I think the last two posters are missing the point here.
Moorad talks about assigning a zero prior probability to the existence of
God, but I never said anything of the sort.
What I said was that it was impossible to specify a prior probability for
the existence of God, or indeed of shape-shifting staffs. The value you
pick is entirely dependent on your own belief. At a questionnaire in the
theoretical physics department at my work once, people were asked to assign
probabilities to various events, such as England winning the World Cup
Football (that's "soccer" to our USA friends). To the "God exists"
question, one person put down zero and another put down 10^-100. The
10^-100 person says to the zero person "now that's what I call faith"! Did
I put down 1? Well, not exactly, I put down 0.9 recurring, but it brought
home to me how silly the exercise really was. If I'd put down 1, I wouldn't
exactly be making a scientific statement, would I? If I'd put down
signficantly less than 1, I'd be indicating doubts that I didn't have. It
was the sheer impossibility of making an objective and truthful statement
that led me to put down the joke answer of 0.9 recurrring.
My view is that there is no way to assign a prior to the existence of God in
a scientific fashion, so one can't make scientifically valid deductions from
evidences of design. The design "argument for God" only works if your prior
probability differs signficantly from zero. But if it's already your belief
that God exists, then you don't need to make the design argument. By
contrast, an atheist is not likely to be persuaded by such an argument.
John, you contend that the analogy is close enough. I beg to differ. There
is a whole world of difference between a prior of close to zero and a prior
of close to unity. It comes down to your own faith position. You accuse me
of failing to describe supernatural events. But supernatural events are by
their very nature unpredictable, and therefore outside the realm of
scientific exploration. If such events were predictable (for example if
such things happened as in the world of Harry Potter by saying the right
spell or by waving a wand in the right manner), then they would be natural
and not supernatural). But miracles occur by God's grace, not by scientific
cause and effect.
Iain
On Dec 10, 2007 5:25 AM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Agreed the analogy is imperfect but again I contend close enough. ID's
> position may be to prove God but I have never said that and it doesn't
> negate the general design inference, even if it doesn't prove it. It makes
> it a rational and logical deduction though which is more than you can say
> for multiverses.
>
>
>
> Your analysis fails to correctly describe the other supernatural events of
> our faith as well. When Moses threw down his staff and it became a serpent,
> there were no known a priori probabilities of staff shape-shifting until
> Pharaoh's magicians duplicated it and even then Moses trumped them by his
> serpents eating theirs. By your analysis Bayesian theory today would not
> affirm this event and it would deny it but to witness such an event today
> even by a person trained in Bayesian theory, the response would likely not
> be an appeal to not having any a priori probabilities for that event.
>
>
>
> Accepting the supernatural and that it is a hallmark of the God of the
> Bible is a prerequisite of the faith, and once accepted, the design of the
> universe is patently obvious. It is only deniable by not accepting the
> premise that God works through the supernatural.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] *On
> Behalf Of *Iain Strachan
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 09, 2007 9:45 AM
> *To:* John Walley
> *Cc:* Randy Isaac; asa@calvin.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?
>
>
>
>
>
> On Dec 9, 2007 1:46 PM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Pim,
>
> Granted there may be some technical distinctions between Easter Island and
> the cosmological constants because one can be described through known
> natural designers while the other can't, but I contend this a distinction
> without a difference.
>
>
> I'm afraid that from my own background in Bayesian probability theory, I
> can't really agree with you there.
>
> The whole point is that your *a priori* probability of the existence of
> known natural designers is 1. But you can't place an *a priori*probability on the existence of God. Hence it is entirely reasonable to
> make a design inference when you see a watch on the heath because you
> already know watchmakers exist. The design inference is thereby not a
> proof of the existence of watchmakers, because you already have independent
> evidence of the existence of watchmakers. But I think the ID position is
> that this design inference ( e.g. in nature, or in cosmological constants)
> wants to be some proof of the existence of God.
>
> What if you didn't have any clue if watchmakers exist? In Star Trek, when
> confronted by an amorphous pulsating blob, Dr. McCoy would exclaim with
> reverence "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it!". Suppose that such alien
> life forms came to the earth, and saw a watch mechanism in the middle of the
> desert, and that this mechanism was as alien to them as they are to us.
> Would such an alien then be justified in making a design inference, as
> opposed to thinking it might have come about by natural processes. Might
> not such an alien say "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it?".
>
> So I believe there is a clear difference in the analogy - the difference
> being you have independent evidence of the existence of the "natural
> designers" - you are not using the inference to prove the existence of those
> natural designers.
>
> Iain
>
>
-- ----------- After the game, the King and the pawn go back in the same box. - Italian Proverb ----------- To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with "unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.Received on Mon Dec 10 04:09:15 2007
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