Re: [asa] The term Darwinism

Gregory,

I will comment on first this part of your recent post:

I was interested in what Stephen Barr was writing in First Things in
response to John West by saying that 'design arguments' take multiple forms.
It would be helpful to hear more about this. If the position of 'multiple
design arguments' could be maintained, this would lead people to see that
the DI's particular form of argument for/from design is not the only one and
that other design arguments hold merit also. If discussions of fine tuning
lead to discussions of theodicy, then we can say that science itself, when
discussed at high levels, can lead people to topics related to philosophy,
worldview and religion, instead of away from them. This would do more than
simply opposing (negative) the 'warfare model' of science vs. religion and
instead promote (positive) cooperation between science, religion and
philosophy.

My comment:

Steve Barr is an unusually thoughtful physicist, IMO, and one of the most
theologically astute working scientists I have met. His standard response
to the whole origins controversy is to point out that design or its absence
is a metaphysical conclusion, not a scientific conclusion. As you know, I
agree with this. He's absolutely right about design arguments taking
multiple forms. For a very clear exposition of this point, with pertinent
examples, I recommend an essay by Oxford mathematician John Lennox,
"Intelligent Design: Some Critical Reflections on the Current Debate," ed.
Robert B. Stewart (Fortress Press, 2007), 179-95. This is a collection of
essays on both "sides" of the ID controversy, and Lennox is probably on the
pro-ID side; certainly he's not strongly against it.

He starts by distinguishing "Level I" arguments about the need for
intelligence in order to have the whole shebbang: the laws of nature
themselves are designed. Then there are "Level II" arguments, in essence
that "front loaded" design won't really work, that "the phenomena themselves
involve direct input from a designing intelligence."

He then further, and deftly, distinguishes "Type I" design arguments, taken
from HPS, from "Type II" arguments based on the details of individual
sciences. Within Type II, he further distinguishes Type IIA, in which
mainstream science is accepted, from Type IIB, which involves "challenging
mainstream science." He takes all 3 of these types seriously, including
Type IIB, but as he says, "arguments of Type IIB are not likely to be taken
seriously unless they are supported (and preceded) by other arguments of
Types I and IIA."

Lennox is more sympathetic than most TEs to arguments about the great
difficulty of explaining the origin of life within mainstream science. My
sympathies presently lie where his are. At the same time, he is forthright
about the somewhat shakier nature of Type IIB arguments, including those
about the difficulty of assembling life naturalistically. And, more than
most other ID advocates (if he is one himself), he takes very seriously the
dangers of appearing to adopt a "god of the gaps" kind of argument. Here is
his conclusion:

"I would conclude, however, by recalling once more that the main arguments
to intelligent causation are of Types I and IIA. The evidence of God is
seen mainly in the things that we do understand and not in the things that
we don't. If those of us who favor such arguments keep this perspective, we
can then evaluate and use some arguments of Type IIB without giving the
impression that all our eggs are in the God of the Bad Gaps basket."

There is just so much good advice and commentary in this essay, that it
ought to be required reading for all who are interested in the ID/TE
controversy. OK, class, now go out and buy the book, b/c you won't find
this online anywhere. This is true for so much of the best stuff. :-)

If his attitude were more widely adopted, then IMO confusion between ID and
YEC views would have been much less likely to develop. You just can't make
some of the best type IIA arguments without challenging deeply held beliefs
of the YECs. The minute that you start to talk about fine tuning the big
bang, you've lost them -- no death before the fall, no allowance for a
figurative reading of Genesis, etc. And, the priority that Lennox (right,
IMO) gives to Type I arguments means that ID itself would be seen not as
"scientific", but more as metaphysical -- and, I note, metaphysical
questions as Polkinghorne points out are not subject to knockdown arguments.
 That would lower the temperature significantly, IMO, in terms of culture
wars.

But my longstanding impression is, that many involved with the ID debate
are thinking as much about Dawkins and Hitchins as they are about the TEs
(who sometimes regarded as traitors or gutless lap dogs at best). They want
knockdown arguments against Dawkins' science, in order to translate those
into decisive refutations of Dawkins' metaphysics. And, they see the Type
IIB arguments as providing this. With Lennox, I would want to hold a more
careful view and project a more cautious tone.

***

Now, as for this part:
 
Since this thread is about 'Darwinism' and what it means to people, I
wonder if you would agree that the term 'Darwinism' is also somehow
extra-scientific, beyond science or a science hybrid. Accepting that it is
would create space for a shared understanding between Terry and Cameron
based on the notion that defending 'Darwinism' as 'pure science' is
unsustainable.

My comment: "Darwinism" means different things to different people, and
probably it always has. To IDists, it means at least these two quite
different things: (1) common descent with a mechanism of natural selection
operating on "unguided" or "random" variations; and (2) a larger
cultural/philosophical mindset or worldview of naturalism, according to
which there is no cosmic purpose and no genuine, transcendent purposes for
human beings. Darwin probably believed both of these things himself (no
question that he believed the first), but many people who accept (1) do not
accept (2). Many IDists claim that (1) entails (2), and that to say
otherwise betokens either confusion or lack of backbone. My own view is
that (2) is purely extra-scientific, and that (1) is no more or less
"scientific," in principle, as saying that atoms decay "randomly" and in an
apparently "unguided" manner.

Ted

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Received on Thu Jul 9 14:58:58 2009