Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

Should have known better than to respond to a lawyer. Sorry, folks.
Dave

On Sun, 20 Aug 2006 09:13:38 -0400 "David Opderbeck"
<dopderbeck@gmail.com> writes:
First, there are many matters where the definitions are not obviously
contradictory, but they have no exemplification. For example, I define
"frfl" as "/Homo sapiens/ with naturally green hair." That involves only
natural phenomena, but no one is looking for frfls. When you get into
explanations which are not natural, I adopt some of them unquestioningly.
That's why I thank God for my food. But prayer is not a scientific
concept, even though the delimitation process is not effective.

This makes no sense at all and I can't see how it relates to whether the
notion of "strong" and "weak" MN is "incoherent." You could easily apply
the concept of "strong" and "weak" MN to the question of your "frfl."
Why is the frfl's hair green? Strong MN says there must be a
naturalistic explanation. Weak MN says other explanations might be valid
if there is no naturalistic explanation. I'd expect that, given what we
know about hair color, the best explanation for a few isolated frfl's is
a non-naturalistic one: some people decided to dye their hair green. If
frfl's are widely present in the population and after interviewing them
we learn most haven't been dying their hair, maybe there is a strictly
naturalistic explanation -- a mutation or something. Why is this a
problem?

As to "compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places," what kind of drivel are
you presenting? I said nothing about computing. I referred to
measurement, if my memory serves, of the fine constant, recently
announced.

I'm not "presenting" drivel, I'm responding to it. Your distinction
between "computing" and "measuring" here is just sophistry. You have to
do computations to measure the fine constant. Regardless, "science" no
longer consists of that which can be precisely measured, as you well
know, and that's the point I was making. We can run a current through a
device and continue to extend our measurement of the fine constant
(assuming it isn't a finite number), but we can't do those kinds of
experiments in large swathes of science. I don't think it's particularly
problematic that not every aspect of science is subject to repeatable
experiments -- do you?

As for your tests of philosophy beyond consistency, I can only conclude
that you haven't read many technical philosophy papers.

Well, I've read a few, and lots of books, but that's neither here nor
there as to the merits of the additional tests I mentioned. I do admire,
though, that you were able to wrap a naked argument from authority and an
ad hominem into a dependent clause of one sentence. That's the kind of
thing that makes this forum so much fun.

As to whatever you think to draw from Popper, he's passe.
Well , yeah. And the arguments in POS since Popper only make your
empiricism look sillier.

But I should perhaps add that consistency has no place in postmodernism
in regard to anything but whatever a postmodern declares to be true.

Uh... ok. And this is relevant how? Who said anything about
postmodernism? The tests I mentioned fit within a pretty traditional
foundationalist framework. What do you mean by "postmodernism" anyway?
The postmodern epistemology I've read isn't nearly so simplistic as this.
 I particlarly like Nancey Murphy's criteria for evaluating competing
truth-claim systems on a non-foundationalist basis. What do you think of
Murphy's criteria? Or was that sort of thing not covered in all those
"technical" papers you've been reading?

