RE: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?

Agreed the analogy is imperfect but again I contend close enough. ID's
position may be to prove God but I have never said that and it doesn't
negate the general design inference, even if it doesn't prove it. It makes
it a rational and logical deduction though which is more than you can say
for multiverses.

Your analysis fails to correctly describe the other supernatural events of
our faith as well. When Moses threw down his staff and it became a serpent,
there were no known a priori probabilities of staff shape-shifting until
Pharaoh's magicians duplicated it and even then Moses trumped them by his
serpents eating theirs. By your analysis Bayesian theory today would not
affirm this event and it would deny it but to witness such an event today
even by a person trained in Bayesian theory, the response would likely not
be an appeal to not having any a priori probabilities for that event.

Accepting the supernatural and that it is a hallmark of the God of the Bible
is a prerequisite of the faith, and once accepted, the design of the
universe is patently obvious. It is only deniable by not accepting the
premise that God works through the supernatural.

Thanks

John

-----Original Message-----
From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
Behalf Of Iain Strachan
Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2007 9:45 AM
To: John Walley
Cc: Randy Isaac; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?

On Dec 9, 2007 1:46 PM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com> wrote:

Pim,

Granted there may be some technical distinctions between Easter Island and
the cosmological constants because one can be described through known
natural designers while the other can't, but I contend this a distinction
without a difference.

I'm afraid that from my own background in Bayesian probability theory, I
can't really agree with you there.

The whole point is that your a priori probability of the existence of known
natural designers is 1. But you can't place an a priori probability on the
existence of God. Hence it is entirely reasonable to make a design
inference when you see a watch on the heath because you already know
watchmakers exist. The design inference is thereby not a proof of the
existence of watchmakers, because you already have independent evidence of
the existence of watchmakers. But I think the ID position is that this
design inference ( e.g. in nature, or in cosmological constants) wants to be
some proof of the existence of God.

What if you didn't have any clue if watchmakers exist? In Star Trek, when
confronted by an amorphous pulsating blob, Dr. McCoy would exclaim with
reverence "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it!". Suppose that such alien
life forms came to the earth, and saw a watch mechanism in the middle of the
desert, and that this mechanism was as alien to them as they are to us.
Would such an alien then be justified in making a design inference, as
opposed to thinking it might have come about by natural processes. Might
not such an alien say "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it?".

So I believe there is a clear difference in the analogy - the difference
being you have independent evidence of the existence of the "natural
designers" - you are not using the inference to prove the existence of those
natural designers.

Iain

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Received on Mon Dec 10 00:26:10 2007