Re: [asa] Definition for MN in PSCF Sept. 2007 issue: consenus definition?

The 2 statements Steve quotes below are confused. MN says that science is to proceed "as if God were not given" - acsi deus non daretur. (This phrase of Thomas Torrance is slightly weaker than the more common etsi deus non daretur, "though God were not given.") The point is that science does not appeal to the concept of God to explain phenomena, even if the scientist may believe in God and think that God is involved in what happens in the world.

But the the last part of the 1st statement & the whole of the 2d are wrong. MN does not require that "God plays no part in the physical world." It does not rule out the possibility - which in fact is the traditional Christian view of providence - that God acts by means of natural processes which can be understood in terms of rational laws.

The statement that "God plays no part in the physical world" does not go as far as metaphysical naturalism. It could be described as deistic methodological naturalism, or more precisely as methodological naturalism which allows deism.

The simplest definition of MN is that science should not appeal to divine action to explain natural phenomena. Note that this does not imply the belief that science can (in principle) explain all natural phenomena.

Shalom
George
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
  ----- Original Message -----
  From: Merv
  To: asa@calvin.edu
  Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2007 9:38 AM
  Subject: Re: [asa] Definition for MN in PSCF Sept. 2007 issue: consenus definition?

  Like you, I've accepted the MN phrase as consistent with my beliefs about both Christianity and science. And I can see what you mean about the statements below, especially the second one. The first one I think I could accept although I would never phrase it that way because it would communicate the wrong thing to too many. Science can proceed "as though" -- as long as it is clear that it is the science doing the proceeding, not the person and their belief system as a whole. The second statement, unlike the first explicitly states that a non-theist (or deist) perspective is (or should be) required while doing science. That oversteps the MN that I've accepted and I would call that PN, and as such reject it. If these become the widely accepted definitions, then I see problems on the horizon about this. --and the birth of some new unpolluted term to describe our version of MN.

  --Merv

  Steve Martin wrote:

    I'd like to hear reactions to statements made in the September 2007 PSCF article "From Scientific Method to Methodological Naturalism: The Evolution of an Idea" by Poe and Mytyk. Before reading this article, I was pretty comfortable with MN as I understood it. It seemed (at worst) innocuous to a Christian worldview (PN obviously is not); best case, one could say that an MN perspective coheres very nicely with faith in a God who respects the functional integrity of his creation ie. He is not a fickle, impulsive, capricious, or untrustworthy deity.

    However, two definitional statements in this article struck me the wrong way. Poe and Mytyk say of MN:

      "In the science and religion dialog, the term "methodological naturalism" refers to the need for science to proceed as though God did not exist, or at least as though God has no part to play in the physical world."

    And later Poe and Mytyk restate the second part of their paragraph above:

      "Methodological naturalism suggests that scientific study should be conducted with the perspective that God plays no part in the physical world"

    My first question: Is this a generally accepted definition of MN? Or is this is a definition used by those who wish to discredit MN, useful as an interim step towards Plantinga's term "Provisional Atheism" that is referred to in the same article? I find Plantinga's term unacceptable (and, for that matter, don't like the term "Methodological Atheism" sometimes used as an alternative to MN either).

    If Poe & Mytyk's definition for MN is the consensus definition, then I guess I have trouble with MN itself. Why should I ever "proceed as though God does not exist"? And why should anything "be conducted with the perspective that God plays no part in the physical world"? Why should I as a theist conduct myself as if I were a deist? I believe God plays a part in the physical world, so why act otherwise? Articulately a model for divine action may be difficult, but it doesn't affect my belief that God does act.

    My second question: I'm wondering if there is a definition in which I don't need to "pretend to be an atheist or a deist". Maybe that's difficult. A related question: Do we actually need a succinct definition in which all clauses are acceptable to all participants? The article authors' definition could be modified to be:

    "In the science and religion dialog, the term "methodological naturalism" refers to the need for science to proceed as though either:
     
    a) God does not exist, OR
    b) God has no part to play in the physical world, OR
    c) The pattern of God's cooperative action in the physical world is normally extraordinarily consistent"

    In this way, atheists, deists, and theists could all agree on how to proceed with science. (ie. Gaps – like the formation of first life - are assumed to be gaps in our knowledge of the natural processes, and not gaps in the natural processes themselves). At the same time, none of us needs to act in a way contrary to our own metaphysical position. Ie. I can choose c) above, deists can choose b) and atheists can choose a).
     
    thanks,

    --
    Steve Martin (CSCA)
    http://evanevodialogue.blogspot.com

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Received on Sun Nov 25 16:39:56 2007