RE: [asa] List of positions on origins

I am looking forward to a lecture in our department by Professor Schmaltz. Hope some of you can make it. Moorad


Department of Physics and Physical
Oceanography Colloquium

“From Causes to Laws: Descartes,
Malebranche, Berkeley”

Tad M. Schmaltz
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy
Duke University

Stillman Drake has claimed that the history of science from Aristotle to Galileo involves "a process by which causes gave way to laws." Without endorsing this general thesis, I emphasize a particular development in early modern thought that does reflect a progression toward the view that the laws invoked in science—then called natural philosophy—do not concern real causality in nature. I begin with a brief consideration of the premodern context for later discussions of causes and laws in natural philosophy, and particularly in physics. Then I turn to the interrelated discussions of physical laws in the writings of three overlapping early modern figures: Descartes, Malebranche, and Berkeley. On my (controversial) interpretation, Descartes endorses an account of laws on which they reflect the intrinsic powers in bodies to bring about changes in motion due to collision. Given his occasionalist view that God is the only real cause, Malebranche is committed to rejecting the claim that bodies have such powers. However, his identification of laws with God's "general volitions" reveals that Malebranche retains the view that laws are tied to real causal efficacy (albeit in God rather than in nature). Though his views on natural philosophy are indebted to Malebranche's occasionalism (as modified by immaterialism), Berkeley takes a turn away from both Descartes and Malebranche in holding that physical laws involve mere correlations among phenomena, and that the natural philosopher is concerned with such laws as opposed to real causes (the latter of which are the subject of the distinct discipline of metaphysics).
Friday, February 27, 2009
2:00 PM
DeLoach Hall, Room 212
Refreshments will be served at 1:45 PM


From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On Behalf Of Gregory Arago
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:03 AM
To: asa@calvin.edu; gmurphy10@neo.rr.com
Subject: Re: [asa] List of positions on origins

"The belief that God is the ultimate cause of everything that happens, working through secondary causes, includes everything that happens in culture as well as in the biological realm." - George Murphy

"one important distinction would be between those whose TE (or EC) views are distinctively
Christian &hich are merely 'theistic'." - George Murphy
Let me put these two statements together and ask a question: Can a theist reject the distinction between 'primary' (or ultimate) and 'secondary' causality and still be a Christian?

In other words, following the link below which draws on Alistair McGrath's text (2001), can one say that Aquinas' views of 'causality' are now less coherent and thus harder to accept than previously thought, e.g. in the primary/secondary dichotomy, given that new views have entered the arena?

http://www.stjohnadulted.org/The_01.htm#God%e2%80%99s%20Action%20Within%20the%20World
(see section 5 - God's action within the world)

Let me confirm that I am interested in the topic of 'origins' which is the title of the thread (thanks for re-naming it and correcting the spelling, George), meaning not just 'origin of life' or 'origin of humankind,' but 'origins of human culture' as well. One could say there is a 'causes and effects joint' that is missing or waiting for elaboration here. Though it would seem that Polkinghorne's appeal to 'agency' (e.g. considering quantum events) is most suitable for 'science and theology' interface, it is rather impersonal compared to say the way Margaret Archer approaches the term (e.g. being human), which actually speaks about culture and agency within a Christian worldview. George says (paraphrased) "God is the ultimate cause of everything that happens...in culture," yet 'causal agency' can be spoken about by physicists and by sociologists with surprisingly different emphases.

Also, the notion of secondary causality's 'indirect action' or 'acting indirectly' would seem to suggest that any 'bio-physical evolution' is not 'directed' or (an even more loaded term) is 'unguided.' In such a view, the safekeeping of science from 'gaps' arguments appears to be higher in priority for an individual than taking a positive view of teleogical explanations and the language that expresses them as being relevant for 'science' too.

The main question, here, however, it seems to me, is the one about 'primary' and 'secondary' versus other ways to view causes and their effects. George has many times spoken about this in passing, but I fear it is first simply an appeal to the authority of Aquinas, rather than to Aristotle or others, and second, does not allow for the possibility that a better way of speaking about causes and effects in our electronic-information age is available.

"What, for its partisans, is the strength of the idea of primary and secondary causality is, for its critics, its greatest weakness." - John Polkinghorne

J.P. Moreland, for example, also addresses primary and secondary causation in the text below, as only one potential model for the relationship of science and theology (which also speaks of the 'natural' vs. 'supernatural' perspective and appeals to the distinction between empirical science and historical science, which will get Moorad interested):
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-jrnl/web/crj0180a.html
His critics will perhaps not fail to note that Steven Meyer is referenced by Moreland for a new way to look at the issue of primary and secondary causes in science.

A bit of thinking out loud with questions and a yet another friendly challenge to George,

Gregory


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Received on Fri Feb 20 08:55:04 2009