On 8/19/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> First, there are many matters where the definitions are not obviously
contradictory, but they have no exemplification. For example, I define
"frfl" as "/Homo sapiens/ with naturally green hair." That involves only
natural phenomena, but no one is looking for frfls. When you get into
explanations which are not natural, I adopt some of them unquestioningly.
That's why I thank God for my food. But prayer is not a scientific
concept, even though the delimitation process is not effective.
>
> As to "compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places," what kind of drivel are
you presenting? I said nothing about computing. I referred to
measurement, if my memory serves, of the fine constant, recently
announced. As to whatever you think to draw from Popper, he's passe.
>
> As for your tests of philosophy beyond consistency, I can only conclude
that you haven't read many technical philosophy papers. But I should
perhaps add that consistency has no place in postmodernism in regard to
anything but whatever a postmodern declares to be true.
> Dave
>
>
> On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 15:33:14 -0400 "David Opderbeck"
<dopderbeck@gmail.com> writes:
>
> By the way, I find the supposed distinction between strict and relaxed
MN relative to science incoherent.
>
> Why? What's incoherent about distinguishing "natural explanations
exclusively" from "natural explanations preferred in the first instance,
but not exclusively?"
>
> Scientific dicta are, at least in principle, subject to empirical test.
When things go well, there is accuracy to 13 places. When there is no
current test, there will be some that deny that a specific theory is
scientific.
>
> Maybe that was so in the 18th Century, but it ain't anymore. Can you
compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places? Popper came along precisely
because this sort of hyper-empricism doesn't work. And even Popper's
program, of course, has its problems.
>
> In contrast, there is seldom an empirical test for theology or
philosophy. The only empirical refutation I know for a philosophical
doctrine was for Schopenhauer's pessimism. The test for nonscientific
studies is essentially consistency....
>
> Not so. While consistency (or better stated, "logical consistency") is
one test of a philsophy or worldview, other tests include experience
(does it comport with human experience, both of the "outer" world that we
observe and the "inner" world of human consciousness, e.g., moral
consciousness) and practice (does the theory hold up in the laboratory of
life). "Consistency" is thus only a subset of "coherence," which is a
richer way of testing a philosophical position. Maybe philosophical
propositions generally can't be subject to rigorous mathematical tests,
but then, since Popper, neither can large swathes of what we call
"science."
>
> On 8/19/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Greg,
> > The fact is that Keith is right. "Science" is not "Wissenschaft" in
normal English usage. It is "Naturwissenschaft". Of course, there are
always those seeking the prestige of science in Christian Science,
Science of Mind, Creation Science, etc. Scientific dicta are, at least in
principle, subject to empirical test. When things go well, there is
accuracy to 13 places. When there is no current test, there will be some
that deny that a specific theory is scientific.
> >
> > In contrast, there is seldom an empirical test for theology or
philosophy. The only empirical refutation I know for a philosophical
doctrine was for Schopenhauer's pessimism. The test for nonscientific
studies is essentially consistency, although there may be special areas
where the interpretation of scriptures is involved. But I note that there
is not complete consistency among those who hold that the Bible is the
Word of God. Like it or not, such philosophies as materialism can be
consistent, along with Hegelian idealism. As one who follows in the
footsteps of Augustine, I reject both. But that does not mean that I can
prove the existence of a deity. Those who think they can overlook the
holes in their argument.
> >
> > I claim scriptural support for this last: Hebrews 11:6. The empirical
evidence against the latter part of the verse is found in doggerel: God's
plan had a hopeful beginning/ But man spoiled his chances by sinning./ We
hope that the story/ Will end in God's glory,/ But at present the other
side's winning.
> >
> > By the way, I find the supposed distinction between strict and
relaxed MN relative to science incoherent.
> > Dave
> >
> >
> > On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 12:35:52 -0400 (EDT) Gregory Arago <
gregoryarago@yahoo.ca> writes:
> >
> > "The whole point of the coining of the term by Paul deVries was to
distinguish the method of science from philosophical naturalism." - Keith
Miller
> >
> > Does anyone else out there ever get the feeling that, in trying so
hard to distinguish 'science' or 'the method of science' from 'mere
philosophy,' the chosen term 'methodological naturalism' is throwing out
the baby with the bath water? Natural philosophy and natural science -
are they really that different today to speak in such exclusivistic
terminology?
> >
> > It seems so pragmatic, so equivocal between science is naturalistic,
science is methodological, science is progressing toward perfection,
science is evolving, and science is *not* philosophical. Scientists don't
philosophize!? Kuhn and Popper are therefore passe.
> >
> > "MN is descriptive of the fact that science cannot investigate the
supernatural." - K. Miller
> >
> > Did it ever occur to proponents of (strong) MN that God might not
have wanted us to so thoroughly separate science from our knowledge of/
relationship with Him? Is there nothing scientific, for example, about
theology? Is there no scientific theology?
> >
> > In some people's versions of MN, science is SO silent on the
existence of God, our Creator, that we are left unable to hear.
> >
> > "Some non-theists see God as an unnecessary addition to a scientific
description of the universe, and therefore extend this to a philosophical
exclusion." - K. Miller
> >
> > And some theists perceive God as a necessarily distinct addition to
their scientific description of the universe, therefore extending their
philosophy into a source of exlusion and division.
> >
> > Arago
> >
> > ________________________________
> Now you can have a huge leap forward in email: get the new Yahoo! Mail.

> >
> >

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Received on Sun Aug 20 18:02:07 2006