Hi Iain,
Actually, I think it's I who owe you an apology - I clearly "over
interpreted" your remarks to mean something rather stronger than you
were actually saying. Sorry for that.
As regards the specific topic under consideration - let me first state,
so as not to mistake the scope of my criticism, that I'm not offering a
particular critique of Dawkins' argument in the Selfish Gene, but a
criticism of any attempt at an evolutionary ethics. By this I mean an
ethic which presupposes that humans came to be through a process of
unguided biological evolution in the absence of any sort of divine
guidance or foresight. Clearly this applies to Dawkins position, but I
think it must logically apply to ANY atheistic position - as any such
position must, I think, entail an evolutionary origin of humans similar,
if not identical, to that propounded by Dawkins.
My claim, then, is essentially that those who presume such an
atheistic/materialistic/evolutionary origin for human beings have no
right to merely assume the adequacy of human reason as a means for
determining truth. In particular, they have no right to privilege reason
above other ways of knowing - as, presumably, on the basis of a
naturalistic/materialist metaphysic and a compatible evolutionary theory
of human origins, an intuitive insight or mystical experience is just as
adequate a way of knowing as is a rational argument. Indeed, I'd wager
most people take an intuitive insight as a more valid way of knowing
than a rational argument (we at least seem to rely more upon such
intuitions).
In that respect Dawkins makes the same assumption as you yourself do in
assuming that a logical argument of the sort presented below MUST
determine my position on the matter. The difference between you and
Dawkins, however, is that such an assumption on your part is at least
(partly) justified by the holding of a Judeo-Christian world view. It
is, incidentally, also (partly) a justified assumption on the basis of a
Greek notion of the inherent rationality of the cosmos.
Dawkins' problem in assuming the primacy of reason, however, is two-fold:
Firstly, in that he eschews any such notion of inherent rationality (or
at least, his rejection of any sort of teleology, I think, necessitates
a rejection of any notion of inherent rationality).
Secondly - and I consider this the real killer as far as Dawkins'
philosophical coherence is concerned - he simply does not seem to
appreciate the implication of evolutionary theory for the entire process
of human knowing. In particular, he routinely speaks of the "betrayal of
enlightenment values" not realizing that IMPLICIT in enlightenment
thinking is the very notion of universal rationality of the Greek sort
which his own world-view makes unlikely if not impossible. It is
precisely because enlightenment thinkers were thoroughly immersed in at
least a deistic notion of creation that they were able to legitimately
assume pride-of-place for human rationality over and above the "animal
instincts" which might stand in opposition to reason. Such an approach
is, to my way of thinking, quite coherent given either a Greek
assumption of inherent rationalism in the universe, OR given
Judeo-Christian/Islamic or even deistic notions of creation.
But, I think, given Dawkins' very strong argument for the view that
Darwinian theory changes _everything_, then I think it improper for him
to assume that it changes _nothing_ in respects of human knowing,
particularly with respects to the place of human rationality.
Of course, one might argue that, in respects of reason, "wisdom is
justified by her children." That is, Dawkins' might wish to argue that
the success of the enlightenment project and of the natural sciences in
particular, demonstrates that his approach to knowing needs no
justifying argument (or perhaps better, that this success provides some
level of evidentiary support for such an assumption).
But in order to put such an argument Dawkins would have to show what the
last 100 years of philosophy have quite unequivocally demonstrated to be
false; namely that the enlightenment project demonstrates the adequacy
of reason as a comprehensive way of knowing, and that science is itself
primarily a rational project.
Neither claim is easily demonstrated to be even remotely in accordance
with our contemporary understanding of things (we might say, to co-opt
Dawkins' language, that "we've developed intelligence and need not be
slaves to a presumed hegemony of reason"). For Dawkins' to simply assume
the primacy of reason when the last two-hundred years of philosophy
(yes, enlightenment thinking is THAT out-dated) AND the implications of
his own evolutionary theories are against him is, I think, a justifiable
point of objection.
To all the above - already too long winded - I might just add one brief
but relevant observation: If Dawkins IS concerned with the long-term
survival of the human species (and I'm not sure, by the way, what
"long-term survival of a species" means except an attempt to enforce
stasis) then it seems to me that giving primacy to reason is
wrong-headed as an evolutionary strategy on two grounds - both solely
evolutionary: (1) if our "irrational" ways of knowing were, indeed,
detrimental to our survival they would have been evolved out eons ago;
(2) having multiple strategies of knowing would seem akin to a sort of
genetic diversity (who was it who suggested the notion of an "extended
genotype" and in what book <smile>) and my limited understanding of such
things is that greater diversity in a gene pool increases the likelihood
of survival of a species. On evolutionary grounds alone I would have
thought rejection of the "irrational" would be detrimental to humanity's
survival prospects.
In none of this do I believe Dawkins' to be guilty of deliberate
dishonesty. But I do think that he needs to engage seriously with the
philosophical, social, and even theological critiques of his outdated
enlightenment epistemology and his problematic evolutionary
anthropology. As it stands Dawkins attempts to lay the foundations of a
process of radical social reconstruction without offering any
substantial comment on difficulties which others equally eminent as he
have considered fatal to his line of thinking.
Blessings as always, and apologies again for "over interpreting" your
previous remarks.
Murray Hogg
Pastor, East Camberwell Baptist Church, Victoria, Australia
Post-Grad Student (MTh), Australian College of Theology
> But I'm not sure what inconsistency you're illustrating. I don't
> think it's inconsistent to accept evolution as a scientific fact, but
> to look for a better way to do things. The Dawkins/Selfish Gene line
> of argument seems to be:
>
> (1) Evolution happens, and is seen from a gene-centred viewpoint.
> (2) As such it's not directed towards long term goals, but short term
> adjustments that give a greater survivability.
> (3) Short-term viewpoints don't necessarily give the long-term best
> prospects for survival.
> (4) But we now have developed intelligence - to have long term plans
> and to see the long term consequences of our actions. When these long
> term consequences lead to the destruction of the ecosphere, planet,
> devastation, war, etc, we can do something about it.
> (5) In doing all the above we are rebelling against our selfish
> genes, and intelligently planning our survival into the future.
>
> Now, where is the inconsistency there, or the smuggled in assumption?
> I think the only assumption is that we want to ensure our long-term
> survival.
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Received on Tue Jun 3 14:37:12 2008
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