Timaeus wrote:
"ID isn't a "God of the gaps" argument".
This assertion continues to be made and I'm trying to understand it. I know many "god of the gaps" criticisms aren't stated well and aren't valid as has been discussed in this thread. But I'm still having difficulty with the heart of this claim. It seems to me that the above assertion can be tested in the following way. If the assertion is true, then the ID argument would remain intact even if all gaps were to be hypothetically closed. In this case, it means that the ID argument would remain valid even if all the mutations and variations occurring in the course of evolution were some day determined to be within the probabilistic expectations of the laws of nature. That is, if none of the steps of the evolutionary process, nor the composite collection of them, meets the criteria of Dembski's explanatory filter, does the ID argument hold? What does the ID argument look like and how does it play out in such an environment of no gaps?
It may well be that ID is a "God of the gaps" argument and the gaps may be valid and the argument may be valid. But I'd like to understand the real nature of the argument.
Randy
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Received on Sun Nov 2 15:57:57 2008
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