.' He says 'they even have a name for
> it- theodicy.' At first I thought that was kind of patronizing to
> say 'they even have a name for it' then as I thought about it more I
> realized that theodicy was something only that God believers have to
> deal with. I know that is obvious, but it wasn't that clear in my
> mind before, esp. from seeing it from the other side now (not as a
> Christian).
> >
> > ***
> >
> > Ted responds abruptly. Hold the phone, Bernie. There is nothing
> "obvious" about this, unless you simply fail to think about it for
> more than a moment or two. The existence of suffering and evil
> causes great problems for all of us, including atheists. I mean
> great intellectual problems, not only emotional or existential
> problems. For the kind of atheist that Dawkins represents (there
> are other types of atheism that I am not including), there simply is
> no such thing as "good" and "evil," "right" and "wrong." There is
> no such thing. Therefore, we have no moral obligation (please
> reread these three words half a dozen times before continuing) to do
> anything about suffering and what believers call "evil." None.
> That, I venture to say, Bernie, is "the problem of evil" in another,
> equally serious form: for Dawkins, it's a problem that there is no
> category of "evil" at all. Therefore, there is no obligation to
> respond morally to it. A lot of unpleasant things happening d!
>
> oe!
> >
> > s not create a moral obligation to do something. That's a
> problem, Bernie. A big one.
> >
> > Ted
> >
> >
> >
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